

ON GARDENS

nature as matter
of expression

TITLE:
On Gardens:
Nature as Matter of Expression

PUBLISHER:
Ordem dos Arquitectos
Secção Regional Norte

EDITOR:
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PORTO, 2023
ISBN: 978-989-54638-9-3

The starting point for the construction of this book was the FILARCH symposium, the online conference at the Kodolányi János University, Budapest, Hungary on June 22-24, 2022. The images and texts are the exclusive responsibility of the authors, respecting the adopted spelling.
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DEDICATION

Pour ML
avec amour dans les roses de
Santa Teresinha
entourées au loin par les
couleurs des bougainvilliers.

Atravessei o jardim solitário e sem lua,
Correndo ao vento pelos caminhos fora,
Para tentar como outrora
Unir a minha alma à tua
(...)
Terror de te amar num sítio tão frágil como o mundo
Mal de te amar neste lugar de imperfeição
Onde tudo nos quebra e emudece
Onde tudo nos mente e nos separa.
(...)
A ti eu voltarei após o incerto
Calor de tantos gestos recebidos
Passados os tumultos e o deserto
Beijados os fantasmas, percorridos
Os murmúrios da terra indefinida.
(...)
Para ti eu criarei um dia puro
Livre como o vento e repetido
Como o florir das ondas ordenadas.

Sophia de Mello Breyner Andresen

To the Ukrainian people.

Invoking David and Goliath in
this hour of grief and suffering,
reminding us that the fight for
freedom comes with a high cost.
And that it is a long journey.
May courage be by our side in
building peace,
the highest summit in life.

A LINHA IMAGINÁRIA

O inverno e o inferno
De mãos dadas na Ucrânia
Perante a dor das mãos
As lágrimas nas mãos
A cobrir a cara
Onde fica essa vergonha
De perder o sol da vida?

Eles vivem ainda
Nos nossos sonhos
No nosso sofrimento
Fantasmas vivos
Na ressurreição
Do ódio e do amor.

E na esperança da vingança
de cobrir o sadismo
com excrementos de lama.
Um enterro digno.

Como deve o jovem ouvir os poetas?

Todos nós nos cosemos
com as linhas imaginárias
tentando ligar horizontes
presente passado e futuro
a algum sentido e ordem
das nossas vidas.
Linhas de fronteira
que vençam o caos e o sofrimento.

Toda a política é uma ficção.
que por vezes se torna nua demais,
crua demais,
mortes a mais,
suja demais.

Como deve o jovem ouvir os poetas?

Vemos a Ucrânia ao longe,
e saudamos com acenos largos
e sons arrastados. Os seus mortos.
Os cobardes saúdam o torturador
na sua tortura lenta
O monstro ri-se
da impotência,
do frio que aí vem.
Está a ganhar. Até quando?

Os monstros são o nosso pesadelo,
encarnando
a linha do insuportável
a pilha de corpos
o nojo em vômito.
Ergue-te Europa. Luta.

(Espera sentado como o Buda.
Veremos.)

Paralisados pelo medo,
pela fome e pelo frio,
ou paralisados pelo conforto,
pela solidariedade, pelas notícias.
Ergue-te Europa. Luta.

(Espera sentado como o Buda.
Veremos.)

Só os poetas nos podem salvar
esses mensageiros inconscientes de Deus.
Escrevemos à beira da morte
e à sua sombra
Esperamos o milagre
que nunca chega,
que chega sempre.

Os poetas são os mensageiros de Deus.
Como os músicos.
Que revelam
E anunciam ao mundo
Que tudo está cheio de beleza
Que tudo transborda de música.
E a beleza é a única coisa que temos,
a única coisa que resta no fim,
como uma promessa de fé.

Sozinhos e naufragos,
inundados pelo medo,
ancoramos os nossos corações
nas saudades de Deus
temendo o esquecimento
Daquele que nunca nos abandona.

Não nos abandones.
Não nos esqueças.

CONSTANTINO
PEREIRA
MARTINS

I would like to start by expressing my admiration for Professor Diogo Ferrer and thank him for his support in this endeavor. His style, serenity, and wisdom are truly inspiring.

To underline the crucial role that Borbála Jász and Zsolt Batori in organizing the FilArch annual event in Budapest at the Kodolányi János University - Research Centre for Art and Creative Industries, even in such stressful and uncertain times of war in Europe again, which is the root of this book. I would like to wish Borbála and Zsolt all the happiness in their new life.

This book would not have been possible without the excellence of the design work and composition of Vítor Alves that always excels in his good taste and perfection, but also the outstanding support in the review by Brian Onishi, extending in his person our greetings to Penn State Altoona and Rock Ethics Institute.

Last but not least, to the Centre for Classical and Humanistic Studies, to the University of Coimbra, and to the authors that built this book with me.

A final word of appreciation to all the members of FilArch that work for this academic international platform that aims to study and bridge Philosophy and Architecture.

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ABSTRACTS

ABSTRACTS

THE TEXTURE OF NATURE. ON THOMAS BROWNE'S PHILOSOPHY OF GARDEN

ALESSANDRO
MONTEFAMEGLIO

The purpose of this essay consists in reading Thomas Browne's treatise *The Garden of Cyrus*, published in 1658, with a specific attention to the role of the figure of the garden, aiming at circumscribing what, in the comprehensive account of Browne's philosophy of nature, can be considered as the elaboration of an original philosophy of garden. In the first part, we will introduce the main topics of the treatise from a narrative, historical and conceptual point of view, with a focus on the idea of quincunx. We will proceed analysing the Garden from the perspective of the architecture of the text itself, showing how Browne traces a correspondence between form and philosophical content. The last part will be precisely focusing on the figure of the garden, considered both as a methodological resource and as a relevant philosophical concept. In this last regard, the circumscription of Browne's philosophy of garden will move from a direct reading of the text to the comparison with specific instances and concepts belonging to contemporary thought.

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LANDSCAPE CRAFTMANSHIP: SUBTLE ARCHITECTURAL INTERVENTIONS IN LANDSCAPE

ANA
MUÑOZ-LÓPEZ

The transformation of the landscape and its relationship with architecture is a difficult task similar to surgery in which the fruitful results end up with an indissoluble merge between both parts making timeless constructions while in the cases where this is not achieved the results are catastrophic and the dissolution between them is heavily emphasised. The use of the landscape, both as a modifier agent and as an intervention material applied with traditional techniques, uses to result in a subtle operation where the union between architecture and environment is unbreakable. From the CIAM IV on, after the observations made on board of the *Patris II* where the attendees were marvelled by the integration of local architecture in the descending coasts of the Mediterranean, some architects started to conceive their projects considering the vernacular tradition and merging it with the new constructive systems creating a new regional identity which merges and preserves the landscape. One of the foreheads of this silent movement, the Greek Dimitris Pikionis made his intervention in the surrounds of

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the Acropolis of Athens creating two different pathways. In his intervention he modified the topography with the reuse of the stones from close demolitions, including, with this gesture, the memory of precedent landscape. Others, like the Italian Alberto Ponis, used the same logic in their interventions. In the Yatch Club made in Porto Rafael, Sardinia, he used the rock formations as the material of intervention generating, with the mixture of granite rocks and cement, the sinuous path that connects a beach with an abandoned bunker and also establishes interesting visual relationships with the coast itself and with the distant landscape.

KEYWORDS:

Landscape, Alberto Ponis, Dimitris Pikionis, Critical Regionalism, pathway.

ANA SOFIA
DE MATOS PINTO

THE GARDEN THAT FEEDS AND THE GARDEN OF THE FED

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The Palace of Vila Viçosa, home of the Braganças, is still one of the most impressive works of Portuguese civil architecture. As important as the building are its gardens and the typical landscape of Alentejo that surrounds the palace, whose construction began circa 1500. In the late 19th century, the Portuguese Royal family, who lived in the capital, Lisbon, often travelled to this house in Alentejo, where the regal protocol was softened, and the food was more Portuguese.

To explore the intimate relationship between the gardens of the palace, its architecture and, particularly, its food network, we focus on some of the royal meals that took place at the Palace of Vila Viçosa in the late 19th, early 20th century, during the last years of the Portuguese monarchy. These same meals will be studied through their menus. By accessing them, it is possible to better understand the dialogue established between some of the palace's green spaces – the Garden of the Dames, the Garden of Picadeiro, the Garden of Reguengo and the Preserve of Vila Viçosa –, its food network – the kitchen, the kitchen patio, and the dining room – and the food practices – its ingredients, its time.

THE GARDEN AGAINST MODERNITY: LAHORE, PARIS, AND KYOTO

ANTON HEINRICH
RENNESLAND

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In this paper, I argue how gardens provide an alternative vision for living in a city subjected to what I consider as a kinetic utopia that subjugates the city. I use Hartmut Rosa's (with Klaus Dörre and Stephan Lessenich) three crises of modernity – appropriation, acceleration, and activation – to further my discussion of a kinetic utopia and to frame how burnt-out forgetfulness, accelerated progress, and unlimited increase are fundamentally the problem of the city subjected to infinite mobilization. Against this backdrop, I argue that the garden is the laying bare of society, the necessary opening to danger, to vulnerability bringing forward remembering or resonance, slowness, and release-ment. To argue this, I provide three views on the garden that make it stand in opposition to the crisis of a kinetic utopia. The first is a focus on the Shalimar Gardens in Lahore, Pakistan, to argue remembrance. This provides the Islamic perspective as a hint at the remembrance of paradise lost and paradise to come. With this, I similarly discuss the views of the other two monotheistic religions, Judaism and Christianity, to present a peculiar tension between the present, the past (the Fall), and the future (as an eschatological vision). The second is the Tuileries Garden in Paris, France, for the slowness of everyday life. It is found in the middle of the Axe Historique from the Louvre pyramid to the Grande Arche. Its location at the heart of Paris shows the spleen of Baudelaire; the heart of the triumphalist march of globalization is a garden. Finally, the third is a focus on the Ryoan-ji Zen Garden in Kyoto, Japan, for releasement. This pays close attention to Zen Buddhism's expression of freedom within the garden as a reflection of Buddhism's movement from India to Japan that has cultivated an awareness of a space dedicated to cultivating the interior and exterior of the structure, alongside Daoist features, that reflect one's own consciousness.

KEYWORDS:

Garden, Modernity, Triple-A-Theory of Dynamic Stabilization

BASIA
NIKIFOROVA

LIFE BETWEEN SACRUM AND PROFANUM: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S GARDENERSHIP AND CONSTRUCTING

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The article is dedicated to the meaning of garden and house as environmental spaces in Wittgenstein's private life and philosophical investigations. He could not have reconciled himself to any of the Christian denominations of various dogmas, for example, the idea of God as Creator, as this doctrine did not shape in his own thinking. His letter that addressed the Garden Committee of the Trinity College in 1934 is very interesting because of his objections to their plans regarding the Fellows' Garden. Both the gardening and construction activities help him to feel the creator of harmony. Wittgenstein's words about the limits of language in communicating ethical or moral values generally opens the way of how to explain his public and private preferences and the relations with his family.

KEYWORDS:

Garden, Ecolinguistics, Environment, Moral Values, Natural Goodness, Religious Dogmata, Wittgenstein

BÉLA MESTER

CITY AGORA OR CITY GARDEN? AN URBANISTIC DILEMMA IN THE 19TH-CENTURY HUNGARY

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A novelty of the 19th-century history of Hungarian political ideas is the new phenomenon of the mass demonstrations; amongst them the most important ones were organised in the time of the revolution of 1848. In the second half of the century, mass demonstrations became permanent and usual elements of the Hungarian politics. Histories, functions and ideological backgrounds of these demonstrations are well-known in the Hungarian historiography, but their relationship with the urbanistic discussion of the same period is just a rarely researched field in the Hungarian scholarship. The present paper is focussed on the connection of the political history of Hungary and the cultural usage of the public realms, in the 19th century. The hypothesis of the paper is that there is a hidden tension between the new-type usages of the public realms as agorae for the political activities and as gardens for the recreations; the most important example is the changing function of the public realm in front of the National Museum from an open square of political demonstrations till the closed garden of recreation.

A PHENOMENOLOGY OF A JAPANESE REMEMBRANCE GARDEN

BRIAN HISAO
ONISHI

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In this paper, I use a Japanese Remembrance Garden on Seattle University's campus as an opportunity for a phenomenological investigation, arguing that the garden embodies both a tension between visibility and invisibility, and between bounded space and excess. To do this, I will appeal to Robert Pogue Harrison's *Gardens: An Essay on the Human Condition* and expand on what he calls the "phenomenological conversion" of garden experiences. I will also appeal to Carolyn Merchant's *Reinventing Eden* as a way of incorporating garden narratives, which challenge the narrative of conquest and control that we find in the Biblical story of Eden. Finally, I will look to Merleau-Ponty's work in *The Visible and the Invisible* to argue that this tension in the garden between visibility and invisibility mirrors the challenge of internment thrust upon Japanese Americans during World War II. By using the Japanese Memorial Garden as an opportunity for phenomenological investigation, I highlight issues of visibility in race relations, and demonstrate the importance of material memory in shared spaces and on university campuses.

THE HETEROTOPIA OF THE GARDEN: THE GARDEN AS AN ARCHITECTURAL SKETCH TO THINK ABOUT SOCIETY THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT

CATARINA PALMA
DE FIGUEIREDO;
RUI MEALHA

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In this essay, we seek to investigate the possibility of exploring the garden as a space/device that allows us to think about society. For this purpose, we understand its interdisciplinary condition both in spatial, historical, cultural, behavioural and sociological valences, which the concept of the garden represents - questioning and validating this reasoning, through Michel Foucault's theoretical construction of the concept of heterotopia.

In an interpretative way, by relating different data and the author's analysis of the proposed problem, we intend to expand the field of vision on the interaction between the human being and the garden, contributing to the discipline of architecture, anthropology, psychology, sociology, philosophy, and botany. Thus, these disciplines compose the vast referential complexes, that build a clear enough image to investi-

gate the possibility of thinking of these spaces as an interpretative way to read societies. The garden constitutes a dynamic process of relations in constant mutation, progressively accumulating its complexity due to its interdisciplinarity.

We seek to clarify the processes that build the notion of the garden from the individual's perspective, and consequently from the communities' perspective, operated by their experience and interpretation of the space. For this purpose, we frame the research window that we named *Towards an Ontology of the Garden*, where the interpretative processes of the individual are critically analyzed, related to his means of *perception, representation, and apprehension of the garden* (henceforth named *communication process* in this essay).

We reflect on the possibility of the construction of a *shared image* - of certain commonly shared mental images of the communities - associated with the idea of a certain place. These images may represent codes for the way individuals interpret, live, and think about a place. The shared image implies the experience of the same types of landscape and, consequently, of the same cultures by a determined group of individuals.

These notions make it possible to think about the space's social environment and its behavioural norms – which characterizes the way people occupy a certain space - and, therefore, to think about the way individuals interact and perceive that space.

The individual in this essay is thought to be a valid representation of society, in the way he portrays a personification of the designs of the individual, and therefore, could build a generalized image of the interaction between the human being and the environment.

In this essay, we intend to formulate a set of reflections that allow us to understand how the garden can be read as an architectural device in the understanding of societies, given its interdisciplinary favourable conditions, which place these spaces in a key theoretical position in the city making it possible to make these associations. Thus, we aim at some aspects that could be of interest in the approach to a new epistemology of criteria of analysis of the garden in the city.ⁱ

KEYWORDS:

Garden, Heterotopia, M. Foucault, Interdisciplinarity, Society, Architecture

ⁱ) This essay is eminently theoretical juxtaposing ideas and concepts that further investigate the topic of concern.

ON FEAR, SPACE AND MOVING LANDSCAPES: THE CASE OF THE ACHUAR GARDEN

CHRISTOS
MONTSENIGOS

P. 145

This paper will explore a case of convergence between garden and forest under the lens of a horticultural practice. Situated within the dense Amazonian Forest divided between Peru and Ecuador, the site in question is managed by the tribes of the Achuar peoples in the logic of a regenerative alteration between cultivation and fallow. Such a situated practice of intermittent management allows for plots of land to remain untended for large periods of time, letting them fuse back into the forest, whilst producing a symbolic system of landscapes that move in space and time. Drawing evidence from the ethnological accounts of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, the presentation will seek to understand the ways in which the Achuar regulate prohibition and proximity to the forest, turning their gardens into complex spatial configurations of vegetal matter and cultural memory. Descola's systematic critique of the nature-culture divide imparts to the Achuar the status of a counterexample, their ancestral gardening seen as a minor practice suggesting alternative political ecologies capable of transcending locality. Viveiros de Castro's observations on the particular sense of danger that is prominent in Amerindian thinking, allows in turn for a renewed understanding of the spatial implications of fear, resonating with contemporary environmental anxieties. Facing the constant risk of their gardens dissolving back into the forest, the Achuar transform their environment in terms of a delicate and reversible spatial production. Through the conditions set by the global climate emergency, western landscape practice is also lapsing into a similar state of precariousness. Juxtaposing the moving gardens of the Achuar with the rigidly structured landscapes of western experience, raises the question of whether there are similar perspectives to be found within emerging practices of ecological reconstruction and alternative approaches to land management.

CONSTANTINOS
V. PROIMOS

A NEO-CONSTRUCTIVIST'S VISION. ZAHA HADID'S DESIGN OF FREEDOM SQUARE AND ITS MOAT GARDENS IN NICOSIA, CYPRUS

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In the words of Zaha Hadid Architects who won the competition for the refurbishment of Eleftheria (Freedom) Square in Nicosia, Cyprus (2005-2020), their proposed plan is a “historically significant architectural intervention” which aspires to connect the old town, fortified by the Venetians, with the modern city and “can become a catalyst to unify the last divided capital of Europe.” The refurbishment, along with its exuberant moat gardens covers an area of 35300 square meters and, according to the architects, proposes “a bold vision of coherence and continuity,” which has however been met with a lot of skepticism from the part of locals. The expressed concerns about the project are that Hadid architects seem to rival the monument of Venetian walls with the massive scale of their design, do not encourage public interaction within the square and do not take under consideration the city climate, scale and materiality. In this paper I shall first take these concerns under serious consideration in an effort to assess them in view of Hadid architects' method that is termed as parametricism. I shall investigate parametric design as generational technique, in accordance with, but also, contrary to, Patrick Schumacher's claims that it enunciates “a new style in the sense of an epochal phenomenon.” Second, in view of the voiced criticism of the square refurbishment, I shall also consider Hal Foster's thesis about the “imageability” which becomes the primary criterion of building construction, stressing formal expression above all, while essentially remaining on the level of decorated shed. Drawing from the phenomenological tradition, I shall question the application of digitized and iconic architectural interventions in historical urban contexts tied with issues of memory and past ways of life.

FAY ZIKA

THE GARDEN AS MICROCOSM AND COSMOS

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After a series of adventures in the so-called cosmopolitan world of the 18th century, Voltaire's *Candide* closes with the proposal that “we must cultivate our garden”. Whereas Voltaire uses the garden as a critical contrast to the evils incurred by what today we would call globalization, my talk aims to show how the migration and cultivation of plants

offers a variety of strategies for connecting the local with the global, pointing to an expanded ecological aesthetics. The fact that the garden is a *locus* where nature and culture meet, the double meaning of ‘cultivation’ –both of the land and of the mind-, turn the garden into a focal point within this discussion. My paper draws on theoretical support from three sources: philosopher and social theorist Michel Foucault's observation in his essay *Heterotopias* that “The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and yet it is also the totality of the world”; landscape architect Gilles Clément's notion of the *jardin planétaire*, which plays on the term's Greek etymology between planetary (*πλανητικός*) and errant/migrant (*πλάνητας*); garden and nutrition theorist Michael Pollan's view of the garden as “second nature” and the connection between cultivation and a better way of living (*εὖ ζῆν*). To further illustrate the connection between the inward-looking microcosm of the garden with an outward-looking access to the *cosmos*, I will end with a discussion of a couple of relevant projects by two contemporary Greek artists: Nikos Papadopoulos' *Flora Filopappou: From City of Rocks to Garden* (2018) and Natasa Biza's *A Plan for Planting* (2014).

MACHINE VERSUS GARDEN – THE IDEAS OF METROPOLIS AND REGIONAL CITY IN THE THOUGHT OF LEWIS MUMFORD

GÁBOR KOVÁCS

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Lewis Mumford (1895-1990) was a prominent figure of the first generation of American cultural criticism whose life work embraced a wide spectrum of activities: cultural and historical philosophy, ecology, sociology, literary criticism, histories of architecture, city and art, city-planning. This embarrassing many-sidedness based on his conception of intellectual role model: he defined himself as a generalist opposing the narrowminded specialist who restricts himself/herself to a narrow part of reality. However, his main intention was to bring the ecological sensitive cultural criticism to the field of city planning. He was a leading figure of the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) founded in 1923. This group elaborated the idea of an alternative urbanization based the concept of regional city. Lewis Mumford was the theoretician of the RPAA. In the centre of his thought was the binary opposition of metropolis and regional city. The main orientation points for him were Patrick Geddes (1854-1932), the Scottish city planner and Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928), the founder of the garden city movement. I will, in my paper, to give a critical reconstruction of Mumford's theory focusing on the meeting points of cultural criticism and city-planning

JOÃO CEPEDA

FRAGMENTS OF A DISCOURSE: *BETWEEN FORM AND EMPTINESS – TRACES OF THE JAPANESE GARDEN’S “INTERVAL”*

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Japanese gardens constitute one of the country’s exquisite imprints, having caught the attention of numerous authors since 19th century, who studied them through several different approaches – culturally, artistically, architecturally, or even phenomenologically. However, a subliminal (yet essential) Japanese cultural feature seems to have been generally forgotten, or perhaps, (naturally?) overlooked, as far as the Western’s perspective is concerned. Based on these indications, and on the (un)translatable spirit of this disregarded conception, which this essay chooses to name as *interval*, this text inspects this (little-known to the West) existential notion, rehearsing an in-depth interpretation of the potentiating effects that, from a Western’s perspective, it may have had in Japanese landscaping-design philosophy. From the country’s historical gardening-practice, and following some Western architects who revealed true fascination with Japanese gardening-aesthetics (as Conder, Taut, or Nitschke), this research focuses in the Japanese architectural-landscaping atmospheres that, as Taut suggested, the eyes look for, but (apparently) do not see – building upon the theoretical resonances and practical exchanges that, we believe, can be found *between* the *interval* and the Japanese garden. Grasping some traces of its possible reverberations on the Japanese garden-design ‘*idearum*’, it is in this absence *in-between* form that this *interval* invites us to embark.

LUCIANO
PESSOA

SOBRE MUNDOS INTERIORES, PAISAGENS, E A NATUREZA DO OLHAR

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Nas relações entre natureza e paisagem, entre natureza e jardim, entre natureza e arte, é possível identificar uma mesma questão, uma área de contraste, alocada, não sem alguma tensão, entre dois movimentos aparentemente distintos: de um lado, certa autonomia dos devires próprios da natureza; e, de outro lado, um suposto controle e intencionalidade na ação humana sobre determinada natureza, nas elaborações entendidas como paisagem, jardim, e nas artes. A partir dessa colocação, propomos uma questão. Se tal tensão pode ser observada na relação entre o ser humano e a natureza, poderá sê-lo também na relação entre o ser humano e a natureza de sua interioridade, de seu pensamento, de seu olhar? Nesse sentido, poderíamos entender também o inconsciente, tal

como conceituado na psicologia moderna, como uma forma de natureza em nossa interioridade? É o que tentaremos discutir neste ensaio.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE:

Natureza, Paisagem, Jardim, Arte, Interioridade.

LANDSCAPE AND PEOPLE: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE

ROBERTO
FRANZINI
TIBALDEO
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The first thesis I would like to argue in this chapter is that, in addition to its aesthetic meaning, the notion of landscape is endowed with an ethical and political value, capable of shedding light on the socio-economic, political, and cultural dynamics that transform the places where we live in the globalized epoch. In this sense, landscape turns into an interpretative key capable of fostering critical awareness of the ways of living, as well as guidelines for territorial planning.

Secondly, I endeavour to highlight that the ethical-political meaning of landscape provides a hermeneutical framework for the enhancement of democracy. A review of the latter in the light of the combination of responsibility and participation offers innovative perspectives and strategies to address the problem of contemporary deterritorialization and achieve a more balanced, sustainable and just development.

These aims will be achieved through a philosophical reflection on individual and collective freedom, and on its active and transformative commitment towards reality. I plan to focus on the two-faced Janus of human freedom: on the one hand, freedom is oriented towards the past and aims to identify the reasons for the current crisis; on the other, it is oriented towards the future in the endeavour to imagine alternative scenarios of territorial development, and design effective, far-sighted interventions that respect the complexity of the relationship between place, people, and culture, and are able to contribute to the reconstruction of society, through the combination of “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives.

ROSARIO ASSUNTO, THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE GARDEN

MOIRIKA REKER

Philosophy, in its long tradition of giving sense to our existence and experience of the world, would not shy away from taking the Garden as an object of study. If indeed one can trace a liaison between gardens

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and philosophy back to antiquity, presently the garden has come to occupy a preeminent place – as this conference testifies. There are several authors that have contributed to such a rise in attention, but there is one that absolutely cannot be left out: Rosario Assunto (1915-1994), the Italian philosopher that brought the garden to the centre of philosophical inquiry in times when gardens were taken as devoid of philosophical density. With an overview of the essential points of his work, our short essay aims to assert Rosario Assunto's crucial contribution to this field of study, as we believe his profound and acute reflection offers powerful insights for further reflecting on the relevance of gardens in the contemporary (and future) city.

SÉRGIO PINTO
AMORIM

HORTUS CONCLUSUS: FROM EDEN TO METAPOLIS

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The text develops a critical reflection about what we can call 'green space' in the actual space organization complexity.

Based in a qualitative perspective about the meaning of space, from the concepts of *spatium* (generic and abstract space – based on Cartesianism) and *Raum* (place or concrete physical space – based on human/existential space introduced by Otto Bollnow/Christian Norberg-Schulz), it is intended to identify, characterize, and categorize certain essential aspects of man's relationship with the world through 'green spaces' (form, function and atmosphere), from the idyllic garden of paradise conception (Garden of Eden – Book of Genesis) to the nihilistic conception of 'green' territories found in today's dispersed urbanity of the Metapolis (François Ascher).

The 'enclosed garden' is, in this circumstance, a basic abstract concept from which several conscious/unconscious space structuring can be identified at different moments in human history. The idea of an area delimited by organizing element(s) is the expression of the intent to impose an order in space, which can assume different forms, materialities and scales (architecture, urbanism, territory), exposing different relationships between culture and nature. In these circumstances, the human existence/thinking while structures the artificial habitat also interferes with the natural environment. The inevitability of the human actions potentiates different 'space anatomies', or in other words, certain 'topologies' in the world, following Heidegger's meaning (from Norberg-Schulz): space as a system of relationships that derives from our positioning relative to 'things'.

The Hortus Conclusus is, here, considered a concept that already has a formality of enclosure of a humanized 'green space'. Therefore, from this perspective of the Human/Nature relationship, through some examples (from the simple *terrarium* to the natural parks and reserves in a vast territorial area), it is important to identify, characterize, and categorize how this portion of space is framed by 'built elements', which were – and are – the result from the intentionality and rationality of 'knowing how to do' (architectural design practice).

KEYWORDS:

Space, Place, Form, Phenomenology, Architectural Design Practice

GARDEN, WALKS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL

TOMAS
KAČERAUSKAS

P. 252

The chapter, which covers philosophical, communicative, and educational issues, examines four schools of ancient philosophy concerning the garden environment and walks in it. On the one hand, the garden indicates an exit both from the urban environment and from everyday activities, as well as from instrumental thinking. On the other, such a daily practice as a walk is associated with a "bypass", i.e. metaphysical thinking. For example, when talking about pleasures, Epicurus paid attention not to satisfy the needs of the body, but to mental activities that are cultivated among friends. Stoa was a space for both festive narratives and everyday meetings. Zeno chose Poecile Stoa for his teaching and discussion of the possibility to meet both virtue and truth while walking with his students. Thus, the stoa was a safe and open place for all passers-by to develop their virtues. As for Aristotelian Lyceum, the walk has several layers. Here one learned by walking after the teacher in the covered galleries. In addition, the walk can be called an interdisciplinary study, which was matched by the multifunctional environment of the lyceum. Finally, the walk is related to Aristotle's first substance and the scientific approach "from beneath". This later evolved into empirical and field research. The platonic garden out of the city – the academy – also indicates several things. First, in choosing an academic path, we seek to be heroes of wisdom and virtue. Second, the academic environment represents liberation by breaking away from what is irrelevant and untrue. Third, the dead people buried on both sides of our path to the garden of the Academy are full-fledged interlocutors in our communication with ancient philosophers. The paper

ABSTRACTS

concludes with a consideration of Eco's walks through the woods of imagination and fiction, which emerge as an alternative to philosophy, which also requires a "way out" and a "bypass".

KEYWORDS:

Garden out of Town, Walks, Epicurean Gardens, School of Stoa, Aristotelian Lyceum, Platonic Academy

FOREWORD

FOREWORD

CONSTANTINO
PEREIRA
MARTINS

“E como dois antigos namorados
Noturnamente triste e enlaçados
Nós entraremos nos jardins da morte.”

Vinicius de Moraes, *Soneto da hora final*

There is an ancient and unsolved battle between Culture and Nature. The only place where we could find an expression of truce was through the creation of gardens. From the beginning, the relationship of man with nature is usually hostile and based on struggle and survival, but the garden was a symbol of the domestication of the wild, the victory of reason, elegance, and grace. There is a long tradition, in different civilizations and eras, of the cultivation of gardens, of the cultivation of natural beauty. The beauty has a strong connection and relation with our senses. From the look to the touch, the ordered nature is a great source of pleasure to all senses, revealing the nose as king along with the perception of smell that takes an important role in the contemplation and enjoyment of a garden. Time is a physical concept in a garden. We can see the seasons unfold through the colors, the leaves, the branches, and the water. A garden is an honest and humble reminder of our own fragility and temporality. It stretches to the sun or the snow, the flower or the tree, and from them all, a lesson echoes in unity: seek peace and you shall find it, here is a place of joy and community. Laying down or just strolling, babies and elders, men and women, all taking part in this arranged and natural intermission in the fight for life. It sounds like even the cry of a children can be harmoniously mixed with the singing of the birds above in the trees. Or with the lovers embraced in the grass, savoring the suspension of time. They all seem untouchable. With silence as a background orchestra or just the birds punctuating the hours of the day. This suspension in time is probably one of the great virtues of a beautiful garden.

The living gardens inhabit our memories, experiences, and present. Most of us know well the pleasure of a walk under the bare branches of trees in winter, the delight of lying under the shade of a tree in summer, with a sleeping child on our chest, our whole life there in one perfect exhalation, or even simply sitting on a bench watching life unfold. Ever since I was a child, I have had a fascination with gardens.

When I was small, I loved the park in my mother's homeland in Vizela, where I swam in the river. Still while I was young, the hours were endless studying and dating in the Gulbenkian and Lumiar gardens, Museu do Traje, and also as an adult becoming a man for the first time, with all that this implies, in the Parque (de São João) da Ponte in Braga. Gardens throughout life accompany us, and for those who love them, a relationship of wonder and affection is always established, as if our gaze could have the same care as the hands of the gardeners who feed it. In fact, between us and the gardeners, there is a secret aesthetic pact: they work with the certainty that someone will admire their continuous gestures without anyone knowing. There is a life in every garden, which could extend from emptiness and solitude as in Parque D. Carlos I in winter, to the fullness of summer life in Parque Ibirapuera in São Paulo, full of families, children, athletes, games, and music. Or also the possibility of witnessing the natural sublime in Parque Terra Nostra in Furnas, and the island itself, an immense garden, in which we feel humble and grateful to belong and to witness the beauty of God's work. And then of course those we would like to have lived in and never visited, like the one in Curitiba, several in England, and many others. There are many kinds of gardens, and it is not the place here to expose their vastness. But just a word for those submerged oceanic gardens that we fly over in snorkeling, suspended in underwater landscapes, infinite in detail. These ocean gardens, hidden at first glance, hold their very special place of communion and secrecy for all who visit them.

Each person will have his or her own garden. With its memories and affections scattered through the days, plants and trees witness that presence, that specific day. With sun, with wind, with rain, with cold. The garden preserves the last stronghold of uselessness, freedom, contemplation, and flaneurism, of life in the present. In the garden, no one is attached to anyone. Nobody is bound to do anything. Except, to be in the garden. And this occurs even though the garden today is full of activities and events. Everything that is of the order of passion and the wild is threatened. Chance is a drive to be eradicated. The garden, between existence and dwelling, is suspended in a non-place, where solitude is still acceptable. There is a particular beauty and consolation in every garden.

Of course, the relationship between Philosophy and gardens is also ancient. From the garden of Epicurus to Wittgenstein who worked as a gardener in a monastery. The sacred, or a religious feeling, could also arise in this relationship with nature. But usually, the garden is

interpreted and understood nowadays alongside the notions of landscape and ecology, or under that big notion of Philosophy of the city. The emphasis on the garden as a public space reveals a political, sociological, and anthropological dimension that has gained a new volume under the public health global emergency that we have lived in for the past two years, exposing our need for relaxation and open pure air. Basic things, elementary teachings, and lessons that most of us might have forgotten and that were brutally reminded: the need of the other, the interdependent society that we have built, the global multiple complexities, the crucial role of science or inversely the rise of panic, suspicion or conspiracy disorders and delusions. The garden rises above all the discussions and re-enforced its old essence of a peaceful setting, connection with oneself or others, escape space, and basic promoter of mental health that we all needed more than ever. A sign that there is more to life beyond the screens where we all seem to be captured, that there is a time and a rhythm above the artificial ordinance of our cities, politics, and media.

The philosophical gardens are also an ancient dream of reclusion and detachment. We all are left with the possibility to imagine the garden of Epicurus, away from the *polis* and its endless and pointless battles, looking for the simplicity and the pleasures of life. Sharing the care for each other and the *Tetrapharmakos* mantra against suffering and angst: *don't fear god, don't worry about death, what is good is easy to get, what is terrible is easy to endure*. Easily said than done. And maybe even more difficult to understand in our times of technology and sedentary lifestyle, locked in our digital caves without walking, hunting, or even loving. Walt Whitman said it best: *Something startles me where I thought I was safest; I withdraw from the still woods I loved; I will not go now on the pastures to walk; I will not strip the clothes from my body to meet my lover the sea; I will not touch my flesh to the earth, as to other flesh, to renew me*. Today the philosophical gardens sound utopian, if not childish or foolish. Too naive. The only remnant of its strength and beauty remains in the pleasure we take in gardening, caring for the plants and trees, or effortlessly reading a book in the garden. Either way, the philosophical pleasure is diluted in gestures. It has become natural. Perhaps it's better that way. *The gardener does not love to talk*. And we can feel the truth in this, the beauty of silence. That's why poetry is the highest form of writing we have created. Alongside mathematics and music, poetry is full of silence. The prose is as infinite as running. One always feels it could go on forever.

Writing forever and not saying anything. Throwing your life away like a bricklayer, word after word, words on top of other words. You can't do that in Poetry.

The living garden is surrounded by threats, plastic gardens, huge green lawns, ornamentation, and quick enjoyment. Kant spoke of ornamental gardens. Decoration and composition. Things that will belong to the world of the pleasant, analogies, imitations, and simulacrum. Problems of taste. *The transition (...) without too violent a leap*, accordingly to the contemporary logic of the pleasant, the moderately pleasant.

But of all the philosophical gardens there is one that rises above the rest because of its gardener: Wittgenstein. There are many possible entries into Wittgenstein's work, life, and thought. He lived for a while on a cliff, and that, itself, reveals vertigo, an attraction to the abyss and to the merge with nature, with raw energy. There are men who feel this need to be tested to the limit, to be close to the limit and survive it; To connect to a wild and authentic side of life. There is a need for reconnection with nature, but also isolation, from the noise of the world, a renewed stoicism. As in Thoreau's case. Living in the forest is not an experience for the faint of heart. Both internally and externally. Perhaps one way to get a glimpse of the difficulties and character required to undo such a journey is the documentary *Alone* at Lake Baikal with Sylvain Tesson. A glimpse from our couches into the 180-day retreat, seclusion, and asceticism and all it involves, in human relationships, animals and nature. A plunge into oneself, into solitude.

The garden hides the fear of nature, of what is wild and untamed. It is a dialectic of fear and trust. Which could also be expanded and reinterpreted in light of a hermeneutical difference between superstition and faith (*fear/false science vs. trust*), or wisdom and faith (*cold vs. passion*).

What I consider essential is to carry out the work of enlightenment with courage: otherwise, it becomes just a clever game. (...) One could put a price on thoughts. Some cost a lot, others a little. And how does one pay for thoughts? The answer, I think, is: with courage.

Wittgenstein combines the courage of action and the courage of thought. He is indeed a man of singular stature. Several events substantiate this rarity. We could mention that his Notebooks are from wartime, his multiplicity of tastes and talents, of having been a gardener and primary school teacher, or simply the fact that he donated his fortune. Wittgenstein is a particular kind of man, one who volunteers for the war. This would certainly shock most intellectuals and schol-

ars of our time, so much so that they are invested with cowardice and small-mindedness. And then one gets into the voracity and plundering of the authentic. The great terror of Kierkegaard. Nothing new. Repetition of repetition. Fortunately, the thought has survived, and even letters attesting to its uniqueness and courage:

(To B. Russell, 6.8.1920) *Lieber Russell! (...) At the moment I'm spending my holidays as a gardener's assistant in the nurseries of the monastery of Klosterneuburg near Vienna. I have to work solidly the whole day through, which is good. - My inner life is nothing to write home about. - When shall we see one another again? Perhaps never. Every day I think of Pinsent. He took half my life away with him. The devil will take the other half. In the meantime I am, as always, Your devoted friend.*

The confession of his homosexuality still remains absent from most research to this day, not that this alone was a source of great astonishment, debate, and deepening, but because it was probably the source of some inner anguish and despair, suicide always being that last cliff to jump over and first philosophical question to ask. And of course, the existential experience of all thinkers, and in particular, those connected to Philosophy, always pushes them at some point towards a steeper cliff. The temptation to give up. To abandon everything and never come back. To never write a word again. Especially philosophical. To abandon everything and be something else: bricklayer, cook, gardener, sailor, lighthouse keeper, carpenter...

(From F. P. Ramsey, 20.2.1924) *I am so sorry you are using up all your strength struggling with your surroundings; it must be terribly difficult with the other teachers. Are you staying on in Puchberg? When I saw you, you had some idea of leaving if it got too impossible, and becoming a gardener.*

It should be noted that Wittgenstein was not an author who devoted a specific part of his work to the religious question, with one exception, and therefore this approach is a short excursus into his philosophy. In this sense, we will give an account by notes and indications, as he himself did, of these matters. The most important text, also relevant for its historical dating, is the Notebooks 1914-1916. There is a general interpretation of mysticism that is partially true. There are indications to this effect, the strongest written on 25.5.15: *The urge towards the mystical comes from the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not touched at all.* Since Wittgenstein works by indications

pointing to the problems, it is not convenient to stare at the finger. Another indication of this feeling is concerning an experience of the unity of life, of the perception of life as a whole, which reinforces the deeper and etymological interpretation of the religious sense: *Aesthetically, the miracle is that the world exists. That there is what there is.* This feeling of ontological perplexity over Being and not Nothingness might be clear enough were it not for the initial aesthetic reservation. Of course, beauty can be the expression of something deeper, in relation to the sublime, and does not annul the paradigmatic character of the statement. Wittgenstein works, not without anguish, the limit of limits, of meaning and knowledge, of what can and cannot be clearly expressed. But he also takes risks. *To believe in God means to see that life has meaning.* The problem is complex in this fine work of the limits between knowing and believing. *Fear in the face of death is the best sign of a false, i.e., a bad, life.* We can interpret these passages in the light of the problem of what can and cannot be said or as a process of inquiry into the nature of philosophical problems and philosophical methods. It surprises, and perhaps in that surprise lies the mystical emphasis, an improbability. Another possibility of confronting the problem within the classical corpus of analysis is in the *Tractatus*, as the final result and clarification of the *Notebooks*.

In this sense, and regardless the forms of relationship or evolution between the two texts, the correspondences are clear. It is in the final part of the *Tractatus* (6.432 - 6.54) that the interpretation of mysticism is most strongly developed. Once again the amazement of the world exists as mystical amazement in the sense of a totality. And this is rephrased in 6.522: *There is, however, the inexpressible. It is what is revealed, it is the mystic.* Thus, and taking into account what can be said or not said, this silence that Wittgenstein brings back from the battlefield is now a silence that reveals itself. It is not an empty silence. *After the search for a correct method of philosophy, one must, so to speak, throw away the ladder, after having climbed it.*

More radically: *What is the goal of philosophy? To show the fly out of the bottle.* There is something mysterious in the opposition of these two propositions, which goes beyond the problem of interiority and communicability. Perhaps the relationship with God in war makes Wittgenstein understand the limits of philosophical expression itself. Of what is intuited in the trench, and of thinking in times of war, there is something unspeakable that remains buried there on the battlefield. It cannot be told within the clear limits of knowledge and propositions,

it lies between soliloquy and autobiography, in the monologue of the writing of the self. Wittgenstein's quest only points, in this search for logical and enunciative clarity, to a desire for transcendence, and the work of Philosophy as a work on oneself, of interrelation and destruction.

Beyond the limits, faith. And there the demonstration game is not necessary. It has to do with the heart. It has to do with trust. It can come from our experience and suffering. But it is not peaceful, you must fight. It's about a different plane where you risk things, as a way of life. *Faith is not an opinion but a state.* Beyond an explanatory framework of a negative theology, Wittgenstein's relationship to religion is strong. Unlike the perception and interpretation of analytic philosophy in general, Wittgenstein is inhabited by a religious experience. Of his times of seclusion in Norway, Russell will reveal in a letter: *We discussed his book [the Tractatus] every day I had felt in his book a flavour of mysticism, but ended astonished when I found that he has become a complete mystic. He reads people like Kierkegaard and Angelus Silesius, and he seriously contemplates becoming a monk. It all started from William James's Varieties of Religious Experience and grew (not unnaturally) during the winter he spent alone in Norway before the war, when he was nearly mad.* He went to the Great War to look death in the eye and become a decent man, and to read the Gospels according to Tolstoy. The scattered indications on the religious question in his classic corpus are not the source that displays most clearly what we see here. As is well known, Wittgenstein considered Kierkegaard a saint, and although he did not consider himself a religious man, he could not avoid seeing the problems from a religious point of view. Nevertheless, he went to mass, it was obligatory, but he prayed daily when in Italy he was a prisoner of war. Faith and religion had to be a form of life. That was the meaning of being Christian, to be so through action. Although his Judaism had acquired a weight of existential consciousness, he admired Christianity. His Catholic funeral, although problematic, was held. He had a wonderful life.

A cemetery can also be a garden. And it's quite interesting to see the relation of the last resting place with nature. And if the garden, or the gardening, exists towards cure and therapy, or care and cure, it's quite amazing that the garden is the stronghold and trench of the idea, open and exposed, that beauty is cultivated. It is a process, it takes work, it is fragile, and it depends on continuous care. Even if the gardeners' work takes place in apparent invisibility. Wittgenstein's thought

can only be understood by someone who walks, who wanders. There is a mobile and peripatetic nature to the writing. Ethics and aesthetics, the garden connect the macro and the micro.

Maybe all of this excursion through the thought of Wittgenstein could help us to see better and enter a more mystical and religious part of the garden. From the Christian tradition, Saint Augustin or St. Hildegard, where the garden is divided, earthly and eternal, city of men, city of God, matter and soul, to the unity of the oriental garden oriented to peace and zen, unity of all with all.

The garden wants to suspend the relationship of time with movement. Like an embrace. *Há um corpo que é teu enquanto o reténs nos braços*. The Japanese garden, the Zen garden, is the transcendental immanent, a praise of the poetry of nature, in celebration of the seasons and cycles of life. This depth in understanding life is on the surface. The garden floats in that enormous fragility of Humanity, between the essential care that goes from memory to oblivion, that blank nothingness, the final abode of us all. Or as David Mourão-Ferreira said in his songbook:

(...)

*Há-de vir um Natal e será o primeiro
em que o Nada retome a cor do Infinito*

(...)

*There will come a Christmas and it will be the first
in which Nothingness takes on the color of Infinity*

Nature as a sanctuary is not an immediate perception. It requires listening, patience, surrender, and contemplation. And humility. It sounds complicated but it is simple. Remembering the simple and forgotten things almost always involves going back to the ancient Greeks and revisiting them as someone who once told us great truths but which we have forgotten over the years. It often is the case that we forget what our parents once told us. In our culture this attention to nature and having in it, and through it, our interlocutor and dialogue has long since been forgotten, but it was in fact the beginning of all philosophy. It was a passage from mythology to an attempt at a rational understanding of things, so to speak. It was a leap in Ancient Greece from the mythology of the forces of the world, and the multiple gods, to the age of reason. Of course, this is a round-trip ticket, and we often return to myths and magic to understand the real. Even what we today call pre-Socratics

often has this shadow of something still quite childish and simplistic, but nothing could be more mistaken in this exchange between primitive images and primordial images of thought, and as Nietzsche identifies, perhaps everything was already present in the pre-Socratics: the struggle between unity and multiplicity, substance and becoming, etc. We have to move away from the preconceived patronizing of magical and hermeneutical thinking to a contemporary view of these perspectives and their value. To return again to nature, to *Physis* in this search for the secret nature of things, to an *Archē* as an explanatory principle, and through this *Physis* to rediscover Metaphysics, and the depth of the world, which today is so painfully dragged along by appearances. And we have all asked ourselves these same questions: what is the origin of life? where do we come from? what is the principle of the world? how to understand the mystery of existence? the mystery of being? Returning to the pre-Socratic classics, we see with amazement how incredible and marvelous even today the timeliness of the atomistic theses, how Zenon's thought on movement divined the cinema, or even Anaximander's mysterious *apeiron*, all provoke in us a shiver for the intelligence and vision of these far-off thinkers.

Since the caves, men have been in love with nature. Seen from the outside, at a distance. Even today we see on those cave walls mirrored the mystery of this attraction of ours for the beauty. But it was not only the beauty that was being captured. It was also the artist, his gaze, the collective emotion of a hunt, and at the same time the possibility of grasping the moment and the movement. And after fixing, putting his hand on history and time, remembering, talking about it in the light of the fire that would probably animate the drawing, leaving memory for those who come next. There is a music in life, and in thought itself, that is hard to translate into words, but that dwells in the words themselves. Perhaps we have yet to look at these primitive drawings with eyes other than those of the supposed owners of archaeology. Art and its reflection as a creator of spring-concepts, of springboards, that take us to other places, to the new, and that does not petrify us. Nature has this power to reconnect us, to give us strength, to surprise us, to make us breathe better, and sometimes to crush us with its beauty. Kant understood well this crushing, this powerful reconnection that nature operates on different scales and amplitude, with the unnameable; a sublime dynamic. A free play where ecstasy can be revealed. In this encounter with the natural, everything can suddenly be exceedingly beautiful, sublime. The unbelievable beauty and uniqueness of every form of existence, from

trees to birds, from the warmth of the sun on the skin to the multiple forms of plants.

The passion for the natural is an old story in and out of Philosophy, from Poetry to Geography, from Goethe to Pessoa, where we almost always find this evident enchanting power of nature, in the dance of the elements, and the seasons, with each other, and us with them. The nameless. Only a poetic science could rescue nature and aesthetics, from the continuous threat of technological mechanicity. A field full of farmers and peasants is radically different from a field with a single giant machine for watering, cultivating, and harvesting. A single man can today cultivate acres and acres. A human desert, a breakdown of the habitation of nature, and the old alliance with men, and of men with each other. This goes beyond aesthetic romanticism, but not romanticism itself. It is a vision and perspective of adherence to the reality that changes everything. Like the lines that paths draw in nature by the millennial habits of feet. And the memory of things. The memory that constitutes us. The memory of my father teaching me the names of plants and trees, of my effort not to forget, of him trying to show me the beauty of each thing or how it works. Or even when older, where this space is more difficult, in Professor Filomena Molder's classes and of her sensitivity and delicacy with which she spoke about nature and plants. There is a love for botany that has always united the more alphabet farmer and the more urban scholar, and it is absolutely breathtaking to see these very different perspectives sharing the same passion, like two children in dialogues of those discovering the same thing for the first time. And nature allows that, the rediscovery. The secret bond between people who love nature is their *de facto* understanding of the notion of care. They all know that things need to be taken care of. That you have to care for the plants, the animals, the people, and the world. That we have this magical power of caring. A kind of Beatitude and caring for all that exists, not laughing or crying, but understanding. Maybe the right word is kindness.

If the problem is originally about the Planetary House (*oikos*), that giant natural ship that orbits through space, then we would have to talk about a future and necessary science of the habitation of the planet earth. The whole of human history could be interpreted as a process of domestication and control of nature. On the one hand, the domestication of fear, where the great human terror is a sudden interruption of life, something unexpected that brings the end of the species, be it in the cataclysmic and overwhelming form of a meteorite, earthquake, etc.

(of what is bigger than the eye can grasp), or in the tiny form of a virus, an epidemic, a small bug, etc. (of what is smaller than the eye can notice). Between the scales, fear is a major motivator. On the other hand, control, essentially for survival, is given by resistance to the unforeseen, the imponderable, and random. The game of life as luck and chance, and the attempt to control the great conceptual phantom of philosophical thought: the notion of accident. Which then demulsifies itself into all areas of practical human life, from a knife cut on the finger to ships or airplanes in the sky. In other words, vertigo into the abyss of chance and necessity. Of a shipwreck, with or without a spectator. We forget, perhaps, in the carpeted present of our civilization based on mediations and prosthetics, the dirt under our fingernails to be able to eat, the bed full of sweat accumulated for days, that space where by the house the animals were familiar and filled bellies in times of cold, of treating the seasons like clocks and knowing their rhythms. We forget, perhaps almost all, or many, that nature is not the domestic animals, zoological contemplations or the wonderful wildlife programs on television. We forget perhaps, in our *polar inertia*, that nature can be hostile to us. Hostility that reveals our essential fragility, our vital vulnerability, and transience. That we are dust, that we belong to the earth, and that we will return to dust.

If the problem of ecology is vast, its face is more visible, clear, and circumscribed, that is, if the new ethical-political dilemma of ecology can imply a change of paradigm and mentalities, still, this will not annul the problem already at hand. The abyss can quickly turn into a drain, and quickly show this nightmare horizon of extinction. It reminds one of that old joke among philosophers about Thales, who when contemplating the sky and the foundations of the universe fell into a pit. Says Plato as a warning for our times: "*They say that a determined and witty girl from Thrace mocked him, telling him that he sought to know what was passing in the sky, but did not see what was near his own feet.*" Anyway, it is easy to see how right Sartre was to call attention to the concept of rarity, of scarcity. Facing the assumptions that go beyond theoretical ambiguity, and revealing the substratum of radical incompleteness, implies assuming rarity as a starting and ending point, and given that the world does not have infinite resources and forces choices, it reveals itself as finitude, vulnerability, and poverty, but always with an ethical demand, whatever the path or outcome. We are all in need, we are all beggars and destitute.

Thus, confirmation is given in the category of Anthropocene. It

is a matter of understanding as a new motor of political history the question of energy, energy wars, and more deeply the understanding of history, as Kuhn realized for epistemology, in the form of paradigms and through the notion of mark, as Damásio formulated, or marker for understanding time or geological era. In short, it could be defined as the mark of Man on the planet as a factor of unavoidable acceleration and transformation.

Ecology ethics emerge as an essential problem. Hans Jonas is certainly one of the most important figures in thinking about Ecology and he must be revisited. His most important Kantian-inspired contribution is summed up in the Principle and Imperative of Responsibility (“*Act in such a way that the effects of your action are compatible with the permanence of authentic human life,*” or, “*Do not endanger the indefinite continuity of humanity on Earth*”), in the resurgence of the notion of the Common Good alongside intergenerational responsibility. But if Jonas has discovered the heart of the problem, already his mood is borderline. In the current carnage between morality and economics, reported daily by the global media in all sorts of poignant and unchallenged malignity, we realize that the old maxim that evil only wins when the good abandon the battle and resign is in full operation, in the global anesthesia of indifference, insensitivity, a kind of atrophy of boredom and the desire for death, but without a critical exercise of the life examined. The situation seems to be one of those classic clashes between virtue and vice, in an accelerated and compassionless logic where greed and the voraciousness of the present where everything is reducible to profit, economic and financial opportunities. This opportunism, shared laughter of the winners and immune to the miseries of others, more than a natural egotism that sees every critical exercise as an expression of the baseness of envy, is what can be called a short-term vision. That is, it also results from the complicity and symbiosis between consumer activism and the price of comfort. Nobody likes to give up comfort. And so, the only player on stage that changed the rules of the game was China by introducing a long-term plan into the immediate logic of profit. Of course, the consequences of a quasi-slavery industrial system based on a communist-capitalist ambivalence cannot be a global development model with shared universal values, but it is without a doubt, the most brilliant political-economic move of our time. This is because China still lives in an imperial time. Something older than Anglophone and American formulations. The perception of time is slow. Without further digressions, the history of ecology in the

passage to the 21st century, and with the new challenges of a technological era, is the mirror of a planet still obsessed with the domination of blocks, which walks towards that unification of perpetual peace seen by Kant, ironically without the Hegelian self-consciousness. If we had to talk about political evolutionism, one could say that we are in a process of profound change to stay the same, as Visconti would say in *The Leopard* (1963). In this context, the question is: should the economic perspective be hegemonic? The primary division of the problem that is established between anti-capitalists and entrepreneurial liberals seems insurmountable, but is it possible to build a political platform, beyond fear and terror, to overcome the capitalist-communist antinomy, founded on ecological ethics as the basic moral principle of responsibility for those who will come after us? It seems too idealistic at first glance, and the risk of a dictatorship of ecological harmony and health is enormous. However, Jonas argues that in times of urgency, one has to be able to rise to the occasion and that the risk of non-action implies an apocalyptic risk. In short, we seem to be at a difficult impasse. And the dreamed horizon of harmony still seems very distant. Here is the basic civilizational dilemma: a civilization that eats itself and its children. More than a parallax error, we are in a collective psychopathological paradox, and if Bioethics and Biotechnology seem to be entering a new threshold of the construction of a second nature, perhaps it would be necessary to start working on the idea of a post-nature within Hans Jonas’ hermeneutic framework. This implies redoing a link between responsibility and care, that is, creating a new space of questioning that I would define as an *Ecology of care*. In short, linking the ecological question to a political problem of the common good, but radically in an interpretation of planetary survival, beyond the traditional understanding of the Good, approaches a new political theology. In this new way of understanding the relationship between the present and the future, the clash between the natural and the artificial approaches a complex abyss: on the one hand, the maximum artificiality with the birth of artificial intelligence and the dream of the singularity or robotic self-consciousness, and on the other, the minimum naturalness in facing the end of nature, the realization of the finite and of scarcity. In a global perspective the mass exploitation of natural resources and the opening of the planet’s Pandora’s box releasing evils and pain on a global scale, and on an individual scale, Dostoevsky’s disturbing and challenging exclamation: *each of us is responsible for everything and everyone before everyone else, and I am more responsible than the others*. Between Jonas, Sar-

tre, Levinas, and so many other thinkers that throughout history have called us to the dangers of indifference and lack of responsibility, today we run the risk of generating a time that promotes global automatism outside the critical sphere. Perhaps the planet will no longer remain silent. *Terra viva*. Having arrived here, one of the honest and humble conclusions in face of this matter, and resorting to Bergson's perspective of *élan vital* and Morin's methodology through complexity, we will have to consider the possibility of a return to an evolutionary and analogical perspective of the planet and humans as the new neuronal network of the earth, as in trees. This second nature under construction and emersion, far beyond the politics and geopolitics of ecology, implies the vision of the Earth itself as multiple and one living being, of the planet as a unique living being of multiple relations. A living planet with defense mechanisms for its own survival, between chaos and equilibrium. The overwhelming complexity of what is experienced on a human scale shows the cosmic disproportionality in the face of its eternal claim to control. Thus, and returning to the humility contained in the proposal for a new *Ecology of care*, this is a possibility to understand the planet as a spaceship, that needs to be taken care of like a car in its trips to the mechanic. Simple as that. This general care is established at all scales, from cherishing the trees, and those wonderful time machines, to respecting water, the source of all life on earth. This unity, fragility, and multiplicity can be reached by images of the Earth seen from space. In the immeasurable distension between the infinitely small to the infinitely large, we can fall into the unfortunate inattention to the rarity, the uniqueness, and the exceptionality of the living. And if we are often inattentive to music and dance in nature, smells are something striking. Only the science of gastronomy and perfume takes smell as its center. Can there come to be a nasal-olfactory philosophy, of smells? Sometimes it smells bad, it smells like a stench, a lie, bullshit, idle talk. Maybe Nietzsche would have tried a philosophy of instinct. Maybe we need to go back to that primitive and passionate connection to the earth, a dancing, and musical connection. Of celebration and communion.

Our time is struggling with very serious problems that transcend the present itself, since one of its hallmarks is inter-temporal awareness and mastery, *i.e.*, we have a strong relationship with all modes: past, present, and future. This awareness and this experience, even for the benefit of the technology we have, allows us to have a perception that time belongs to us and that we are all interconnected. This means

a complex equation between time and memory, space and belonging: identity. *Kings and vagabonds, shadows and dust.*

The present, hesitant and confused in the face of an open future, caught in ecological dilemmas and at a cyclical crossroads, holds us hostage to the hypocritical irony of the present, which lives itself in the aporetic crossroads of optimism and pessimism, as if nothing that happens in the future is its responsibility. A meta-ethics of the impersonal and indifference. Nature, an *infinite reservoir of forces, will also one day ignore our tears and smiles.* With the inauguration of our second nature, technological and digital, which distances us from the body, from the earth, it may turn out to be sterile, a cold mathematics of chaos, a war between body and memory.

The garden today is also, involuntarily, a political space that reflects this ongoing battle. We are all in the garden. We are, were, or will be, all the characters in the garden. Like the peripatetic garden, in motion, is the dream and contemplation of the old man sitting on the bench.

Of collective dreams, we are only left with the Amazon, a heavenly garden on earth, the last. The last witness of a world lost in that time when we were just guests. Back then we entered in fear, and as pariahs, we were easy prey. We still are today. And everything in nature dazzled and frightened us. Primitive and primary emotions etched in rock, and pregnant with all the stars in the sky that amazed us, like everything we didn't know in every being.

What is a point of no-return? It is the point of the rawness of life. Of having no other choice. Of bumping head-on into the rawness of things. Of not being able to go back, to make amends. Of not being able to apologize. The unstoppable, that awaits us. Or that involves us in a tumble, in an endless fall, in an embrace without letting go. It is inexorable. Knowledge is also this. Once we know something, we can no longer go back in time, to pretend we don't know. It is the curse of knowledge. Knowledge is also a point of no-return. And it can be maddening if this point coincides with the eternal return of the same. Of wanting to stop knowing what one knows. Man was made for truth. Conformism loves the comfort of silence. The bad silence. The accomplice silence. The guilty silence.

And if the artificial gardens seduced Baudelaire to go out in search of truth and to flee from death, the end of nature is acceptance. And our destiny will be that too. The acceptance of our condition. *Kings and vagabonds, shadows and dust.*

FOREWORD

If the winds are favoring radical egoism, solipsism, and contempt for the common good, the contemporary equation of the impossible balance, the limbo and the tragic crossroads of freedom and indifference are revealed. We could go through all the visions of disaster, all the announced, impending apocalypses, and that too would always lead us to the beginning. That there is in humans a vertigo. Always. An instant in which everything can change. A shadow. Always waiting and lurking. Relentless.

Non erit vobis in Deum non erit vobis in gratia Dei

Caldas da Rainha, February of 2023

ON GARDENS

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THE TEXTURE OF NATURE. ON THOMAS BROWNE'S PHILOSOPHY OF GARDEN

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“But the Glory of the Garden
lies in more than meets the eye”

R. Kipling, *The Glory of the Garden*¹

If in the diversified palimpsest of early modern philosophy, a truly atypical case exists, it is undoubtedly represented by Thomas Browne's *The Garden of Cyrus*. The small treatise, published in 1658 by the English polymath in a diptych which comprehended also *Hydriotapia*, *Urn Burial*, the author of which Samuel Taylor Coleridge described as, «in short, an affectionate and elevated *Visionary*» (Brinkley, 1955, p. 449), remains an example of an incomparable way to approach – methodologically and theoretically – certain issues of philosophy of nature. More particularly today, when contemporary philosophy seems to question again matters that to a cultured XVII century reader of Browne's work still might appear as expressions of an epoch, even if peculiar, rereading the *Garden* may contribute to enrich the philosophical and cultural debate, and not only from a historical point of view. It is in this regard that the figure of the garden stands out for its specific relevance.

The readers of Thomas Browne's *Garden of Cyrus* are already aware of this. The treatise focused on, as the subtitle suggests, to the «Net-work Plantations of the Ancients, Artificially, Naturally, Mystically considered», is inspired by a historical episode narrated by Xenophon in his Socratic dialogue *Æconomicus* where, in the fourth book, the Greek historian reports the encounter between the Spartan navarch Lysander and the son of Darius II, Cyrus the Younger, in the city of Sardis. Cyrus shows to his guest a marvellous *paradise*, a garden that the prince himself had set up and cultivated. One element above the others astonishes the visitor, which concerns the internal architecture of the garden: it is the arrangement of the trees chosen by the gardener, geometrically placed following the structure of quincunx². This is how Browne describes it: «rows and orders so handsomly disposed; or five trees so set together, that a regular angularity, and through prospect, was left on every side» (Browne, 1968, p. 296).

Xenophon's passage, and specifically the component of the quin-

1. I would like to thank Hannah Thacker and Dael Sassoon for their precious help, having linguistically revised this essay.

2. Transposed from the lexicon of Roman Republic numismatics, where it indicates a coin whose value consisted in five (*quinque*) twelfths of an as, the term quincunx generically designates a geometrical pattern exemplified by the disposition of the pips on the five-side of a common dice. It is historically testified that this kind of arrangement has been used by gardeners (and not only) to dispose at the same distance trees and plants in a *hortus*, so they do not stand one on the other and can equally benefit from the sunlight and the nourishment of the soil (cf. Della Porta, 2010, p. 309), with relevant benefits for the whole cultivation.

quincuncial disposition, had a certain fortune among the moderns. In particular, it re-appears in some botany treatises that Browne has the possibility to confront with. In 1560, Benoît de Court published a vast botanical book, *Hortorum libri triginta*, where he recalls the episode of the garden of Cyrus and mentions the quincuncial order; an analogue gesture does Giovanni Battista Della Porta in his 1592 *Villa*, where the episode, including the quincunx section, is mentioned again and further deepened. From these sources Browne can trace the thread not only of an ancient tradition that, with Xenophon, evolves in the Latin botanical works (Varro, Plinus, Columella etc.), but also of a modern one, capable to intertwine cultural history with a still useful stratified apparatus of technical notions, arising in decades when innovative practices of garden architecture were emerging.

Beside the theoretical approach a series of texts might provide, Browne himself could experience some of these practices. Reid Barbour, in his biographical work on Browne, reconstructs in detail the travels that brought the young student of medicine Thomas Browne all around Europe (from England to France to Italy to northern Europe) when he could visit not only international university cities like Oxford, Montpellier, Padua or Leiden, but also when he had the possibility to refine his botanical knowledge, visiting some of the most renowned botanical gardens. «With the university botanical garden on hold in the late 1620s», says Barbour, «Oxford students could still absorb knowledge of herbs and plants from the gardens, meadows, and fields in and around Oxford – with bulky assistance perhaps from “Theophrastus, Dioscorides, Mathiolus, Dodonæus, and our English Herbalists”» (Barbour, 2013, p. 98). In the same way, «Montpellier’s extraordinary botanical resources» are described as a true «revelation» (p. 116). In Padua, the young polymath visits what even today remains one of the biggest and richest botanical garden in the western world, but he also attends the classes of a prestigious teacher like Johann Vesling, who could combine renewed skills as an anatomist to his refined knowledge in the botanic field. And again, for Browne, Leiden «also exemplified habits of study, collection, and moralization that corroborated the university’s practical mission in a world of wonderful variety», a variety represented by a garden designed «to maximize the botanical knowledge of the observer who would encounter plants from the Middle East and America alike» (pp. 193-194).

Furthermore, we should not completely believe Browne when he humbly says he had never been a «master of any considerable garden»,

or when he states that he «pretend not to multiply vegetable divisions», since this «Field of knowledge hath been so traced, it is hard to spring any thing new» (Browne, 1968, p. 291). In fact, his rhetorical stragem does not allow directly the reader to realize that, on the contrary, Browne himself «lived in a community of fine gardens at Norwich, a place [John] Evelyn mentions as “very addicted to the flowry part”» and «Browne’s cultivation would have been herbal as well as flowery». When Evelyn himself «visited Browne’s house, he was struck by the plants, among other things, in that “paradise and cabinet of rarities”», aspects that reflect the personality of the scientist who used to urge his disciple «to “simple” in woods, meadows, and fields, as well as in gardens» (Merton, 1956, p. 161). And above his deference, if the sum of these two worlds – the reception of a cultural heritage, measured on the confrontation with the texts of the ancients, and the familiarity with the knowledge of the contemporaries, both theoretical and practical – could culminate in an original philosophy, where the contemporary reflection meets Platonism, the Christian tradition encounters the paganism of the gentiles, scientific rationalism is mixed with mysticism and esoteric symbolism, is Browne’s, and Browne’s only, merit.

The conceptual figure of the quincunx is obviously the most striking example of this virtuous capacity of Browne’s wit – to use the most precise word to identify this ability in finding a perspective point where different things may combine, no matter how apparently divergent they may seem. In fact, the quincuncial arrangement is transfigured by Browne in a philosophical process for which from its original contexts of application it becomes a metaphysical concept, finding in it none other than the actual structure, the inner texture with which all nature, at its multiple plans, is ordered.

The architecture of the text is profoundly involved in this process. Conceiving his treatise as a five-chapter book, which reproduces the quincuncial pattern, the *Garden* itself obeys the structure it wants to illustrate. In this architecture the single points (in this case the single chapters) do not connect to each other following a consequential order as if they were disposed on a line, with the risk of a hierarchical emergence of an element on the other – logically, spatially, chronologically etc. On the contrary, the whole arrangement is able to conserve the same sorting from any point of view, an aspect that undermines the ordering power of the perspective eye of the observer. That is why nothing would really prevent the reader to leaf through the *Garden* avoiding a linear reading, since this gesture does not preclude an equally compre-

hensive emergence of the whole text, just as Lisander can look at the disposition of the trees in Cyrus' garden from any angle, without the risk of losing the comprehensive sense of its global arrangement.

It is important to remark how this correspondence of form and content crosses multiple planes in Browne's work, earning this way a true philosophical relevance. The overshadowing of the ordering power of the observer, realized by the equivalence of all the possible points of view on any singular points, corresponds, epistemologically, to the interweaving of all the possible *considerations* (we use here Browne's own lexicon) on the examined subject. Looking for the quincuncial matrix into the natural world rather than the one of the artificial manufactures; adopting a mystical approach instead of a rational outlook, or evoking, for example, the wisdom of the symbolism of the ancients, must not be considered as mutually exclusive alternatives, but in fact they are part of a same, unique perspective. They can be distinguished for a methodological or a logical purpose, but they are necessarily interlaced.

The connection between the metaphysical and the aesthetical perspective might be assumed as an example of this procedure. Browne underlines this connection first of all remembering a sentence by Quintilian, who in *Institutio oratoria*, VIII, 3, 9 writes: «What fairer sight is there than rows of trees planted in echelon [quincunx] which present straight lines to the eye from whatever angle they be viewed?» (Quintilian, 1959, p. 215). It is not a coincidence that one of the first aspects that Xenophon emphasises in his story is precisely the beauty emerging from the paradise of Sardis, to which Lisander cannot remain indifferent. But that aesthetical value is not considered in itself by Browne: it rather represents the sign of a metaphysical and ontological concord that the geometrical equivalence of the intervals which compose the quincuncial network exemplifies. In other cases, Browne emphasizes this equivalence: if «a regardable part» of «the skins and outward teguments of animals», which presents a quincuncial pattern, is «beautiful by this texture», says Browne, that is because nature itself has provided «a like correspondency in figure» (Browne, 1968, p. 319). The «practise in Ornamental Garden-plots» also produces «handsome» results, not because of the aesthetical judgement of a subject, but because it is objectively «discoverable in so many works of Nature» (p. 339). If Browne describes the division of trees and plants into five (*quinque*) equal parts as a «handsome division», it is because this «Divisive Number» is the number which divides «the Entities of the world, many remarkable

things in it, and also comprehending the general division Vegetables» (p. 338). And when, in the last pages of the *Garden*, Browne enriches these reasonings with a Pythagorean and a kabbalistic perspective, he underlines that it is not a case if, following the biblical and musical context evoked by the domination of the evil spirit of Saul by Samuel's lyre, «the Cabalisticall Doctors» place Tipheret, the sixth sephirah of the kabbalistic Tree (associated, among other things, precisely with the idea of beauty and balance), when the fifth chord is involved (p. 341). Therefore, if the human eye is constitutively able to grasp the *speciositas* of the quincuncial order, it's because it somehow participates, biologically and spiritually, to it; because, to use an Empedoclean lexicon, similarity allows mutual recognition.

Coincidence does not consist, in Browne's philosophy of nature, in a sort of an ephemeral lack of a cosmic randomness. On the contrary, coincidence is always a sign that a geometry, a well-composed structure lies beneath all the natural facts, a structure that Browne reads precisely in the figure of quincunx. In this sense, in the *Garden* coincidence becomes a form of correspondence: all nature is coincidental, because all nature responds to a recurring rule. Even when this structure involves the artificial world and the human *techne*, it maintains its fundamental, natural relevance. Speaking in Aristotelian terms, in this case the efficient cause changes, but the formal one remains unchanged. There is no real difference between a bee and an architect, in the *scala naturæ* that Browne put in place: «The squared stones and bricks in ancient fabricks, were placed» by architects following a quincuncial order, i.e. accordingly to a lozenge or honeycomb-shaped disposition (p. 301), just as «the sexangular Cels in the Honey-combs of Bees, are disposed» by wasps «after this [same] order» (p. 318). Whether this order is imminently acting in the germinal constitution of a flower or of a body organ; wheter the soldiers of the Macedonian phalanx were disposed this way by a strategist, or it emerges from the architecture of a garden, this texture remains unaltered bringing out, for the philosopher or the scientists who detect it, all its metaphysical outreach. To prove this, Browne adopts, as the scientist he was, an inductive method: it is by showing *how much* (and *where*) the principle is acting, that we can have an almost clear certainty about its nature as a principle.³ That is why Browne, even if he underlines, for example, that he is writing «no Herball» (p. 291), like the *Hortus Eystettensis* by Basilius Besler, the *Garden* resembles, more than a traditional philosophy of nature treatise, to an elaborate *Wunderkammern*, a *rerum naturalium thesaurus*

3. In this regard, another sentence by Coleridge became quite famous among Browne's contemporary scholars: «Quincunxes in heaven above; quincunxes in earth below; quincunxes in deity; quincunxes in the mind of man; quincunxes in bones, in optic nerves, in roots of trees, in leaves, in everything!» (Coleridge, 1820, p. 198).

or a collection of historical and human manufactures, as well as a book of symbols.

If the figure of garden assumes a main relevance between these symbols, these manufactures and these *res naturales*, it is because it probably appears to Browne as the figure which may condense all the elements and the instances he exposes. The garden is, conceptually speaking, that point where all the apparently different and multiple figures exposed throughout the book seem to find a certain unity. The reasons why we can affirm this are again of two different kinds: methodological and philosophical.

From a methodological point of view, the figure of the garden of Cyrus behaves like a sort of allegorical frontispiece, even if in narrative form. Browne does not affirm it, but we can remark how this narrative image, placed at the beginning of the treatise, has peculiar similarities with other (in this case figurative) frontispieces that, for example, appear in several Baroque treatises between XVII and XVIII Century. Giambattista Vico's *Dipintura allegorica* ("allegorical painting"), placed at the beginning of his 1730 and 1744 *New Science*, may be, in this case, an effective model. Far from being a merely ornamental component of the text or a simple narrative motif, the *Dipintura* not only introduces the main themes of the *Science*, adhering to the internal figurative logic that Vico will unfold during the entire text, but it works as a scheme that intensively contracts in a single, complex image the entire *Science*. In a very peculiar way, Vico shortens, to deny it, the distance between the non-verbal figure and its verbal deployment.

Analogously, even if he does not provide an actual allegorical frontispiece but only an already known representation of the quincunx pattern, the narrative image of garden (in particular Cyrus' garden) has in Browne a similar function. The effort of grasping the possible aspects of this image could result already in a confrontation with the multiple perspectives adopted in text. We can in fact discuss the garden in terms of a *res naturalis*, since one of its conditions of possibility is its natural substantiality. It is an artificial entity, because no garden exists without the efficient cause represented by the work of the gardener. As such, we can examine it from a historical point of view, which Browne does in his analysis of the *plantations* of the Ancients. Furthermore, we can read it as a symbol, a reading that Browne realizes focusing on the earthly paradise. The quincunx itself, the main conceptual motif that crosses Browne's treatise, is primarily circumscribed in the context generated by this image, before others: it firstly emerges as the architecture of a

garden, already manifesting its capacity to link the metaphysical necessity of the concept with the ideas of beauty and practical utility.

Nevertheless, the primacy of garden is not considered by Browne only from a narrative or a methodological perspective. If we can address Browne's treatise in the sense of an effort to elaborate an actual *philosophy of garden*, it is above all because according to its author the garden has also, and mainly, an ontological primacy. Consequently to the parallelism established by Browne between the different plans of investigations we have described above and the content of the treatise, it is even claimable that garden can have a fundamental importance in methodological terms, working as a narrative and a conceptual guide, because it has a "firstness" precisely in that constitution of the world the *Garden* aims at accounting for. In this regard, one of the first sentences of the *Garden* is quite emblematic: «Gardens were before Gardiners, and but some hours after the earth» (p. 294). In this context, the primacy of garden, expressed by this sort of absolute antecedence of the thing to its efficient causes, has undoubtedly biblical roots, concerning in particular «the primitive garden» (p. 294), the one that, according to the famous Francis Bacon's sentence in *On gardens*, «GOD Almighty first planted»⁴. Every garden – from the hanging gardens of Babylon to the imaginary garden of Alcinous – somehow finds its source, directly or indirectly, from this sort of *Ungarten* which is the Eden. But this idea of a primitive garden is brought by Browne to more radical conceptual consequences, exemplified by a judgement contained in the dedication to Nicholas Bacon, a judgement that could be taken as an introduction to the entire work: «the Earth is the Garden of Nature, and each fruitful Countrey a Paradise» (p. 291).

It would not be a stretch to affirm that disclosing the consequences of this enthusiastic judgement would result in illustrating the main aspects of this philosophy of garden deployed by Browne. Following Browne's argument, garden is not an entity among others, in nature: it is the one to which nature primarily refers to.⁵ Just as he had done with the quincunx, transmuting it from its original context of application to a metaphysical model, Browne takes a substance (the garden) and he grasps its universal reach. By doing so, Browne's philosophy of garden becomes a full-fledged cosmic philosophy that giving sense to a human practice and to a history it also gives sense to the world itself. What is distinguished by the microcosmos of the garden is nothing but another garden; what exceeds the limits of a garden is not a garden in potency: it is a garden which is already in act.

4. It is relevant that the medic Thomas Browne find, in this Edenic context, a common root both for the art of surgery and for botany: just as «Chirurgery finde its whole art, in that one passage concerning the Rib of *Adam*» in Genesis II, 21, in a similar way «it is more than probable the first curiosity, and cultivation of plants, most flourished in those quarters» (pp. 294-295), where the primitive garden had been placed. It is one of the many cases in which Browne establishes a parallelism between human anatomy (and medicine) and botany. The already mentioned case of the human skin, another natural thing where the quincunx pattern emerges, together with many plants, is maybe the most representative one, starting from a sentence to which Browne refers to and that he takes from Isaiah, 40, 6 («All flesh is grass, and all its strength like the flower of the field»). In this regard, it is important to refer to Pablo Maurette's study on the *forgotten sense*, which also contains an important chapter on Browne and on the *Garden* (cf. Maurette, 2018).

5. To be more precise, designating this philosophy exclusively in terms of a "philosophy of garden" would be incorrect: we should rather talk of a "philosophy of nature" which has its main declination in terms of a "philosophy of garden". In fact, the Earth is not a *garden*, says Browne: it is the garden of *Nature*.

In this respect, it would be constructive for our argument to engage Browne's sentence in a fertile dialogue, even if anachronistic, with a statement proposed by one of the most relevant XX Century philosophers of garden, Rosario Assunto: garden is a microcosm that reflects a macrocosm (cf. Assunto, 1973, p. 195). The significance of the complex dialectic between singularity and totality, expressed by Assunto in terms of a mutual reflection, determines the modality through which Browne's reasoning is articulated. Just as, biblically speaking, each garden after the Eden evokes the primitive paradise planted by God, analogously the particular *hortus* (even if just a «fruitfull Countrey») is related to earth in terms of a microcosm that reproduces a macrocosm. But if in the first case the relation is a qualitative relation, i.e. symbolic, the second one brings into play also a quantitative, i.e. spatial, aspect of the relation: the singularity is *in small* the whole, the whole is *in big* the singularity.⁶ That is why we speak, following Assunto, in terms of reflection.

In this dialectical relation, the human factor has not a secondary importance: according to this argument the distance that divides the human from the divine is read in terms of a difference of degree. In shaping his Lydian paradise as a demiurge who fashions nature after the model of quincunx, the prince-gardener Cyrus does nothing but repeating *in nuce* the gesture of Nature, which fashions after the same model that macrocosmic garden that is earth. This is the same reason why we must be careful when we read the ontological primacy of the garden in absolute terms, especially today, when post-humanism and his inclinations are philosophically and culturally trying to undermine the centrality of the human represented by modern anthropocentrism.⁷ On one hand, when Browne says that «Gardens were before Gardiners» he is certainly saying that there is a sort of antecedence of the natural fact on the artificial one, that the generative power of man is a manifestation of the generative power of a living and animated nature; on the other hand, Browne's conception of nature does not allow to fully differentiate the two plans. If, as we have said, Browne dedicates one chapter of the *Garden* to the study of the quincunx in the natural world and another chapter to the artificial manufactures, it is not to separate them but, on the contrary, to show their interdependence, if not even their coincidence. If the anatomist, closed into the gloomy Anatomical theatre intent to observe the labyrinths of the innards of the body, encounters the knowledge of the botanist or the gardener, busy with his living bulbs at the light of the sun of a botanical *hortus*, it is to demon-

6. It is not a case that this logic of microcosm and macrocosm is declined by Browne also facing, in the third chapter of the *Garden*, the contemporary (in his years) debate about genetics. This debate oscillated, as is well known, between the epigenesis perspective and preformism, according to which the organism progressively "unfolds" its different parts from an undifferentiated seed, or on the other hand it is conceived as already formed but enclosed as a miniature into the seed. The problem of germination and of the seed reflects, in Browne, the issue of the generative power of the quincunx to function as a "cosmic seed" generating a cosmos *in nuce*, or as a sort of neutral matrix which will successively be shaped by nature. On this subject cf. Dunn, 1950.

7. We consciously use the umbrella-term "posthumanism" without presuming to solve years of philosophical debate around this category, its inclinations (transhumanism, antihumanism, metahumanism, new materialism etc.) and their interdisciplinary relations. Our point wants to be a mere point of reflection in order to understand how, far from these debates, the peculiar conception of nature exposed by Browne can interact with these contemporary instances. For a more specific comparison with posthumanism cf. at least Ferrando, 2019.

strate not an aleatory but a necessary relationship between the two. Differentiating the natural from the unnatural is a nonsense, for Browne, since it is a difference established not between *two*, but into a *one*, that one represented by the only texture that crosses all the possible plans and that makes nature *a* nature.

Furthermore, even when conceived in cosmic terms, garden remains a product of an act, whether this act is human or not. If the whole earth is a garden it is not because garden ceases to be the outcome of a process, but because there is a first Gardener. The first concern of God, in this peculiar Christianity of Browne, is to bring the formless and empty earth «into rule and circumscription» (Browne, 1968, p. 295), and he does it by "gardening" the earth. That is why we have previously referred also to a quantitative, and more precisely spatial, relationship between microcosm and macrocosm. By utilising once again contemporary categories that Browne would have never used, but useful to understand our argument, the act of *ruling* and *circumscribing* made possible by the gardener is readable in terms of what Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari would call an act of territorialization and institution of a striated space (in opposition to a deterritorialization action or the emergence of a smooth space).⁸

It is evident from many points of view that garden may exist in a model of striated space. Firstly, garden represents, using a metaphor drawn from the tailoring lexicon dear also to Deleuze and Guattari, a cut-out in the fabric of the world; a territory circumscribed by a *limes*, a margin that separates him from other spaces as a demarcation line.⁹ Even the etymology of "garden" and "hortus" confirms this idea. The root gard-, findable in the English noun "garden", in the German one "Garten" or in the French "jardin", similarly to the one in the Latin "hortus" and its equivalents in Spanish and Portuguese, "huerto" and "horto", comes from the Indo-European roots *gher, indicating the coral, the enclosure, and *ghort, with analogue senses. Even the Persian "pairidaeza", from which the Greek equivalent "paradeisos", used by Xenophon in the passage we have quoted at the beginning, refers to the idea of the boundary wall. Formally, garden is a closed space which is the outcome of a territorializing human force. This is why, formally, it cannot be considered as smooth.

The comparison between garden (as an enclosed space) and the concept of landscape (as an open space), as showed by the contemporary debate, assumes here a fundamental significance.¹⁰ Referring to Assunto's pages about the idea of an absolute landscape (cf. Assunto,

8. Deleuze and Guattari, as is well known, introduce these concepts in *A Thousand Plateaus*. Comparing it to the *rhizome* model, where «there are only lines» (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 8), smooth and striated space are models of space characterised by «points, lines and surfaces», with the only difference that if the striated space «intertwines fixed and variable elements» producing «an order and succession of distinct forms», and if in it the «lines or trajectories tend to be subordinated to points», smooth space «is the continuous variation, continuous development of form», so that the trajectory is not subordinated to points but «points are subordinated to the trajectory» (p. 478).

9. Some of the models of striated spaces illustrated by Deleuze and Guattari seem to match with the ones used by Browne. The technological model, for example, exemplified by the fabric. Analogously speaking, the quincunx with which the prince-gardener Cyrus fashions his garden is characterized by parallel elements that «intertwine, intersect», following the scheme of the warp and the weft of the fabric. Similarly, Browne not only refers to the «neat and curious textures» of «the very *Americans*», weaved from point to point, but also to «the woof of the neat *Retiarie* Spider, which seems to weave without transversion, and by the union of right lines to make out a continued surface, which is beyond the common art of Textury» (Browne, 1968, p. 304). But more evidently, according to Browne, beyond any metaphor, the quincuncial scheme is again applied to that "concrete fabric" which is the human skin – «the same is also observable in some part of the skin of man, in habits of neat texture, and therefore not unaptly compared unto a Net» (p. 320) – after a verse of the *Psalms*, which Browne himself translates, even if freely: «Thou hast curiously embryodered me, thou hast wrought me up after the finest way of texture, and as it were with a Needle» (p. 321; cf. *Psalms*, CXXXIX, 13-15).

Furthermore, a striated space works in accordance with a musical model, organizing «horizontal melodic lines and vertical

harmonic planes» (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987, p. 478). Browne also refers to a musical imaginary, as already mentioned, in the fifth chapter of *Garden*, more precisely with the obsessive effort to find the number five into the complex palimpsest of kabbalistic symbology. Here Browne revokes the Pythagorean idea of the music of the spheres, embracing both the quantitative component of the universal mathematical correlations and the qualitative one of the manifestations of these correlations in harmoniously interconnected sounds, and the analysis of the physical nature of sound, i.e. the physics of the sound wave. But as Deleuze and Guattari explain, the vibratory nature of sound generates space: «Every milieu is vibratory, in other words, a block of space-time constituted by the periodic repetition of the component» (p. 313). Repeating a milieu means generating a rhythm without which there would just be chaos. «Nature as music» (p. 314), they say following Jakob von Uexküll.

10. On this subject cf. D'Angelo, 2021, pp. 5-19.

11. It is not a case that, as Baldine Saint-Girons claims, there is a relationship between garden and society: historically gardens are always placed in a context when a State apparatus is operating or, at least, complexes social apparatuses, so that is hard to imagine a society without gardens (cf. Saint Girons, 2010, p. 104).

12. Deleuze and Guattari define them as nomadic spaces: the steppe is the result of a deterritorialization by desertification, the forest by accumulation and proliferation, mathematically illustrated, for example, by the fractals.

1973, pp. 195-206) and the ones on the idea of garden as a *subjectivised nature* (cf. Assunto, 1988, p. 29), Paolo D'Angelo explains this comparison very clearly: garden is a landscape shaped by man (cf. D'Angelo, 2021, p. 7)¹¹. An analogue comparison would occur with some of its possible opposite concepts in the deleuzoguattarian palimpsest in *A thousand plateaus*, the steppe or the forest, that represent two fundamental geographical examples of smooth space obtained after different kinds of deterritorialization.¹² Bringing rule and circumscription to a forest or a steppe would result, then, in a form of territorialization of a smooth space, delimiting it through an enclosure, with the consequence of its domination, regulation and rationalization. In this regard, Browne's philosophy of garden (and of quincunx) may still represent a philosophy where the concepts of smooth and striated have some relevance. But if there is the risk, according to Browne, that nature appears as a chaotic organism, as an *ingens sylva*, to use again Vico's lexicon, where it is hard to distinguish an actual sense of order, it's because men may not see its inner geometry, its meticulous mathematics, hidden even in its narrowest places. It is in this sense that the chaotic space of the forest or the open one of the landscape "leave space" to the garden fashioned by the skilful hand of the gardener, whether this gardener is a Persian prince or God. Thus, it is in this way of conceiving the garden that nature and art, sensible experience and universal principle, singularity and totality, stand in a cooperative relationship that unveils an order hiding behind an only apparent anarchy.

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LANDSCAPE CRAFTMANSHIP: SUBTLE ARCHITECTURAL INTERVENTIONS IN LANDSCAPE

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THE LANDSCAPE OF THE *MEDITERRANEITÀ*

The transformation of the Mediterranean has been done in different stages throughout history implying the colonization of the landscape and the adaptation of the new constructions to its diverse and complicated topographies to make them liveable. For the succeed of these interventions, it is necessary to act by means of architectural surgery in collaboration with local craftsmen, who will use their knowledge in architectural tradition to preserve the place. With subtle transformation both, the building and the terrain will be modified creating an indissoluble union between construction and nature. However, in some cases where interventions are not carried out with the necessary care, these delicate environments will be damaged and the dissolution between the two parts will be further emphasized. To avoid this undesirable result, in many cases the proper landscapes in combination with materials from local tradition are used as matter of transformation to guarantee the union between architecture and its surroundings.

In 1933, during the 4th CIAM on board the Patris II, a series of well-known architects of Modern Movement crossed the waters of the Mediterranean towards the city of Athens marvelling themselves with the integration of the local architecture in the landscape of its coasts and the craftsmanship in them. "The house was born in the Mediterranean. Whoever builds never makes a mistake, but neither makes the design: from the walls to the roof, the factory proceeds according to the rules. The masons of the Mediterranean are prodigies: they even build dry stone walls, using the ingenuity of calculating forces and balances instead of mortar. It is not for nothing that we call the mason: master. In these villages there are no architects, because all the masons are architects". (Bardi, 1933, p. 19)¹ Through these observations of the landscape and the anonymous white constructions staggered to the waters in the coasts of the *Mare Nostrum*, the participants at CIAM IV dared to affirm that Greek architecture would have a resurgence in the next 20 years which will be marked by a rapprochement with the constructive forms of the regional tradition made by anonymous builders. What

1. In the chronicle of the trip published in the magazine Quadrante, the participants relate how they were amazed by both the Mediterranean landscape and its architecture, developing the implications of these two elements in the culture of the place.

the CIAM attendees did not know was that this same current would spread stealthily through the waters of this sea. Its focus will be set in the islands, where their territories will be transformed by the economic touristic investments of the 1960s, such as the Greek islands, Sicily, Sardinia and the Balearic Islands.

Many of the architects who intervened after the European conflicts in the lands bathed by this legendary sea looked, as it had been predicted at CIAM IV, to regional architecture in order to create buildings integrated in the place. With this reconciliation with the local memory an opposition to the uniformity previously imposed by the Modern Movement these architects will seek with their buildings a new local identity. Moreover, the intellectual background of many of these interventions comes from exhibitions such as *Architettura rurale italiana*² by Giuseppe Pagano and Guarniero Daniele shown at the Triennale in Milan in 1936 or others done after the Second World War such as the *Mostra de architettura spontanea*³ created by a group of architects led by Giancarlo de Carlo. Also this movement will have its impact outside Italy with examples such as the *Arte Póvera* led by Germano Celant or the MoMa exhibition *Architecture without Architects* by Bernard Rudofsky. All of this examples, Italian or not, denote a praise for the spontaneous character for the anonymous constructions, for the craftsmanship in construction and for the everyday nature of the resources used, whether artistic or architectural. Besides, the use of these common materials and simple constructive methods known by transmission of knowledge from generation to generation denoted an appreciation of local materiality and a deep knowledge of the materials and their executions.

THE INTEGRATION OF ARCHITECTURE IN THE LANDSCAPE

In the 1980s, reflections that advocate the consideration of the regionalisms will be sheltered by Kenneth Frampton under the term “Critical Regionalism”. The author himself explains it as “a critical rear-guard that has to separate itself from both the refinement of advanced technology and the pervasive tendency to return to a nostalgic historicism or the fickle decorative”(Frampton, 2002, p. 43). This way of valuing a new intellectual position of architecture unites traditional anonymous knowledge with new technologies. Furthermore, it also shows a special attention to the relationship between construction and topography, setting a clear opposition to the *tabula rasa* because the lack of relations

2. Giuseppe Pagano's exhibition of architecture presented at the Milan Triennale in 1936 was collected in a catalogue in which photographs of humble regional Italian architecture are shown and where their functionality is particularly valued, appearing as abstract objects in which little reference is made to the context.

3. The 1951 Triennale di Milano catalogue contains photographs of the exhibition organized by Giancarlo de Carlo's team, in which some of the local Italian buildings can already be seen in their context, subtly highlighting their adaptation to their surroundings.

it implies with the context and proposing instead a cultivation of the place. Thus, the environment is modified in order to integrate of architectures in it.

To deepen into this thought, Frampton turns to the theory of architect Mario Botta who explains how the integration of the built into the natural is achieved through the “construction of place”, or in the same words, the evocation of natural forms or those of landscapes anthropised for agricultural purposes in order to make the architectures that belong to the context. These forms that Botta speaks of, such as the terracing of farmland or the organic volumetries that seem to continue the forms of the environment, are resources commonly used in the vernacular architecture found in places such as the Mediterranean coast, executed locally according to tradition to adapt to the place through the use of knowledge passed down from generation to generation (Davidovici, 2018, p. 99). These architectures that were previously seen by the attendees of the CIAM IV, characterized by white houses erected by anonymous builders, using local materials, and adapting themselves to the topography, will serve as inspiration for many architects who will work in the Mediterranean from the inter-war period onwards, employing a construction logic similar to the Critical Regionalism, symbiotically joining the logic of anonymous architecture with new construction systems.

In these architectures, as Frampton describes, tectonics play a fundamental role in the relation between landscape and construction. The correct application of constructive logic will not only allow the incorporation of intangible values such as the creation of visual relations or the control of lighting, but they will also be fundamental in the adaptation of the construction to the physical environment in which they are located.


THE ALTERATION OF THE LANDSCAPE

Among the many architects who have explored the relationship between tradition and contemporaneity taking craftsmanship as a fundamental value, Dimitris Pikionis could be considered as one of the pioneers. The Greek architect was one of the first to break away from the Modern Movement to consider anonymous architecture with the intention of creating a new regional architecture.

In 1957, Pikionis completed an intervention to adapt the surroundings of the Acropolis with a design of organic forms that suggest-

ed a subtle link between tradition and modernity through the execution of the path as well as the materials used. The intervention, based on a previous study of the site helped the architect to capture the sensations aroused by the environment of the monument and helped him to configure the pathway, proposing a slow transformation of the topography carried out *in situ* in collaboration with masons. The proposal is formalized in two ascending paths, the first up to the Porppileos, 300 metres long, and the second, on the hill of Philopappos, opposite to the entrance to the monument, 500 metres long, both materialized with the same logic but with a whole different character [fig. 1]. “The Acropolis path is designed to lead the visitor very directly to the monument, the Philopappos path is recreated in the shapes and views of the landscape, it is a path for walking and contemplation” (Álvarez Álvarez, 2013, p. 42)

FIG.1 Dimitris Pikionis, the intervention in the Acrópolis 1954-57. Source: Ferlenga, A. (1999). *Pikionis : 1887-1968*. Electa. p.237.



The route taken by Dimitris Pikionis on the hill facing the Acropolis is made up of two stretches, the first one leads to a small car park, while the other reaches the top of the hill where the monument that gives it its name to the mount is located. As Darío Álvarez Álvarez explains, Pikionis designed a path that contemplates the landscape and the monument itself, adapting to the vegetation, dodging trees and rocks, adapting to the topography, and even using stairs when required. In the middle of the ascent path, Pikionis locates the Anderon, a small viewpoint also accessible from the end of the car park, that relates to the distant landscape and contemplates the Classical monument in a direct but discreet way without competing either in scale or importance with it.

The systems conceived by the architect and executed by local builders with local materials in both sections of the project allow to adjust on site, adapting the paths to the most prominent points of the landscape, allowing the rocks to emerge during the course of the walk and even taking advantage of these slopes to place benches and elements that enrich the route itself, generating visual relations and creating a new conception of the surroundings of the Acropolis.

Other architects have also carried out interesting operations in much more modest contexts than the one of Pikionis, which stand out for their functionality and, like the ascending path to the Philopappos hill, propose new ways of rediscovering the place. Thus, the Genoese architect Alberto Ponis designed a winding path that adapts to the landscape of the Costa Smeralda skirting the greyish granite rock and the low Mediterranean vegetation and linking an old bunker, which will be converted into a restaurant and Yacht Club, and the nearest beach.

“So, in 1964 I was coming to the site where the jetty Yacht Club was built, at six in the morning. In May and June, it was already bright sunshine and wonderful – nobody was around, it was like a dream. The builder who was doing the Yacht Club – the conversion of an old bunker from Napoleonic times – introduced me to a young mason. He would follow me, I would follow him, through the path. I was deciding where to pass on site. We would trace it with pieces of wood, strings and then he would immediately mark on paper the main reference points”(Alberto Ponis, 2018)

Like Pikionis, the project designed by Ponis is based on a previous study of the site. In this case, the architect uses the same technique that enabled him to discover the Sardinian culture on his arrival on the island, gathering information by means of sketching and taking photographs that reflect an obvious dialogue between the journey of discovery and the landscape [fig 2]. This documentation representing this first act of wandering, impulsive and influenced by the sensations perceived by the environment, will help him to create the final design of the path.




FIG.2 Alberto Ponis. Yacht Club Pathway. Source: Alberto Ponis. (2018, August 2). Yacht Club Path – Drawing Matter. <https://drawingmatter.org/yacht-club-path>

The path of the Yacht Club in Porto Rafael was designed in situ, in company of a local craftsman in the early morning, the time when the coastline was best lit. The succession of photographs taken in sequence in his frequent visits and the expressive and analytical sketches where the most singular elements of the topography are represented, have a fundamental role in the configuration of the final sinuous route of the path. The sequence of panoramas photographed are similar to the ones it frames and while you wander in it, you can appreciate the rock and vegetation avoided to be preserved. This continuous process of working on the site with constant analysis throughout sketches will allow the architect to adapt to the topography, saving the highest elevations by means of stairs as well as the creation of new visuals, perpendicular to the discourse of the path that frame the Costa Smeralda with the small islands that enclose it as a backdrop.

LANDSCAPE AS A MATERIAL

In these projects where the adaptation to the place takes precedence, the execution of these projects, as Frampton states in his *Critical Regionalism*, takes on a special relevance. The construction systems used in an appropriate manner allow the integration of the construction into nature, generating a feeling of belonging that is favoured by the inclusion of non-tactile elements such as the adaptation to climatic conditions or the consideration of light.

The project of Pikionis shows special attention to the integration of materials into the site, as evidenced by the reuse of stones from the nearby ruins as a building material to compose the pieces that will make up the paths and mixing it with contemporary systems such as reinforced concrete, with which he ensures the necessary resistance to allow road traffic without forgetting the plasticity of the chosen material.

“The grey lines of the concrete break, curve, open up or strangle, following the course of the road, suggesting a movement that seems extraordinarily modern, as if the vital lines of Kandinsky’s paintings from the lyrical period of *Der Blau Reiter* or the analytical lines of his texts, especially *Point and line on the plane*, were converted into traces of concrete on the road, skilfully handled by Pikionis” (Álvarez Álvarez, 2013, p. 42)



FIG.3 Dimitris Pikionis. Acropolis de Athens pathway, 1954-57. Source: Ferlenga, A. (1999). Pikionis: 1887-1968. Electa. p.270


The use of stones from the demolition of 19th century houses, which were part of the Greek landscape and its memory, are recovered with a new use, the materialisation of the paths of ascent and contemplation of the Acropolis. The combination of these pieces with contemporary materials such as reinforced concrete adds a counterpoint to the landscape in a subtle way that does not stand out in the environment and the execution of the project in a calm and handcrafted way reminds us once again, through the contribution of traditional knowledge, of the need for care in the integration of architecture into the environment and the great contribution of vernacular construction logic in these architectures. In addition, the insertion of the paths into the site is reinforced by the cleaning work carried out prior to the execution of the route, in which Pikionis only permits the elements that belong to the ambient of the site, this includes the elimination of invasive species and the demolition of the alien constructions that incorporated noise into the environment.

In the Yacht Club, Alberto Ponis resorts, like Pikionis, through a much more modest proposal, to the use of the landscape itself as a material for intervention, respecting the most important elements and generating new relationships between the project and the surroundings that make use of the vegetation and the pre-existing granite boulders as a delimitation of the views and protection, allowing the place to be conceived in a new way.

The material used will be the granite stones existing on the site, which will be joined together with a cement of a similar colour to mark the walkable areas of the route, skirting the most notable elements of the landscape, and adapting the larger elevation drops by means of stairs of the same material. In addition, large granite stones will be used to delimit the views and frame the coastal landscape. The symbiosis between granite and concrete will also be used in the readaptation of the old bunker and its surroundings, gaining land to the sea and configuring a series of descending platforms that end up leading people down to the water.

The use of this local natural stone material combined with the contemporary artificial stone that is cement represents a reuse of the landscape, but also, considering the scarce urbanisation of the Sardinian coast in the early 1960s, a reconfiguration of the local memory, as well as an enhancement of the local construction systems made by craftsmen.

FIG.4 Alberto Ponis, Yacht Club, 1964. Source: Brandolini, S. (2014). *The inhabited pathway : the built work of Alberto Ponis in Sardinia* (S. Brandolini (Ed.)). Park Books p 170.



CONCLUSIONS

The transformation of the site in order to achieve the integration of the interventions in the environment necessarily implies prior knowledge of the ambient, its forms and elements that compose it, as well as the collection of information relating to its characteristics, history and memory of the place. However, to create interventions that are fully integrated into the environment, the knowledge provided by traditional architecture should be included.

Since the inter-war period, several architects have developed works that embody the principles of Critical Regionalism enunciated by Kenneth Frampton, combining the knowledge of anonymous architecture with new construction systems to ensure the relationship between the artificial and the natural. Many of them, influenced by the reflections made on board the *Patris II* or the exhibitions at the Milan Triennales of 1936 and 1951, decided to look to local architecture and its craftsmanship to create a new regional identity.

One of the forerunners in this kind of reflection was the Greek architect Dimitris Pikionis, who gently transformed the topography in the surroundings of the Acropolis with his two sinuous ascending paths, the first one leading to the monument and the second ascending to the top of the opposite hill. For his intervention he used elements that form the landscape itself and the memory of the place such as the stones from the demolition of nearby houses in the previous century. The execution of these pathways, intercalating this material with the concrete and executed by local builders, allowed the architect to adapt to the most singular points of the landscape, avoiding them and dissolving the intervention into the surroundings.

The relationship with a magnificent element such as the Acropolis is not an obligatory conditioning factor in this type of actions and other architects have therefore carried out interventions that follow the same logic of minimal intervention in the landscape, generating a new conception of it creating new visual relationships and reusing the landscape itself as a material for execution to integrate their projects into the place,

The Italian Alberto Ponis, who starts from a method of discovering the place by means of graphic documentation and photographs as a basis for his interventions, makes an adaptation of these first experiences in the place in his Yacht Club. Like Pikionis, Ponis generates a winding path that avoids the most notorious elements of the place and

adapts to the highest differences of the topography for what he uses the same granite rock that makes up the Sardinian coast. The construction of the route with local materials, also developed by a local builder, will allow the architect to adapt the pathway to the site while respecting the landscape and its memory.

Thus, both interventions in very different contexts are clear references in the integration in the landscape, betting on the execution developed by craftsmen and using the material itself as a material that allows the disintegration of the intervention in the site.

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THE GARDEN THAT FEEDS AND THE GARDEN OF THE FED

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INTRODUCTION

Vila Viçosa is a small village located in Alentejo, a region in southern Portugal. Here is the birthplace of one of the most important Portuguese duchies: the Duchy of Bragança, which would inherit the Portuguese crown in 1640 when D. João (1604-1656), 8th Duke of Bragança, ascended the throne and became D. João IV, King of Portugal.

The indelible link between the House of Bragança and Vila Viçosa was, undoubtedly, a relationship of unparalleled affection for the land and landscape of Alentejo. Even after the ascension of the Braganças to the throne, and their relocation to Lisbon, the connection to this town was maintained through sporadic trips to their Alentejo home, the Palace of Vila Viçosa [Fig. 1].



FIG.1 Main façade of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, photography taken by the author, 2021.

Together with the Kitchen [Fig. 2] built during the duchy of D. Jaime I (1478-1532) – and altered by his successor D. Teodósio I (1505-1563) –, the Dining Room [Fig. 3] constitutes one of the main spaces of the food network of the Palace of Vila Viçosa. By the turn of the 19th century, a palatial food network – which the one in Vila Viçosa is an example of – was a vast and complex system, composed of 1. produc-

1. In certain cases, a patio can be understood both as a support and service space. When the patio space is used to prepare (wash, debone and clean) foods, which happens before the meal service, the patio functions as a support space. In some cases, as it happens with the Kitchen Patio of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, the patio possesses infrastructures that allow dishes, pots and pans to be washed simultaneously to the meal service, hence its consideration as a service space also.

2. It was customary for the meal to be accompanied with live music, thus the classification of the music room as a service space. It does not mean, though, that it would not be used after the meal as a digestive space.

tion spaces: vegetable gardens, olive groves, orchards and preserves; 2. cooking spaces: royal kitchens and smaller room kitchens; 3. consumption spaces: dining rooms, banquet halls and other rooms where meals were consumed; 4. support spaces: patios, storage rooms, cellars and other spaces that provided storage and where there was no contact with cooked food; 5. service spaces: patios¹, sideboard rooms, service corridors, washing rooms, music rooms and other spaces mostly activated during the meal and 6. digestive spaces: music rooms², billiard rooms, smoking rooms and certain gardens used for postprandial enjoyment.



FIG.2 Royal Kitchen of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, unknown author, c. 1940. Courtesy of Centro Português de Fotografia, Depósito Frio, Estante 02, Prateleira 29, PT/CPF/ALV/010675.

FIG.3 Dining Room of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, unknown author, c. 1940. Courtesy of Centro Português de Fotografia, Depósito Frio, Estante 02, Prateleira 29, PT/CPF/ALV/010691.



With this definition of a palatial food network in mind, and especially in the Palace of Vila Viçosa, it is possible to identify a close dialogue between its most important interior spaces – Kitchen and Dining Room –, and some of the palace's gardens – Garden of Reguengo, Preserve of Vila Viçosa, Garden of the Dames and Garden of Picadeiro.

The Kitchen, the main and most interesting cooking space of this palace, interacts with both the Garden of Reguengo and the Preserve of Vila Viçosa which, as production spaces, formalize a *Garden that Feeds*. In turn, the Dining Room relates itself to the Gardens of the Dames and of Picadeiro, two digestive spaces that, as a whole, can be understood as a *Garden of the Fed*. The relationship between garden and food or, more properly, between garden and food practices, constitutes an interaction between parts that has Man at its core: Man, creator of the garden, capable of transforming the site into a place and making it a medium for his happiness and, at the same time, for his nourishment. (Carapinha, 1997, p. 34)

These relationships between the built environment of the palace and the greenery that interacts with it, having the food network as a frame and the food practices as a background, are being studied with the lens focused on the time interval during which Portugal was under the rule of D. Carlos I (1863-1908), that is from 1889 to 1908, a fertile period in political drama and elucidating records of the Royal Family's eating practices. These records, which range from meal menus to lists of food orders from various palatial kitchens, reveal an apparently uniform food scene, with a strong French influence and transversal to the different palaces inhabited or temporarily visited by the Royal Family and its retinue. However, they also make it possible to identify a precious exception: that of the Portuguese tone and relaxed simplicity that some of the meals consumed at the Palace of Vila Viçosa took, especially at lunchtime. Back to its origins, to the Alentejo land that almost four hundred years before had seen the Braganças leave, the daily life of the Royal Family embodies what seems to be a way more peaceful experience in this palace, distant from the ceremonious and more accelerated agenda of the capital, where the place and the activities assign to it also influence what is eaten, and how it is eaten.

The analysis of one hundred and six menus related to the meals given at the Palace of Vila Viçosa between 1895 and 1908³ allowed us to delineate, for this period of time, an image that aides in the characterization of the aristocratic diet in Alentejo lands.

Although mostly written in French, these menus see this trend

3. These menus found belong to the Historical Archive of the House of Bragança Foundation (AHFCB) and can be consulted in the 2019 collective work *Menus da Família Real: Coleção do Museu-Biblioteca da Casa de Bragança*.

4. Menu AHFCB NNG 3728, n. 55.

5. Menu AHFCB NNG 3728, n. 42.

6. Menu AHFCB NNG 3728, n. 52.

7. Menu AHFCB NNG 3728, n. 52.

8. Menu AHFCB NNG 3728, n. 55.

9. Although the menus of the lunches consumed at the Palace of Vila Viçosa are only a small parcel of the sample of menus collected, in this parcel about the Portuguese dishes, both written in Portuguese and in French, and the simplification of the meal with more frugal and earthly dishes is clearly recognisable.

10. Besides the irrigation system, the Garden of Reguengo was also (and still is) provided with some reasonably sized water tanks. It is known that in some cases there were freshwater fish in these tanks, something that still occurred in the 19th century. Friar Manuel Calado (1584-1654), in his work *O Valeroso Lucideno e o Triunpho da Liberdade* mentions, in page 97, “a lake of spring water, with lots of fishes, and other waterwheels, and wells (...)”.

11. Túlio Alberto da Rocha Espanca, born in Vila Viçosa, was one of the most prestigious Portuguese art historians, having dedicated many of his works to the Alentejo region.

thwarted when they sometimes reveal dishes such as “Migas à Alentejana”⁴ or “Gigote de Gallinha”⁵. Or, without contradicting the language of fashion, they appropriate traditional Portuguese dishes such as “Cochon de lait rôti à la portugaise”⁶, “Lapereaux au riz au chasseur”⁷ or even “Riz sucré à la portugaise”⁸. The unpretentious character that is emanated by these lunchtime meals in Vila Viçosa⁹, with a more limited number of dishes compared to those consumed at dinnertime and/or in other royal residences, is reflected by the recurrent use of modest ingredients such as eggs, plain rice or with chicken, and also potatoes, which are the preferred side dish. Game meats, varied, are also common at the table, where Italian pasta is also paraded, and fish almost goes unnoticed.


THE GARDEN THAT FEEDS

During the reign of D. Carlos I, the Royal Family’s experience in the Palace of Vila Viçosa, although seasonal and usually concentrated around Christmas time, implied a much desired and beneficial relationship with the building’s natural surroundings, and the (obvious) usufruct of the foodstuffs produced there. In the vicinity of the Palace, the Garden of Reguengo stands out as fertile ground – mostly due to its irrigation system capable of contradicting the sometimes unbearable Alentejo heat¹⁰ –, whose history precedes that of the palace itself and which, like this house, has also undergone successive transformations.

The Garden of Reguengo [Fig. 4], as a food producing garden, must be understood as a ground zero in the food processing chain and, therefore, its understanding will be in close relationship with the Kitchen. Considered the heart of the food network, the Kitchen of the Palace of Vila Viçosa has in its implantation in the territory one of the key aspects for such a successful relationship with Reguengo. As the Kitchen and the adjoining Kitchen Patio are located in the periphery of the volume of the palace, they are able to connect to the Garden of the Reguengo through a spatial circuit which is clearly denoted.

In the late 19th century – and with the end, in 1860, of the private leasing regime applied to these lands –, the grounds of Reguengo included two olive groves and three vegetable gardens, all contiguous: a flourishing cultivation and recreation area open to the public, delimited by plots where, in the words of Túlio Espanca¹¹ (1913-1993), there was a proliferation of “flowers, tables and vegetables, orchards, vineyards, olive groves and fresh trees”. (Espanca, 1978, p. 626)

However, the Kitchen does not relate itself solely to the nearby cultivated lands. It is also in a close dialogue with the Preserve of Vila Viçosa [Fig. 5], one of the first hunting grounds established in Portugal, whose approximately one thousand five hundred hectares much pleased king D. Carlos I and his entourage.



The topography of the land of the Preserve takes on a very unique physiognomy, alternating planes and valleys with gently undulating hills, traced by water courses that contribute to the fertility of the soil, wooded with olive trees, holm oaks, cork oaks and pine trees. In these, deer, roe deer, fallow deer, foxes, wild boar, as well as partridges, hoopoe and birds of prey roam freely. The Garden of Reguengo and the Preserve were thus important suppliers of food to the Palace: from the former, vegetables, fruits, olive oil, eggs and some poultry were obtained; from the second, and mainly, game meat. The symbolic value of these two gardens is intrinsically linked to satisfying the human need for food, while generating enjoyment. Reguengo and Preserve are, therefore, spaces for enjoyment where contemplative walking and the recreational activity of hunting are promoted and from where, simultaneously, supplies are taken for the palace’s storages. Therefore, these are territories whose fruition is achieved not only in the immediate presence of their exploration, *in loco*, but also, by extension on the plate. The relieving shade of the orange trees on a hot Alentejo afternoon will be as pleasant for a man as the dessert made with those same

FIG.4 (left) The Garden of Reguengo in its relationship of proximity with the Palace of Vila Viçosa. Drawing elaborated by the author based on a representation possibly made by Perry Vidal, c. 1850, that can be consulted at the AHFCB.

FIG.5 (right) The Preserve of Vila Viçosa in its relationship of proximity with the Palace of Vila Viçosa. Drawing elaborated by the author partly based on a representation made by Manuel de Sousa da Câmara entitled Carta da Cobertura Vegetal/ Estrato Arbóreo da Tapada Real de Vila Viçosa that can be consulted at Sistema de Informação para o Património Arquitetónico (SIPA) with the reference IPA.00002768 DOC.00065452 FOTO.00725612.

oranges of that same tree that sheltered him on his walk through the Garden of Reguengo. And, perhaps, the crumbs of that same dessert will also be pleasant for the hens raised nearby, completing a cycle of transformation and fruition.

THE GARDEN OF THE FED

In December 1903, the Spanish king Alfonso XIII (1886-1941) stayed for a few days at the Palace of Vila Viçosa, following his State visit to Portugal at the invitation of D. Carlos I. After one of the lunches at the palace, the entire Iberian entourage gathered in front of the Garden of the Dames [Fig. 6].


FIG.6 Visit of King Alfonso XIII to Portugal: the Iberic entourage at the staircase in front of the Garden of the Dames of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, photography taken by António Novais (1854-1940), 1903. Courtesy of Arquivo Municipal de Lisboa – Câmara Municipal, PT/AMLSB/CMLSBAH/PCSP/004/LSM/000672.



The reconstruction of the image that this garden would have had at the time of such a visit is completed using two architectural plans from the 19th century: a first by Nicolau Pires, who carried out a *sui generis* drawn survey of the Palace of Vila Viçosa in 1845 [Fig. 7], and a second, made by Ricardo Peyroteu in 1868 [Fig. 8] which is presumed to be more faithful in terms of architectural representation.¹² In these drawings it is represented identically, at least in geometric and planimetric terms, both the Garden of the Dames and the Garden of Picadeiro which is adjacent to it. These gardens, designed in the French spirit, which owes much to the landscape architect André Le Nôtre (1613-1700), extended themselves to the photographed participants, inviting them for a contemplative walk. The drawings don't show any reference

¹² Both these drawings can be consulted at the AHFCB.

to sitting places in these gardens, so one was really supposed to walk through them, touching the greenery, smelling, and truly feeling it.



It should also be noted that at the time, as the drawings by Nicolau Pires and Ricardo Peyroteu attest, there were two dividing walls between the Garden of the Dames and the Garden of Picadeiro, to the south, with little to no visual permeability from the first to the second garden. At the time of the reign of D. Carlos I, however, it is imagined that the continuity of gardens could be visually encompassed from the balcony of the Dining Room, without the embarrassment of such dividing walls.

The relationship between the Garden of the Dames and the Garden of Picadeiro, spaces of digestion, with the meal and, spatially, with the Dining Room [Fig. 9], is considered to have three moments: a first, a scission with the interior, in which the gaze comes into contact for the first time with the dimension of the natural surroundings outside the palace, which takes place immediately after the diners leave the Dining Room to the terrace overlooking the gardens; a second, which corresponds to the approach of a contemplative state by walking down the staircase that leads to the Garden of the Dames, a staircase that makes the transition between the plane of physical pleasure (associated with the act of eating) and a spiritual one, evoked by the gardens; and a

FIG.7 (left) Partial representation of both the ground and first floors of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, drawing by Nicolau Pires, 1845. Courtesy of © Arquivo Histórico da Fundação da Casa de Bragança.

FIG.8 (right) Partial representation of the ground floor of the Palace of Vila Viçosa, drawing by Ricardo Peyroteu, 1868. Courtesy of © Arquivo Histórico da Fundação da Casa de Bragança.

FIG.9 (left) The Garden of the Dames and the Garden of Picadeiro in its relationship with the Dining Room of the Palace of Vila Viçosa. Drawing elaborated by the author based on the representation by Ricardo Peyroteu shown in fig. 8.





FIG.10 (right) (Detail) The Garden of the Dames and the Garden of Picadeiro in its relationship with the Dining Room of the Palace of Vila Viçosa. Drawing elaborated by the author based on the representation by Ricardo Peyroteu shown in fig. 8.



third, of contemplative and conscious wandering through them. Overlooking, with its adjoining balcony, the Dining Room appears to have a dominant posture on the green geometric cloth at its feet, implying that, in order to ascend to a contemplative and spiritual state, one has, paradoxically, to descend, leaving the plane of the table behind, which is symbolically associated with earthly pleasure [Fig. 10].

The lower level at which both gardens are located promotes a distance from the Dining Room, which acts as a barrier to the penetration of greenery into the consumption space. But one must not forget that the Dining Room – as it was decorated in the early 1900's with its walls covered in game heads, and the chandeliers made of game antlers –, emanated a powerful image that symbolically bridged the distance gap between consumption and production, speaking to the heart of the Preserve.

BUT WHAT IS IT LIKE TO TRULY EAT ALENTEJO?

The relationships established between the Kitchen and the *Garden that Feeds*, and the Dining Room and the *Garden of the Fed* are of a different kind.

If in the first case this is essentially a relationship of subsistence (albeit with characteristics of enjoyment), fully earthly, where there is approximation, dialogue and balance, under a bidirectional flow of goods and influences regardless of the distance between the parties – it should be noted that the entrance of the Preserve of Vila Viçosa is

located about five hundred meters from the Palace's Kitchen –, in the second case, the proximity between the Dining Room and the Gardens of the Dames and of Picadeiro actually materializes a distance that can be translated into a path of spiritual ascent.

The Kitchen, the Garden of Reguengo and the Preserve are linked through osmosis: the vegetable garden, the olive grove, the orchard and the hunting grounds produce what the act of cooking needs, according to the season of the year and the conditioning of the Alentejo region, allowing, at the same time, a tactile and immediate enjoyment; on the other hand, the ground may receive food waste from the kitchen, which returns to its origin, and can be used either as nourishment for domestic animals or fertilizer. The relationship between the Dining Room and the Gardens, in turn, seems to be one-sided: the French-style gardens, which could belong anywhere, do not intrude on the physical space of the meal (whereas the Preserve does). They allow the contemplative wanderings of those who, after eating, head to the terrace and undertake the perhaps arduous task of descending the stairs, with full stomachs. The gardens absorb the diners who, as they digest the food consumed, are themselves digested.

The relationship of subsistence between Kitchen, Reguengo and Preserve brings about an approach to the Alentejo, an approach also reflected in some very modest and relaxed meal menus that characterized the stays of the Royal Family in this palace. An approach that implied local food practices, the place and the time of year, and presupposes the capacity of the soils to produce sustenance. However, between the Dining Room, the Garden of the Dames and the Garden of Picadeiro there is a relationship that cannot be identified with the Alentejo region, because the garden itself does not reflect Alentejo and because this is a relationship of spiritual approximation, not specific to a place or time.

Thus, and having said that, one is led to the conclusion that, perhaps, the most Alentejo meal that the Royal Family would have consumed in Vila Viçosa would not have taken place in the Palace's Dining Room. It would have taken place, yes, in the Preserve, in the form of a picnic – where everything, from the food on the plate, to the surrounding food landscape, to the climate, to the ground, to the mood – is Alentejo.

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THE GARDEN AGAINST MODERNITY: LAHORE, PARIS, AND KYOTO

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What I argue in this paper is a critique of a city subjected to a kinetic utopia through three views of the garden. A kinetic utopia, as I develop elsewhere following Sloterdijk (2020, p. 9ff; 2012, p. 45), is no longer best represented by the automobile as the pinnacle of auto-mobility but rather by the escalator; the zenith of mobility today is not the movement from point A to point B but rather the paradoxical figure of perpetual immobile mobility or, better said, suspended animation. This bears enormous affinities with what Klaus Dörre, Hartmut Rosa, and Stephan Lessenich (2017, p. 56) frame as how capitalist societies “resemble a bicycle that gains in stability with the speed of its forward motion, while it easily tips when slowing down or coming to a halt.” Through their exposition of the Triple-A-Theory of Dynamic Stabilization (Appropriation, Acceleration, Activation), they signify how modern (capitalist) societies stabilize themselves by furthering the accumulative temperaments in socio-economic, socio-cultural, and socio-political senses that paradoxically lead to their destabilization. The logic of escalation naturally builds upon itself that whereas previously the sciences stood as vanguards of tradition, they today stand as the harbinger of change.

What I do in this paper is a critique of this theoretical framework – that espouses burnt-out forgetfulness, accelerated progress, and unlimited increase – from the writings of Klaus Dörre (*Landnahme*), Hartmut Rosa (Acceleration), and Stephan Lessenich (Activation) respectively through a discussion of three gardens. I seek to present the tensions of the garden as a microcosm: being part of the city yet outside of it, a description of the capacity of heterotopic spaces vis-à-vis contemporary situations. (Haghighi, 2020, pp. 241-352) Michel Foucault (1986, pp. 22-27) mentions how heterotopias are saturated spaces, yet are ones that mirror everyday life, forming spaces of repression, deviation, purification, and ultimately of time. Against the neoliberal city’s kinetic disposition, I present the Shalimar Gardens (Lahore), Tuileries Garden (Paris), and the Ryoan-ji Garden (Kyoto) to posit remembering or resonance, slowness, and releasement in contradistinction to the Triple-A theory, arguing how the garden is the laying bare of society, the necessary opening to danger, to vulnerability.

SHALIMAR GARDENS, LAHORE, PAKISTAN CONTRA APPROPRIATION (*LANDNAHME*)

This first section provides the tension between the Shalimar Gardens in Lahore, Pakistan, and appropriation (*Landnahme*) as the first in Dynamic Stabilization’s Triple-A-Theory. I first provide appropriation in economic and then eschatological terms, the latter linking my critique of using the Shalimar Gardens’ multicultural expression of remembrance on two levels: its actual, historical socio-political diversity and an Islamic emphasis (projected along with Christianity and Judaism). This purview presents the tension between the present, the past (the Fall), and the future (as an eschatological vision) within the garden in order to highlight how its relation to the city heightens a certain sense of remembrance.

To begin, Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich (2017, p. 56) present how “*Landnahme* (appropriation), originally a socioeconomic concept, primarily describes the spatial-temporal as well as sectoral expansion of capitalism into non-capitalist environments.” *Landnahme* is literally translated as an occupation or the seizure of land, providing a sense of colonization, while referring to the commodification or the inclusion of a non-capitalist entity within the system from an economic perspective. (Dörre, 2016, p. 228) This term points to Capitalism’s automobility through its capacity to reproduce itself not just through aspects of society, such as the exploitation of the working class, but even the commodification of what is precisely beyond it. Rosa Luxemburg’s (2015, §§26 and 31) critique of capitalism provides a bigger picture: an obvious tie between capitalism and imperialism; what is outside the social strata provides an expansion in production and purchase. The exchange value of commodities is heavily determined not just by their internal movements but by a projected aura. Evident in history was the expansive action of labor’s further estrangement in a foreign land and even the exoticization of foreign products. The degree to which what is foreign is indeed foreign increases the density of the Capital cult’s atmosphere.

Luxemburg’s observation captures the modern image of Marx’s assertion of primitive accumulation. For Marx (2000b, pp. 445-450), primitive accumulation is in fact the starting point of capital’s threefold cycle: its accumulation, concentration, and the decapitalization of the intermediate links between capital and labor. Capitalism has this ability to reproduce itself due to its theoretical nature, referring not to it being theory per se but its ability to abstract (the labor from the individual)

and be abstract (estranged and commodified). This designates capitalism as an autopoietic system in perpetually appropriating new expressions within its singular grammar. Luxemburg sets this critique upon the global, historical stage as a critique of colonization that provides rejuvenation to a system exhausting its resources. There is no greater evidence of this than chartered companies that paved the way for today's global markets. The Magellanic revolution, i.e., the discovery of the world's spherical structure, paved the way for a varied approach to political influence. (Sloterdijk, 2013, p. 89) Early modern history is the setting of this naval *Landnahme*. As monarchs used chartered companies to expand political influence, the social and economic effects created a tide toward globalization. (Micklethwait and Wooldridge, 2003, pp. xvi-xvii) The risk of this venture, cartographically speaking, makes more sense by considering the emptiness of old maps. Surveys were not enough to fully chart these territories, and thus the designation of *terra incognita*, branded with slogans such as *hic sunt dracones* (here are dragons), comes to us as no surprise. (Van Duzer, 2014, pp. 303-334; n.d.)

We, therefore, see how *Landnahme* stimulates capitalism's persistence. The quest for global colonialization spurred a rush in the desire to establish trading posts, widening the inclusion of material available for trade (commodities) and increasing the workforce, especially through coercion (labor). What is appropriated here is the use (exploitation) of a foreign land and the forceful inclusion of its dwellers to reinforce what would be identified as the capitalist system. One may notice, however, that this narrative lasts for centuries, a development from a nation's political conception as identification with its monarch to one identified with the economy, a development that is not a smooth shift but one laden with crises. Klaus Dörre (2015) presents how capitalism is intrinsically "crisis-prone," and one of its defining features is its ability to cope with any form of crisis through the integration of non-capitalist elements that strengthen the theorization of value. Once more, my use of theorization here, from Sloterdijk (2012, p. 45), refers to a form of suspended activity or rather a suspension of activity with the city only as a backdrop to its own auto-suspension.

From Dörre's view of *Landnahme* that hinges on a precisely socio-economic concept, a second aspect of the kinetic movement bears more affinities to the contemporary consumer, a step toward globalization in which the merger between the world and the market is concretized. Globalization is the "market's transformation into a world [*Welt-*

werdung], or the world's transformation into a market[.]" (Sloterdijk, 2018, p. 35) Capitalism's spatial-temporal and sectoral expansion into non-capitalist environments is provided succinctly by Deleuze (1992) in noting the transition from the disciplinary society to the society of control. The stability of this world-market is due less to its formidability and more to its efficiency. (Han, 2021, pp. 16-17) Today this individual becomes appropriated through the promising image of a kinetic utopia. The land that is seized is not anymore something tangible but eschatological; what is promised to the consumer is absolute bliss. We may notice in these two instances capitalism's constant tendency for reterritorialization, the ability to occupy a particular territory, be it actual land as in the case of colonialization or ethereal through the veil of its promise of utmost freedom. I extend *Landnahme* therefore to signify this thrust of Capitalism to constantly reterritorialize aspects of social interaction.

With this, I turn to its critique via the first garden. The Shalimar Gardens in Lahore, Pakistan is a Mughal Garden complex that, I argue, embodies remembrance through its multicultural expression in two ways. Upon the orders of the Mughal Emperor Shah Jahan, the garden complex in Lahore was completed in 1642 as a *chahar bagh* garden that exhibits the confluence of Indian, Islamic, and Timurid or Persianate traditions. (Wescoat, 1999, p. 124)¹ This complex is patterned after the Shalimar gardens in Kashmir and is composed of three terraces—the upper one is *Far ah Bakhsh* (bestower of delight) while the middle and lowest terraces are *Faiz Bakhsh* (bestower of bounty)—following the social hierarchy. (Sikander, 1986, p. 24; Rehman, 2009, p. 206)² These different terraces eventually garnered the name Shalimar or Shalamar at an unknown period, translated as an abode of bliss or of peace. (Sikander, 1986, p. 24; Khan, 2021) The garden's multiculturalism is evident in its change throughout the various rules of the Mughal empire. Its socio-political climate contributed to the garden's formation: firstly, it distinguishes itself from existing Indian gardens; it then sustains features of Hindu, Muslim, and Timurid traditions; it embodies the engagements with and influences of the European courtly and religious missions; and, finally, it embodies an Islamic tour de force. (Wescoat, 1999, p. 126) This historical aspect of the garden's multiculturalism provides an initial break into what may be reterritorialized. Although certain facets of the garden's expansion are directly linked to a particular historical influence, the garden complex as a whole cannot be appropriated to a particular timeframe. It cannot be territorialized to a

1. For a discussion on *chahar bagh*, see D. Fairchild Ruggles, *Islamic Gardens and Landscapes* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2008), 39ff.

2. The top terrace was for the royal women, the second terrace was for the monarch while the bottom terrace was for nobility and certain guests or members of the public.

singular domain of a socio-cultural impact. The garden persists through its own historicity, and its development is peculiar to itself.

This multicultural impact may be taken from a second dimension. One thing that unites the three monotheisms is a special reverence for the garden, especially concerning the Garden of Eden and the Fall.³ According to these traditions, God created a garden that provided every desire, and the first humans, Adam and Eve, lived blissfully until they had eaten what was forbidden (from the tree of good and evil), and, because of them acting on the temptation, they were then banished from paradise. This eschatological vision of Paradise though remains not simply a static idea beyond life. Explaining this further is a remarkable insight into gardens within the Islamic tradition from an architect: “If I remember correctly, to Westerners ‘my house is my fortress’ but to Muslims ‘my house is my heaven’.” (Salam-Liebich, 1990, p. 69) Based on this, the Muslim’s domicile ought to remind one of life to come, in which Allah welcomes the faithful to the Garden of Paradise. One’s garden, designed according to the Qur’an, reminds one of the eventual experience in the Garden of Paradise. (Ellwood and Alles, 2007, p. 196)

We only have to look at the beauty of the Shalimar Garden in Lahore, Pakistan – the name literally resounding a remembrance of the paradise that is to come – to confirm this. The *chahar bagh* design refers not just to the division of the garden into quadrants but rather the distillment of the elements of a greater landscape. (Watson, 2012) This embodies the confluence of historical, social, economic, and religious elements that provides for the enjoyment of court patrons from the elite but also among the masses, clearly evident today with people flocking to enjoy the serenity of the early hours, praying together, chatting with friends, and even women having their own place where they can remove their burqa. What we have in this garden is a confluence of design: activity and leisure, tradition and progress, permanence and ephemerality, a remembrance of culture, history, and society, and even of being siblings created by a singular Deity.

Ultimately, what the Shalimar Garden represents is the inability to fully appropriate something within the singular grammar of Capital’s expression. *Landnahme* signifies desertification, a continuous movement to incorporate and appropriate elements as its own expression. Serving as a critique of this is the garden that emphasizes the role of memory in disentangling the equation of the market and the world. In doing so, it provides the latter a remembrance of a true eschatological vision that is beyond Capital’s reach, the development of culture and history, and a sphere of genuine social interaction.

3. See Gen. 2:4-3:21, *The Torah: The Five Books of Moses*, Gen. 2:4-3:21, NABRE, Al-Baqarah 2:35-8, *Qu’ran*.

TUILERIES GARDEN, PARIS, FRANCE CONTRA ACCELERATION

The second view focuses on the Tuileries Garden in Paris, France. I frame this in contradistinction to what Hartmut Rosa shows of acceleration within society’s modern context. I first work on how Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich contextualize acceleration as part of the material, social, and cultural world, especially in relation to globalization, of the modern character. This is followed by a critique through a focus on the Tuileries Garden.

One of the crucial features of society’s modern character is the fetish for speed. An often-cited phrase from the Communist Manifesto – “All that is solid melts into air” ((Marx, 2000a, p. 248) – conjures the image of society’s liquefaction (because of *melts*) or rarefaction (*air*). These processes provide a more contemporary approach to society. Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich (2017, p. 58) frame this as acceleration, as “the setting-in-motion of the material, the social and the cultural world at an ever[-]increasing speed.” This is more known today through the buzzwords of standardization, improvement, and optimization that pervert any sense of excellence by reducing it to simply maximization.

Modernity’s equation to this accelerated phase, however, should be divided into two specific phases. The first is raised by “working out, interpreting, and more or less bringing this experience under control.” (Rosa, 2013, p. 36) Acceleration in this sense is represented by regulation, or that regulation is a sign of society’s acceleration. Regulation not only provides the production of materials but also the fabrication of an individual’s epistemological and even ethical outlook. (Bauman, 2000, pp. 56-57) However, acceleration by itself cannot be contained to a mere parameter; a shift in focus occurs from regulation to development, from goals to indicators. This paves the way for the second phase, characterized by the loss of control, through its utter lack. Actual foundations are dismantled because of acceleration, and thus what is conjured is this endless spiral into one’s basic self. (Rosa, 2013, p. 37) If the Fordist orientation that provided a car factory’s seamless production is the best representation of the first phase, then jam-packed highways during rush hour are the best for this second, a shift from automobility to auto-immobility.

Acceleration, however, is an overarching expression of three movements: technical, socio-cultural, and experiential. (Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich, 2017, p. 58) I wish to explain these three phases vis-à-vis the garden that I present as a critique thereof. In the heart of Paris

lies a line of notable infrastructures that form the Axe Historique (historical axis) known as the Voie Triomphale (triumphal way): the Louvre Museum, the obelisk in the Place de la Concorde, the Arc de Triomphe, and the Grande Arche de La Défense at the end.

Against the backdrop of the empire-style of the museum that was once a palace is a glass pyramid, constructed during the bicentenary of the French Revolution. Paris witnessed the erections of “large important buildings devoted to the arts, the theatre, music and science” during the 1980s, beginning with the Georges Pompidou Centre in 1977 and ending with the complete renovation of the Louvre. (Salvadori, 1990, p. 127) The Louvre pyramid was part of this celebratory sweep and was meant to “restore the Louvre’s original purpose” yet did not go without controversy due to its antithetical character to the Parisian tradition. (Bigar, 2019) Today, however, both steel and glass complement the immense Louvre palace as technological acceleration shifted the construction landscape. The pyramid at the heart of what was once a palace represents this change.

The next structure worth our attention along the Axe Historique is the Luxor Obelisk in the Place de la Concorde. This *place* was also known as the Place de la Revolution in being the site of resistance and even the guillotine execution of Louis XVI, Marie Antoinette, Maximilien de Robespierre, and thousands of others during the French Revolution and the Reign of Terror. (Mignet, 2006, pp. 265-266; Carlyle, 2001, pp. 359ff) Yet this horrific past is not evident today as the guillotine, an image of death, has given way to a different image, the obelisk, that of life—the ancient Egyptian obelisk was dedicated to the Sun God, Ra, the god of the living being one of his titles. Besides technological acceleration that respectively allowed the confluence of ancient and modern methods in creating the obelisk in Egypt and transporting it to France, (Clarke and Engelbach, 1990, pp. 26ff; Lebas, 2021) this second infrastructure hints at a socio-cultural acceleration that is best seen in the merge of the two cultures. Today, one may speak of the *Parisian* obelisk without invoking the long history of France’s occupation of Egypt or even the laborious transfer of the monument. These two infrastructures—the pyramid and the obelisk—provide a closer cultural link between France and Egypt, a spiritual bond formed with Paris and Luxor currently having a piece of the two obelisks.

Continuing the axis, the next landmark is the Arc de Triomphe, “dedicated to the glory of the Imperial Army[.]” (Salvadori, 1990, p. 83) Between the obelisk and the Arc, we see the tensions between two

forms of power – divine (the sun god) and human (revolution), of the provincialism of ancient Egypt and the globalized world of the imperial army, of tradition represented by the obelisk and progress evidenced by the sculpture of the La Marseillaise/Departure of the Volunteers of 1792 at the base of the arch. This sociocultural acceleration conveys the movement of society away from theocracy (ancient Egypt) to radical democracy (First Republic).

Lastly, the fourth infrastructure, the Grande Arche de la Défense provides the culmination of the Triumphalist Way in the French capital both geographically and figuratively since it was also built during celebratory constructions/renovations. La Défense is Europe’s largest purposely built business district, having the continent’s largest shopping center and being France’s only vertical neighborhood. (Paris La Défense, 2022) With various plans for further development, La Défense distinguishes itself from other districts within the Paris metropolitan area that seemingly are fixed in time. This final infrastructure represents the third form of acceleration as the total acceleration of life’s speed, which today is fathomable through capitalism’s preponderance on quantifiable, financial terms. The Grande Arche symbolizes the triumph of financial globalization, yet, we are led to ask how this truly embodies a triumphalist way. Although the acceleration from the past to the future is architecturally evident, the problems of the “frozen” district are the same for this “futuristic” one. What this conjures is rather a weak image of triumph, affirming Bruno Latour’s (2018, §4) assertion that globalization is nothing but an extended image of provincialism. The globalized economy accelerates toward its own precariousness, and thus it seeks its stability by securing primarily the local than the global.

To critique this, one only has to look at the very axis. The Tuileries Gardens serve as an intermediary to the hustle of the Parisian capital from the craze of the financial fluctuations to the frenzy of vehicles circulating both the arch and the obelisk to the flocks of tourists queued in front of the Louvre. Between these grand landmarks of power, one is afforded a peculiar image of power: dialogue, in-between, and *inter-esse*. In this garden that stretches in all directions, one is forced to sit to relax tired legs perhaps with a cup of coffee, a good book, or while with friends. This experience brings us back to everyday life and is opportune to ponder on the dire state of globalization’s emptiness.

The garden is our in-between, between past and future, death and life, local and global. *Inter-esse* stands, according to Henk Oosterling (2000, p. 70), as a critical counterweight to radical mediocrity. In face

of the abundance of multimedia, this new form of being, being-in-between, is mindful of the space for a critical encounter with the other. It is not a passage of one into another but rather a *between*, which cannot be fixed but peculiarly relies on the tensions less of time and more of space. It is not about the mere spatial advancement from one infrastructure to another to signify temporal progression but rather realizing one's very own peculiar approach to being-in-the-world. In the garden, one is between these progressions however not entirely identified with them. Contrary to the state of homelessness raised in Baudelaire's *Paris Spleen*, this intermediary brings one out of oneself toward the other. Instead of a victorious way, we are afforded a better image of what this whole fuss of the march from provincial to global really is: a rope on which we juggle our orbs. We are reminded that "The art of life is a morphological art, an acrobatic act of constituting collective spheres whilst balancing over a crevice on Nietzsche's rope between animal and overman." Schinkel and Noordegraaf-Eelens, 2011, p. 7) In this garden, we find a few moments to consider our tightrope act in the bankruptcy of the globalized world and to experience a slowness that may not be hastened. The experience in the garden is that of non-acceleration, a reminder of a locality and identity that may not be accelerated.

RYOAN-JI ZEN GARDEN, KYOTO, JAPAN CONTRA ACTIVATION

The third view focuses on the Ryoan-ji Zen Garden in Kyoto, Japan that provides a critique of activation in the socio-political context, paying close attention to Zen Buddhism's expression of freedom within the garden as a reflection of releasement. The movement from India to Japan has cultivated an awareness of a space dedicated to cultivating the interior and exterior of the structure, alongside some Daoist features, that reflect one's own consciousness.

Following the Theory of Dynamic Stabilization, activation represents capitalism's developed phase in which the state has gone beyond Foucault's disciplinary society and perhaps even Deleuze's society of control. This activated state hinges upon citizens "who are called upon as economic (self-interested) and moral (community-oriented) actors at the same time." (Rosa, Dörre, and Lessenich, 2017, p. 59) At this point of capitalism's development, a citizen of the neoliberal world is entrusted with the economic capacity of self-improvement while at the same time bearing the responsibility for the other person. The politicization of subjectivity is due to an increase in the roles an individual ought to

play: an economic player through purchasing, mindful of promotions and sales; an economic developer through labor, especially in today's flexible working environment; a climate activist with that constant zeal to bring reusable containers and straws; a vegan; a vocal supporter of any movement such as #MeToo, BLM, or LGBTQ+ lest waves of condemnation or cancelation come if one keeps quiet. These are just some examples of subjectivity's politicization due to this confluence of economic and moral, individual and communal, dimensions toward a singular identity. However, escalatory logic lies at the heart of this type of activation. Subjectivity is activated toward progress, and, according to society's modern character, if one is not inactive, then one fails to be a morally responsible citizen. This same development is observable in the engagement with capitalist and socialist principles of the welfare state, balancing the fluctuating figures of economic enterprise with community building and fostering social interaction—an antagonism that paradoxically exhausts both financial and intellectual resources while at the same time fueling the desire for attaining a utopic political vision. (Lessenich, 2015)

The crux of the matter is subjectivity's politicization, not that the advocacies are awry in themselves, but in that this politicization follows the tendency of an escalatory logic of unlimited increase—more roles "activated" due to what is currently found in society, be it the dynamic movement of communities (clicks one may have) or what is fed by mainstream media to various age groups. This leads to the question of the individual's authenticity. A critique is formed through how activation may easily fall under the sway of the market economy, and what moral content of the imperative is simply left to an individual to fulfill. The modern character that is activated in fact oscillates between individualism and a collective that one identifies with; authenticity is freedom from external power. (Moeller and D'Ambrosio, 2021, pp. 165-167, 169) An individual assumes the disposition of maintaining an authentic disposition and identity; anthropotechnics is our contemporary imperative. (Sloterdijk, 2013, pp. 442ff) The bearing on oneself of the economic-moral imperative is due to the shift in focus, seeing even the limits of one's identity as mere restrictions that ought to be overcome. This makes one focus attention on what delineates one's own identity, distinguished between two German words: *Grenze* and *Schranke*. (Marx, 1973, p. 334) *Grenze* is a limit or endpoint that defines a finite entity qualitatively or quantitatively, whereas a *Schranke* implies a barrier or restriction that may be overcome. The disposition of society's

modern character is the non-recognition of definite limits and their consideration as simply barriers to go over, a shift from *Grenze* to simply *Schranke* is capitalism's adage. All identities are provided for each individual; everyone becomes every single one lest be ostracized.

Concerning the active society, I posit the Ryoan-ji Zen Garden as its critique. Built according to a kare-sansui style that conveys Zen Buddhist and Daoist features, this garden is opposed to the abundance of water in the first garden I presented. In fact, it even goes against other prominent architectural designs such as the shinden-zukuri mansions or the jodo-shiki gardens. The centrality of water's absence in a kare-sansui garden signifies a recognition of the transience of fixed identities. Within the Ryoan-ji Temple is a rock garden composed of five groupings surrounded by white sand, that according to Abe Masao (1997, p. 244), express the core tenants of *sunyata*.

Two points are worth considering here. The first pertains to the transmission of Buddhism to the East: the Buddha, silent in the face of his disciples who were eagerly awaiting his teaching, simply raised a flower, and it was only Mahakasyapa who smiled (back) at the Buddha. "The Buddha said, I possess the true dharma eye, the marvelous mind of Nirvana, the true form of the formless, the subtle dharma gate that does not rest on words or letters but is a special transmission outside of the scriptures. This I entrust to Mahakasyapa." (Co, 2015, p. 96) This figures the essentiality of transmission beyond words, dialogues, or even forms to Buddhism. It comes as no surprise that the Heart Sutra of the Mahayana tradition echoes the hollowness of the Skandhas: sensation, perception, memory, and consciousness. (Pine, trans., 2004, p. 2) The Skandhas as those that identify the individual in lieu of the soul, yet with the consistent equation to the emptiness of these Skandhas, one is led to realize how emptiness in itself is not something that is filled but on the contrary something experienced. Enlightenment in this sense becomes understandable not through a positive experience of gain but a negative one. Chan or Zen Buddhism's non-engagement prompts an undercoming of oppositional pairs or even of Enlightenment's association to verbalized identity. It is an understanding of Enlightenment that is transformative with respect to its attention to an emptiness that signifies a receptivity absent in both accumulation and diminution, an imperturbability in face of motion, and a nothingness that is responded to by non-doing (*wu wei* 無為) which stands as the source of everything.

This then paves the way for the second point: what is central to

this garden is in fact, following Hans-Georg Moeller's (2006, p. 137) choice of verb, the undercoming of being human. This comes from a Daoist perspective in that, according to Moeller, undercoming is a refusal of the tendency to overcome (surpass restrictions) for it speaks without a singular identity. This lack signifies also the absence of prejudices for a certain sense of fulfillment, i.e., a human flourishing according to set patterns. This is emphasized in the Daoist view (especially of Zhuang Zi) of oneself not according to a cosmic plan to be realized but an immanent order for things to naturally proceed. (Moeller, 2006, p. 48) Undercoming implies a certain sense of attention to spontaneity or the self-so (*ziran* 自然), of allowing things to naturally proceed instead of imposing oppositional pairs.

Against the active society, what the Ryoan-ji garden provides is not just emptiness but likewise authenticity. The primacy of *ziran* due to emptiness allows one to consider another Daoist concept, *zhen* 真. Moeller and D'Ambrosio (2017, §4) provide an excellent commentary on this: "*zhen* links the idea of "genuineness" (as the opposite of falsehood or fakeness) with the idea of fluid alternation or shifting identities. Paradoxically, *zhen* genuineness, or *zhenuineness*, implies non-essentiality. *Zhenuineness* has no real being and, precisely, therefore, lacks authenticity." The emptiness of the garden undercover identities. Any individual thus in front of the rock garden is brought to the realization of emptiness as one's very own authentic character. (Abe, 1997, p. 244)

Beyond these two points is a third. The rock garden is composed of five groupings surrounded by white sand, and a particular activity here is the raking of the sand. Though appearing simple, this activity requires enormous attention given to detail, and its maintenance is part of the monks' daily routine. (Young and Young, 2005, p. 108) This attention focuses on the nothingness of the activity, providing an ordering not simply of the landscape but a restructuring of one's entire being based on that exact concept of *sunyata*. Byung-Chul Han (2020, pp. 10 and 34) implies how repetitive practices stabilize the world by providing constancy not in what is new but in what is already present. The repetition in rituals "is the 'making at home in the world' [*Einhau-sung*]" since "*Being* is the *verb for a site*." Han gives utmost importance to time and place for mindfulness of these greatly disappears in a society that is activated through utmost speed.

The symbols – the formation of the rocks and the bareness provided by the sand – and ritual are what establish the *Grenze* within

the garden, not there to be overcome. They are there to be overcome in order to decentralize the individual, not to assume particular and ever-increasing identities, but to focus on the boundaries of *sunyata* for one to be fully free. Within the rituals of the rock garden, one is a genuine pretender, or in the words of Moeller and D'Ambrosio, a *zhen-uine* pretender. The raking habituates the doer to both place and time that are both empty. Authenticity in this sense takes on the form not of activation but of identity's releasement.

Conclusion

What I intended to do in this paper was to present how three gardens provide a counterweight to society's modern character. In the opposite direction of appropriation, acceleration, and activation I situated the gardens in Lahore, Paris, and Kyoto to emphasize how remembrance, slowness, and releasement are alternative perspectives. My interchanging of both capitalism and society is due to how capitalism, in its tie to neoliberalism, presents itself as the default choice for a globalized world. Lastly, my choice of these three gardens does not exhaust the potential of gardens as a whole but is merely an attempt to consider how they provide an alternative landscape not just for the built environment but also for one's interiority as a critique of capitalism's escalatory logic.

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LIFE BETWEEN SACRUM AND PROFANUM: LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN'S GARDENERSHIP AND CONSTRUCTING

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“This civilization is perhaps an environment necessary for its spirit but they have different aims”.
“I am not interested in erecting a building, but in [...] presenting to myself the foundations of all possible buildings”.

Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*

INTRODUCTION

Philosophers and theologians can be described as strange and rare personalities who worry about the existence of the external world, and they spend much of their time attempting to solve the dichotomy of nature and culture. To quote Wittgenstein's famous words: “I am sitting with a philosopher in the garden; he says again and again ‘I know that that's a tree,’ pointing to a tree that is near us. Someone else arrives and hears this, and I tell him: “This fellow isn't insane. We are only doing philosophy.”

Wittgenstein was already a famous philosopher, with such professions behind him as an elementary school teacher, a gardener, and an architect. The place of environmental philosophy and the meaning of gardening was important for him as a philosopher and gave an additional impact on Wittgenstein's life and philosophical investigations. It was visible in such areas of his investigation as religion, linguistics, philosophy of religion, ethics, aesthetics, psychotherapy, and neuroscience. Ecological linguistics gives Wittgenstein the feeling of the creator of harmony and contributor to nature. At the same time, he perceives the perfect garden as the beauty embodied by nature.

WITTGENSTEIN AS A PROTOECOLINGUIST

Ecological linguistics is one of significant approaches based on Wittgenstein's moral philosophy, ethics, and linguistics. It has mostly been ignored by environmental philosophy and traditional linguistics. Following Wittgenstein, Einer Haugen presented ecolinguistics as the study of interactions between any given language and its environment.

“The true environment of a language is the society that uses it as one of its codes. Language exists only in the minds of its users, and it only functions in relating these users to one another and to nature, i. e. their social and natural environment”.¹

Haugen emphasized that only through a metaphorical description and approach of language as ecological language, does it develop, reproduce, and compete for survival in a cultural environment. Other linguists in the decade following Haugen developed an approach to linguistics using Haugen's ecological metaphor. His metaphor as such occupies an important place in ecological linguistics; in fact, it uses the same terms and phrases as ecological philosophy which is closely related to the discourse of ecological relations. Examples of such symbolic meanings are typical for ecological language vocabulary: ‘linguistic ecosystem’, ‘language habitat’, ‘environment of language’, and ‘language pollution’. This list could easily be continued. Nicholas M. Sarratt calls Wittgenstein a protoecolinguist. However, he understands and explains the reasons that make this definition difficult to prove: “The first problem arises from a lack of textual evidence from the Wittgenstein corpus, a fact that can be explained by the historical context”.² For the second reason, Sarratt reveals that “the processes of massive losses of biological and linguistic diversity have grown fast during the second half of the twentieth century, and the awareness about this massive extinction of biodiversity and languages arose mostly in the 1980s”.³ Sarratt named this second problem as “a historical asynchrony”.⁴

WITTGENSTEIN'S GARDENING METAPHOR

The similarity or maybe analogy between philosophy and gardening challenges us to see the activity of philosophy in another light. This analogy includes an emphasis on creativity and it excites the imagination. Beth Savickey sees these kinds of similarities “in matters of intellect and grammatical improvisation, we begin again and again”.⁵ But at the same time, it is “consistent with his descriptive, improvisational and performative art” and takes “the form of interactive, multi-perspectival texts that require reader participation”.⁶ The use of gardening metaphors has a long philosophical tradition. Wittgenstein uses them and by that reveals the environmental diversity, at the same time praising the beauty of language and life. Astonishing is the extraordinary range of remarks in which Wittgenstein by ecological, mostly gardening metaphors presents and explores philosophical views on nature, human

1. Haugen, 1972, p. 325
2. Sarratt, 2012, p. 357
3. Ibid, p. 357
4. Ibidem
5. Savickey, 2017, p. 140
6. Ibid, p. 140-141

activity, and its perspective. As emphasized by Michael Polan, “writing and gardening, these two ways of rendering the world in rows, have a great deal in common”.⁷ Wittgenstein describes own originality of text in terms of the seed. In his famous remark about the results of a year-long lectures he wrote: “The only seed that I am likely to sow is a certain jargon”.⁸ He uses many environmental and gardening metaphors when he discusses his writings: *ecology of language, these thoughts fertilize the ground for new ones, original form, freshly grown from within oneself, a manure on your field*, or words are like “a fresh seed sown on the ground of discussion”.

Wittgenstein demands a caring attitude toward every thought or fragment that may sound meaningless, he is against discarding and forgetting what has already been created because we never know the true value of what seems imperfect today. “Ideas too sometimes fall from the tree before they are ripe”.⁹ Through mistakes and delusions, just like a gardener who sometimes is forced to be guided not by knowledge or experience but by intuition, the author or writer along the way faces errors or contradictory conclusions. Yet each of them has its own value and allows you to understand the origins of delusions.

“A mediocre writer must beware of too quickly replacing a crude, incorrect expression with a correct one. By doing so [they] kill their original idea, which was at least still a living seedling. Now it is withered and no longer worth anything... Whereas the wretched little seedling was still worth something”.¹⁰

It was this method that allowed Wittgenstein to leave his complete handwritten legacy. In this, we observe a certain similarity with the legacy of Walter Benjamin, who also carefully treated each handwritten text, both his own and that of others, the loss of the library and the numerous manuscripts that he kept became one of the painful personal tragedies.

NON-INSTRUMENTALITY AND INTRINSIC VALUES

The theory of intrinsic value includes transitioning from our egoistic nature to a more altruistic one. The non-instrumentality according to relation to the environment and non-human beings is a difficult goal from the reason that the theory of intrinsic value is not shared by the majority.

It was at the beginning of the 21st century that the non-instrumentality and intrinsic values as human ideals and a universal rule of

7. Pollan, 1991, p. 6

8. Malcolm, 1984, p. 2–3

9. Wittgenstein, 1998, p.32

10. Wittgenstein, 1998, p.79e

ethics became an important ethics category with the aim of calling for a social and political transition from anthropocentrism to biocentrism. Wittgenstein does not divide and espouse the intrinsic value theory for different reasons. He considers that human beings are not ends in themselves. For them something that is superior always exists. (God, Demiurges, High power, or Numen). His ethics is mostly pragmatic and utilitarian, and he describes a strong foundation for that in the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus* in which he proves that an ethics discourse does not have a clear reference and is nonsensical. Wittgenstein considers solipsism acceptable in ethics. In the *Notebooks*, he underlines that “I can only make myself independent of the world—and so in a certain sense master it—by renouncing any influence on happenings”.¹¹ He thinks that the successful application of the rules used in the community does not guarantee ethical truth. Ethical truth depends on the connection between the individual and the world on different levels and this sphere belongs to freedom of will and personal or social group choice.

For him, ethics is never hedonistic because of the reason that environmental conciseness includes more obligations than rights. He defines pragmatism as a worldview where goal is the satisfaction of individuals’ interests: “I don’t call an argument a good argument just because it has the consequences I want (Pragmatism)”.¹² Wittgenstein’s idea of identification of ethics with aesthetics, allowed him to look for a basis for ecological thinking from another side. He finds the basis for this in the sense of the world as an organized system, in which using one element, its extraction or its absolutization, becomes the reason for destroying the harmony of the world’s wholeness. The Wittgenstein ethic view is concluded in these words: “What is Good is Divine too. That, strangely enough, sums up my ethics”.¹³

Peter Takov explains why we look at Wittgenstein’s ethics as clearly ecological. “This simply means that everything that is the case should be preserved so that we stay in harmony with other things which cannot be destroyed without affecting us in a certain way. It is at this level that aesthetics plays a key role in Wittgenstein’s ethics. Not only are we dependent on the world, but also the world is to be contemplated because it strikes us as something we do not understand”.¹⁴ For Wittgenstein, “the world contemplation” was one of the important tasks. He was against “the instrumentalist language” and “instrumentalization” as such that focus on the commodification of the environment by humans.

11. Wittgenstein, 1979, p.73
11.6.16

12. Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 77

13. Wittgenstein, 1998, p. 5

14. Takov, 2020

RELIGIOUS APPROACH

For Wittgenstein, the analysis of religious language throughout his life was greatly complicated because of the periodical transformations of his religious views. It was a transformation from his early treatment of the language as such to the religious language specifically. For Wittgenstein, every personal belief defends its own, particular “situation”. Derrida, who experienced the same difficulties and understood Wittgenstein well wrote: “The same religiosity is obliged to ally the reactivity of the archaic return or to hypercritical vigilance”. It “can displace the traditional structures of national citizenship; they tend to efface both the borders of the state and the distinctive properties of languages”.¹⁵

The postmodern theory of his concept of religion includes the idea that is close to an immanent sort of eschatology, proclaiming the end of all that went before it. Wittgenstein makes a successful attempt to create a history of the close connection to the practice of gardening and to nature through ethics, aesthetics, and religion. This page includes such statements as:

- “Religious faith and superstition are quite different. One of the results from fear and is a sort of false science. The other is trusting”.¹⁶
- He could not have reconciled himself to any of the Christian denominations with their required assent to various dogmas.
- Even if Christian “religious pictures” spoke to Wittgenstein that his admiration for sincere religious faith was much broader than his respect for the Christian faith alone.
- “All religions are wonderful ... The ways in which people express their religious feelings differ enormously.”¹⁷
- The idea of God the Creator caused him great doubts and practically did not play an important part in his own thinking about nature.

In the *Tractatus Logico-philosophicus*, he takes the image of an eye that sees the world. The purpose of this image is to show that our view of the world is necessarily limited; the eye that sees the world cannot see itself. “The world is my world”, he says.¹⁸

According to David Macarthur, more important to Wittgenstein is “attempting to literally see things *sub specie aeterni* that is, attempting to see things from a universal or totalising God’s-eye perspective above the mundane perspective of contingent facts”.¹⁹ For Wittgenstein, ethics first of all includes the attitude to the world or life as a whole that can show up in anything that we do and say and think.

15. Derrida, 2002, p. 92

16. Wittgenstein, 1998, CV p. 72

17. Wittgenstein, Hermine, 1984, p. 102

18. Wittgenstein, 1974, §.5.62

19. Macarthur, 2014

WITTGENSTEIN'S GRETEL HOUSE

On the one hand, the philosophy of architecture is one of the possible subjects of aesthetics, and on the other, the theories of architecture are constantly inspired by philosophical concepts. According to Derrida, there are also other, less obvious models of the relationship between architecture and philosophy since the philosophical language itself contains many architectural metaphors. From Jean Baudrillard’s view, there exists another connection that is intrinsic to both kind of activities: philosophy and architecture try to precisely achieve a form of unintentional, involuntary radicality.

One of the most important material examples of the interaction between philosophy and architecture is the famous Wittgenstein House in Vienna, which was designed by the philosopher for his sister. It was built in the period between 1926 -1929 and it is called, Palais Stonborough (Gretel’s House). Wittgenstein was indeed explicitly talking of his philosophy and not of building Gretel’s house when he wrote “I am not interested in constructing a building, so much as having a perspicuous view of the foundations of possible buildings”. Wittgenstein’s stature as a philosopher, gardener, and architect has an intimate connection with Wittgenstein’s life and thoughts.

The Wittgenstein House was very Viennese, with absence of decoration inside and minimalistic from outside. In his image it fully corresponded to the mood of Vienna and Wittgenstein’s beliefs. Stuart Jeffries describes psychological, aesthetic and artistic life and atmosphere in Vienna in the following way:

“Fin de siècle Vienna was a city of aesthetic and moral decay and, at the same time, of creatively frenetic reaction against that decadence: Schoenberg’s atonal music insisted that everything that could be expressed had been expressed by tonal music; Loos’s architecture railed against decoration; Freud argued that unconscious forces seethed below a purportedly ordered and elegant society. Established values were being turned upside-down in Vienna”.²⁰

20. Jeffries, 2002

Wittgenstein’s sister, Hermine described the Wittgenstein House as a laboratory or experiment for living. She specified that this was not a house for “small mortals like me”, “this ‘house embodied logic”, it was the embodiment of “perfection and monumentality”. Many researchers and biographers suggest that we can deeper understand Wittgenstein’s architecture by seeing it as the action of estimating from the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. At the same time, architecture and gardening

play a specific psychotherapeutic role in the different difficult stages of his life. Gardening was partly an architectural activity, and the environmental aspect was important for both. Wittgenstein sees a very close connection between these two activities. This similarity is expressed in the following conclusion: “Working in philosophy—like work in architecture in many respects—is really more a working on oneself. On one’s own interpretation. On one’s way of seeing things. (And what one expects of them)”.²¹ Wittgenstein repeats more than once that art, philosophy, and architecture “captures the world sub specie aeterni”.²²

His words that “the world is all that is the case” in relation to his practical constricting activity had a special meaning. He looked at the construction of house not in a way as an object or thing, but as a fact that is the result of his practical activity. “The totality of facts” open for him through writing, gardening, and constructing.

At the same time, we have to remember that constricting activity was not absolutely new for him. His famous words “I am not interested in constructing a building” relate to philosophical research rather than to the construction of the concrete Gretel’s House. The key reason to build House Wittgenstein can be linked to the meaning of “ability” as a potentiality to do a specific thing that one has learned to do. The embodiment of the House project was for him to attempt to realize his potential to do what he learned. He gained the education in design as an engineering student in Manchester, England. And he is known to have designed a kite and a jet-propulsion engine. He used his knowledge when focusing on the design of windows, doors, doorknobs, and radiators, demanding that every detail be exactly as he specified.

In the architectural preferences Wittgenstein was guided by one personal judgement which expressed his understanding of what is and is not architecture. Macarthur wrote that “his taste in architecture, despite the modernist appearance of the House’s unadorned, somewhat asymmetrical white cubic geometries, is decidedly antimodernist”.²³ At the same time, the House was constructed as an act of doing Wittgenstein’s ethical aim of developing “working on oneself” by overcoming the temptation to teach and instruct others. This task has not been fully achieved.

HOW TO STAY IN AN IMPERFECT REALITY

The famous words “I don’t know why we are here, but I’m pretty sure that it is not in order to enjoy ourselves” in fact is a key to Wittgen-

21. Wittgenstein Hermine, et.

al., 1984, p. 16

22. Ibid, p.5

23. Macarthur, 2014

stein’s attempt to find the way to salvation from “the totality of facts”, which make our lives difficult and troubling. However, Wittgenstein did not name a garden or nature as such the all-absorbing salvation or the source of psychological adaptation to the imperfect reality. Nonetheless, Wittgenstein took to gardening as a cure for his own psychological problems. In a letter to the architect Paul Engelmann, he wrote:

“I have broken my word. I shall not come your way, at least for the time being.... For in my present dubious state of mind even talking to you – much as I enjoy it – would be no more than a pastime. I was longing for some kind of regulated work which, of all the things I can do in my present condition, is the most nearly bearable, if I am not mistaken. It seems I have found such a job: I have been taken on as an assistant gardener at the Klosterneuberg Monastery for the duration of my holiday”.²⁴

Wittgenstein’s careful words about “all the things I can do in my present condition, is most nearly bearable” tell us that he is not completely sure of the correctness of his choice. In this sense, he was close to Hermann Hesse’s fragment from *The Glass Bead Game* where Elder Brother laughed that “anyone can create a pretty little bamboo garden in the world. But I doubt the gardener would succeed in incorporating the world in his bamboo grove”.²⁵ Thinking about the meaning of gardening and caring about nature in a broad sense, Wittgenstein doesn’t see the source of the philosophical concept of spiritual health happiness, and existential well-being. The articulation of his statements, including this letter, does not claim to generalize at the methodological level, rather, we have to deal with a careful method of instruction, a description of what helps a person achieve the best result in his professional and private activity and this is the universality of nature and garden, in particular, it gives us the simplest rules for both thinking and acting.

To a certain extent, there is a feeling of closeness of the Wittgenstein environmental idea with the famous Zen Buddhist scholar and author of the popular books *Daisetsu T. Suzuki’s* idea that “...religions are each a sort of organism, an organism that is [through time] subject to ‘irritation’ and therefore shows the capacity to change or evolve.” (D. T. Suzuki. *How to stay in an imperfect reality*. 2010. Pacific Publishing Studio: Seattle). Such books as “*Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance: An Inquiry into Values*” written by Robert M. Pirsig or “*Zen in the Art of Archery*” written by Eugen Herrigel are to some extent close to the spirit of Wittgenstein.²⁶

One of the first researchers who wrote about this similarity was

24. Wittgenstein, 1974, p. 37

25. Hesse, 2000, p. 139

26. Pirsig, 1974; Herrigel 1999

H. Hadson. He underlined that “when doing Wittgensteinian philosophy, metaphysical assertions are at first typically puzzling. Then, we are able to see that a feature of such propositions is that they obliterate the distinction between empirical and conceptual inquiries”.²⁷ According to H. Hadson, there is difference between the philosophical practice of Wittgenstein and Zen meditation but “there is an intriguing parallel between the steps taken to enlightenment or understanding in each”.²⁸ In Hadson’s opinion, similarly to Wittgenstein, Zen has been described as a method and technique rather than a doctrine. “Wittgenstein also denied that he taught any philosophical theses or doctrines but only methods which function as kinds of therapy. For philosophical perplexities are like different kinds of illness, and so different methods are to be used according to the circumstances”.²⁹ Levi Asher emphasizes that “the essence of Zen Buddhist philosophy feels very close to the essence of late Wittgenstein: if the above passage about games is not a great koan, I don’t know what is”.³⁰

CONCLUSION

Different researchers argue and discuss about what was the constructing the house for Wittgenstein: a form of expression of Wittgenstein’s exceptional sensual-artistic talent, or the potential to turn ideas into form, or the house that led him to formulate philosophical ideas and questions. They include the questions if architecture can be sensed as an applied philosophy or if we can treat it as a philosophical theory transposed into the building.

Wittgenstein indirectly wrote his page in the history that connects the practice of gardening and constructing which relates to nature through the ethics, aesthetics, and religion of modern Europe. The laconicism of the House form corresponds to and reminds us of the laconicism of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* statements. Nevertheless, the question remains open to what extent the architecture has become part of Wittgenstein’s spiritual development. We tend to think that the act of constructing the home had practically no effect on his philosophical research in contrast to Wittgenstein’s gardenership which is more connected to his spiritual, psychological, philosophical, and environmental outlook.

27. Hadson, 1973, p.471

28. Ibid, p.473-474

29. Ibid, p.475

30. Asher, 2014

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CITY AGORA OR CITY GARDEN? AN URBANISTIC DILEMMA IN THE 19TH-CENTURY HUNGARY

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INTRODUCTION

Mass demonstrations represent a new phenomenon; a novelty is the 19th-century history of Hungarian political ideas; the first significant ones in this genre were organised in the time of the revolution of 1848. In the second half of the century, especially after the Austrian–Hungarian Compromise in 1867 (by the term of this age ‘the reconstruction of the Constitution of the country’), mass demonstrations became permanent elements of the Hungarian politics. The description and reconstruction of these demonstrations, including the analysis of their functions and ideological backgrounds are well-known in the Hungarian historiography. But their urbanistic features are rarely a researched field in the Hungarian scholarship, despite the vivid urbanistic discussion in the same period, concerning the same public realms what were used by these demonstrations. The present paper will be focussed on the connection between the political history of Hungary and the cultural usage of the public realms, in the 19th century. The main hypothesis of the present paper is that there is a hidden tension between the new-type usages of the public realms *as agorae* for the political activities and *as gardens* for the recreations. These new-type functions of the public realms were developed in the same time in Budapest, and sometimes the dominant function of a locality was not clear and changed.

Below, the pictorial representation of the new-type public realms will be exemplified by emblematic scenes in the city of Pest – today it is a part of Budapest on the left bank of Danube – a famous café and the front of the most important printing house as a symbol of the dominant media of this epoch and the building of the National Museum. The most important example is the changing function of the square around the building of the National Museum from an open square of political demonstrations until the recreational garden closed with the palisades. The changing forms of the usage of the public realms is connected with the visual representation of the mass demonstrations as symbols of historical events. By the evidence of the analysis of the most emblematic cases of the visually embodied cultural memory, in many cases there

is a tension between the original function of the public realms and their political usage; buildings and environment of cultural, or industrial institutions became political symbols. In other cases, when the political symbol of a public realm and its political usage were in synchrony, the technical conditions of the public realm made it dysfunctional for the mass politics. This tensions and dysfunctionalities have two roots in the history of the urbane development of Budapest. The first one is a general modernisation process of the urban environment of the political centres, and a formation of the public realms able for the requirements of the mass politics. The second one is a speciality of the urbane development of Budapest what was unified from three separate cities into one as late as in 1873; and its urbane structure formed just gradually from a three-headed settlement into a really unified capital of Hungary.

The theoretical starting point of my investigations was a visual interpretation of the key words of the concept of *cultural memory*. The first key word is the *Gedächtnisspur* (say ‘trace of memory’) of Jan Assmann as the central *narrative, non-visual* concept of his theory of the cultural memory. However, Assmann formulated the first draught of his ideas about the cultural memory in an English book (Assmann, 1997), published as a result of his visiting professorship in California, the new term of *Gedächtnisspur* was introduced just in the later published German version (Assmann, 1998), and he never tried to find an English equivalent for this neologism. The second term is Pierre Nora’s *lieux de mémoire* as a *spatial and visual* concept of the historical memory. It is interesting that the English version of Nora’s term, *realm of memory*, connects our third term, *public realm*, with the concept of memory. Nora’s aspect can be regarded as an endeavour to narrate the *history of the public realms*. (For the English version of Nora’s masterpiece, see Nora, 1996.) The theoretical novelty of my approach is that it offers a historical analysis of the *visual representation* of the *public realms* as it is preserved in the *cultural memory*. My intention was to liberate these keywords of the cultural memory from an almost pure *narrative* context and relink them with the *visual* sphere and with the historical and functional analysis of the urbane places. By other words, cultural memory must be more than a simple narrative story-telling, it is the history of the change of the function of the public realms, and a history of the activities of a political community embedded in a special urbane environment. This approach is connected with the different forms of the visual representations of the political personalities; a visual representation of a historical event embedded in an urbane

environment, must contain in many cases visual representations of historical, political personalities in the same visual environment. By this way, traditional narrative elements of the political history will be more embedded into the visual history of the public realms, into a historical urban studies. In the field of the intellectual history, connected with the *cultural memory*, with the function of the urbane environment in the background, the first step was an analysis of the emergence of the genre of *public philosophy* (Mester, 2018a). Later, it was described the cultural function of the cities (Mester, 2018b). The next step was the investigation of the *modern authorial self* in the context of the visibility of the cultural memory (Mester, 2019); my recent paper (Mester, 2022) was focussed on the visual representation from a historical perspective, and the present paper will be focussed on the visual forms of the cultural memory of several emblematic historical events.

SÁNDOR PETŐFI AND THE REVOLUTION OF 1848 IN PICTURES

The best example for the visual historical representation of a symbolic personality in a symbolic public realm is the poet of the revolution of 1848, Sándor Petőfi (1823–1849). (Sándor Petőfi was a poet, an emblematic figure of the Hungarian romanticism. He played a key role in the political life as an initiator of the revolution of 1848; and he died in the battle field in the war of independence, in 1849, as an officer of the revolutionary Hungarian Army, against the Russian Army as an ally of the Austrian Hapsburgs, within the Holy Alliance. For an early English translation of a selection of his poems with his biography, see Bowring, 1866.) In the time of our story he was a representative of the younger generation of the intellectuals, later with an abundant tradition of his pictorial representation. However, we have his authentic portrait made by the *hi-tech* of his age, a *daguerreotype*, as well, and he has a lot of emblematic pictorial representations, his personal opinions about the new trend of the public portraits were highly pejorative. He called it a *new idolatry* and expressed his aims with a Platonic metaphor; according to him, his spiritual face should be engraved *in the souls of his audience*, instead of his reproduced portraits were estimated in albums of celebrities. (See the well-known *locus* of Plato's *Seventh Letter* about the true philosopher who prefers to write his works *on the souls of men than on the leather of animals*.) This 'anti-idolatry' programme is not surprising, if we are informed both about the usual function of the multiplied portraits in this era, and Petőfi's endeavours in the literary

life just before the revolution. Petőfi and his group of young writers and poets called 'the tens' wanted to achieve the authors' independence from the big, privileged editing houses and periodicals by the boycott of the dominant media-companies, and by the foundation of their own periodicals. (In the first days of the revolution, in the first period of the liberty of the press in the Hungarian history, he immediately founded the periodical of his group.) In the same time, publication of the multiplied portraits of the authors of a periodical as a special appendix before Christmas, or, the New Year, for the subscribers, was a well-known part of the promotion in the machinery of the cultural industry of this time. Under these conditions, a logical consequence of the boycott of the big media-companies was a disapproval concerning their promotional activity via the multiplied portraits of the authors.

We should consider that the majority of his portraits were made *posthumously*, and the aim of the single daguerreotype was initially private, just an interesting experience about the technological novelties, offered by one of his friends. His case is an almost unique opportunity to observe how an authentic, realistic, technically supported picture can be transformed into different idealised visual representations, with variations for inland and foreign usage. In Petőfi's case, we can realise the problem of the visualisation of these idealised figures in collective actions like a revolution in 1848. (Hungarian revolution in 1848 was a typical part of the revolutionary wave of the Continental Europe, in the same year. A speciality of the Hungarian case was the long war of independence, as a consequence of the revolution, against the Austrian and Russian troops, till the autumn of 1949. For the history of the revolution and war of independence, see Bona, 1999; and Deák, 2001.) However, Petőfi really was a central figure of the revolution, and the key events of the 'first day of the national liberty' with his participation have an important role in the national cultural memory, we have not any emblematic visual representation of his acting, or, what we have, they are unreliable from several aspects. (Petőfi wanted to form the cultural memory of the revolution of 1848 systematically and consciously, but he used for it narrative elements; i.e., the publication of his diary, written in the first days of the revolution, in accordance of his 'anti-idolatry' attitude.) This situation is connected with another visual feature of this cultural transition is the changing structure of the public realms of the cities, because of the functional transformation of the usage of urban places, from the public cafés and private saloons to the fixed places of the political demonstrations and mass meetings. By my hypothesis,

there is a contradiction in the relation between the pictorial schemes of the individual portraits and the perspective of the above-mentioned new public realms in their representations.

THE PRESS AND THE CAFÉ AS EMBLEMATIC PUBLIC REALMS

Our first examples for the political usage of the public realms touches places what are totally apolitical ones by the first glance, in their original functions. An emblematic visual representation of the revolution is the distribution of the first products of the free press, after the symbolic occupation of the Landerer & Heckenast Co., the biggest printing house of Pest in this time. We can see on the pictorial representations made in synchrony with the events that people read the *Twelve Points of the Demands of the People*, and Petőfi's poem on the distributed flyers, in small groups throughout in the street before the printing house, but the poet is not present, the distributor of the flyers is just an unknown activist. It is a merely typographical vision of a *free nation* connected via the *free press*, without heroes, or charismatic leaders. It is a symptomatic description of all the witnesses of the revolutionary events that Petőfi communicated with the people just in a technically mediated form, via the press. He went to the building of the press, dictated or wrote the text directly for the picker, corrected the proof, and so on (we have detailed written memories of the elderly typographers from the second half of the century). Petőfi acted in the first day of the revolution like on his weekdays as it was usual for a professional writer and public intellectual, he did not intend to change the role of a modern author who works for the press with the archaic and romantic speaker who communicates with the people directly, without technical media (as it was appeared in the image of the posterior generation of the late romanticism). The usual visual representation made in synchrony with the events, this scene directly shows the people, the mass *as the actor of the history*, and the instrument, the press in a symbolic role as prerequisite and cement of the modern liberated society.

Another example for the public places is the emblematic café called Pilvax, one of the headquarters of the revolution of 1848. We should not imagine an intimate location for *rendezvous* and other private affairs. On the pictorial representations made in synchrony with the revolutionary days, we can see that it is a great café-hall, an important catalyser of the political and cultural activity, with complete editorial boards of the new-established periodicals; amongst them the

so-called 'table of the public opinion', the usual place of Petőfi's group, *Society of the Tens*. As this apolitical group transformed into a revolutionary political proto-party, its location found its role in the symbolic places of the visual representation of the revolution, as well. In the previous scene we could see a more official and technical place of the everyday life of a public intellectual of the same age, in here we can see a more informal, but highly important scenery of the same intellectual life. Petőfi and other known figures of the Hungarian cultural life were everyday guests in here; his and many others' post addresses was in this time just 'at the Pilvax in the city of Pest', used the café as an open editorial office and writer's study. However, the interior pictures made contemporarily with the events, a counterpart of the former exterior picture, we can see similar symbolic visual elements. Instead of the crowded mass as a passive audience of the communication mediated by the press, in here there is represented symbolically a working laboratory of the ideas what will be embodied in the press, soon. The usual contemporary pictures of the café-hall are full of anonym figures; portraits on the wall are unidentified, as well, Petőfi and the members of his group are absent from these well-known pictorial representations of his favourite café. As it was observable in the case of the visual representation of the exterior of the printing house 'Landerer & Heckenast', the interior of the Pilvax café shows the symbolism of the place as a public realm. Instead of Petőfi, or his group, it is more important the so-called 'table of the common opinion'. However, this table was the usual place of the 'the Tens', in the first days of the revolution, in the formulation of the visual form of the cultural memory. As in the case of the printing house, the physical place of the free press became a symbol; in here, the physical space of the editorial office of a free periodical became a symbol of the same concept of the liberty. (The Pilvax café works today, as well, in the same place, but the building was totally rebuilt in the 20th century; its structure and especially the interior of the café has changed. The image of the interior of the café in the 19th century is known just after ancient pictures.)

There is a scene of the first revolutionary day where the original political symbolism of a public realm is not in tension with the political action of the revolutionary mass. It is the enforced validation of the *Twelve Points Commitments* by the *Royal Governmental Council* in the city of Buda, and the liberation of a political prisoner from the 'Hungarian Bastille' in the next street. By the first glance, it is the pure form of the political usage of a public realm; a demonstration against

the rulers in front of the headquarter of the rulers. Surprisingly, the visual representations of these events are almost missing; there are just some pictures about the liberation of the political prisoner Mihály Táncsics, but just the scene when he is speaking for the mass in Pest, *on the other bank* of the Danube. Knowing the map of Buda, the mystery of the lack of this kind of the visual representation can be solved; this district was totally dysfunctional for the spectacular mass-demonstrations, because of its narrow streets remained from the mediaeval centuries. (Mihály Táncsics, 1799–1884, was a well-known writer and leftist politician of his age; his enforced liberation was an emblematic event of the revolution.)

A TENSION OF THE USAGE OF THE PUBLIC REALMS: CHANGING FUNCTIONS OF THE MUSEUM GARDEN

In the line of the most important new-type public realms of Pest in the revolutionary days, our main example is the square in the front of the National Museum. In the time of the revolution, the building of the Museum was relatively newly established. It was always planned to be situated in the centre of a would-be Museum Garden, but this garden was not established yet, till the time of the revolution, and after that, under conditions of the political instability and later the military manoeuvres, the garden-building stopped for a while. There was a large and well-located square around the Museum. It was as near to the biggest market-place and to the Danube ports (now there is the biggest market hall of the city), as to the buildings of the university, and the former headquarter of the Academy. Telling the truth, it happened *accidentally* that in the time of the revolution there was the *biggest square* of the city here, optimal for the mass demonstrations. Visual representations of this emblematic scene of the revolution, made synchrony with the events, are similar like the abovementioned examples; their essence is the people as the actor of the history. An emblematic picture describes Petőfi's legendary speech in the Museum square, when he recites his poem for the people. It is a *legendary* event, because actually he did not speak *here, this day*. Other visual representations were focussed on the mass, on the ordinary people as the *actor of the history*, its (unknown) leader is just a point on the horizon.

Later, in the last third of the 19th century, the political usage of this location became amorphous in a way, with the establishment of the Museum Garden. There were continuous demonstrations in front

of the neighbouring provisional building of the Parliament. (This building works today as the Italian Cultural Institute. It was not actually big enough for the all the functions of a Parliament, it worked in a symbiosis with the National Museum, used the hall of the later for bigger festive events.) Political demonstrations have not an adequate location here, because the former square became a garden, closed by palisades, as it was always planned. In these years the Museum Garden became one of the most frequented recreation parks of the Hungarian capital, as it is mirrored in the well-known novel of the epoch entitled *The Paul Street Boys*, written by Ferenc Molnár (1878–1952), in the early period of his career, in 1906 (for a recent English version see: Molnár, 2019). (For the social history of Hungary of this period, see Gyáni–Kövér–Valuch, 2004; for the history of Budapest, see Gerő–Poór, 1997.)

Another novel published just before the move of the Houses of the Parliament well describes the dysfunctionality of this square, for the mass-politics (Hungarian Parliament moved to a yet uncompleted new building on the bank of the Danube, in 1902; the novel was published in 1901). The author of the novel, Gyula Krúdy (1878–1933) is a well-known Hungarian writer, novelist. He is known as a chronicler of the milieu of the ancient Buda and Pest, as well. A scene of the novel describes the arrangements of a demonstration, from a specific point of view used often in the writing technic of Krúdy. It is a sudden switch from the point of view of the central hero of the story to the point of view of a barman, waiter, publican or cab-driver. This writing technic can be described by the most characteristic form in the short twin-stories of the last period of his authorial career, what are interesting from the point of view of the cultural image of the urbane public spaces, as well. The *Last Cigar at the 'Arabian Dapple-Grey Horse'* (i.e. at the inn entitled after this kind of horses), was first published in 1927 (see Krúdy, 1957b), and its twin, *The Journalist and the Death* was appeared in 1931 (see Krúdy, 1957a). (In the following, I will mention the quoted Hungarian works with their English titles; for the original editorial data see the list of references.) The twin short stories offer a description of the last evening and night of two socially highly different heroes, before their duel in the next early morning. The poor journalist, Titusz Széplaki and the 'retired colonel P.E.G.' eat the imagined usual foods of each other and use the symptomatic public spheres of each other; the journalist is walking around the garrisons and the central officers' club, the colonel has a walk in the street of the editing houses and around the cheap pubs. The end of the story is a kind of the change

of their social roles and images; at first from the inversed aspect of the main characters, in the end from the point of view of a publican and a cab-driver. In these short stories there is a great role of the inverse social usage of the urbane spaces.

The work quoted here is Krúdy's first novel, entitled *The Goldmine* (Krúdy, 1960, first published in 1901). In the background of the novel there is a continuous change of the urbane landscape of Budapest; important scenes of the story are always destroying, building, or rebuilding. In the scene focussed on the Museum Garden, we can see just one, unique public sphere, from different aspects. After the points of view of prominent politicians and young students who organise the demonstration in the front of the Parliament against an act proposal, suddenly appears the point of view of the gardener and guardian of the Museum Garden, who is an experienced veteran soldier:

The serious building of the Museum is swimming in a fog, and from the fog appears a veteran [...] who provides the Museum garden. [...] He read [...] in his morning newspaper that [...] it is planned a demonstration in the front of the Parliament. [...] Why? The veteran did not know it and he was not interested in it. [...] He is worry just about the garden where the crowd will be cooped up by the police. (Krúdy, 1960, pp. 106–107.)

In this novel, the dysfunctionality of the political and recreation usages of the Museum Garden appears clearly from the point of view of the veteran-gardener. In the next year after the publication of the novel the houses of the Hungarian Parliament moved to the bank of the Danube, in the middle of a large square. This square was the scene of the mass-events of the next important political event that is the constitutional crisis in 1905–1906, without any disturbance of the apolitical people. In 1906 was published the abovementioned novel of Ferenc Molnár, with an emblematic opening scene of a *marble game party*, a favourite activity of the children of this epoch, in the Museum Garden. There was just 5 years between the novels of Krúdy and Molnár, and in the case of the last one, another usage of the Museum Garden than the recreation, was not mentioned again.

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A PHENOMENOLOGY OF A JAPANESE REMEMBRANCE GARDEN

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The garden is a simple concept that is full of hidden complexity and contradiction. It is a bounded space that always seems to exceed its boundaries. Enchanting and familiar, the garden demands both work and rest. At first glance the garden is the embodiment of nature transformed by the use of human reason, a plotted story of material prose. But the garden grows not from a singular plan or source but from a collaboration with unseen and unpredictable actors. We can extend the scope of the garden to include weather patterns, worms, soil constitutions, and pollen distribution. If we do, then the picture of the garden as predictable begins to fail and the complexity required for growth begins to emerge along with new collaborators and partners.

During my time at Seattle University, there was a Japanese Remembrance Garden just outside my office. This garden has a plaque that tells a story about the intentions of the gardener and the names of the donors that have provided the space for material memory. In many ways, it is the plaque, rather than the garden itself, that tells us that this space is a garden at all. I will use this garden as an opportunity for a phenomenological investigation, arguing that the garden embodies both a tension between visibility and invisibility, and between bounded space and excess. To do this, I will appeal to Robert Pogue Harrison's *Gardens: An Essay on the Human Condition* and expand on what he calls the "phenomenological conversion" of garden experiences. I will also appeal to Carolyn Merchant's *Reinventing Eden* as a way of incorporating garden narratives, which challenge the narrative of conquest and control that we find in the Biblical story of Eden, and Steven Vogel's *Thinking Like a Mall*, where I replace Vogel's mall with a garden to highlight the need for collaboration that exceeds linguistic communication. Finally, I will look to Merleau-Ponty's work in *The Visible and the Invisible* to argue that the tension in the garden between visibility and invisibility mirrors the challenge of internment thrust upon Japanese Americans during World War II. By using the Japanese Memorial Garden as an opportunity for phenomenological investigation, I highlight issues of visibility in race relations, and demonstrate the importance of material memory in shared spaces and on university campuses.

Standing in front of the Japanese American Remembrance Gar-

den on the campus of Seattle University, the garden does little to evoke a sense of memory, reverence, or grief. In fact, the experience of the space as a garden at all is not immediately clear. There is no peaceful repose or steady path to guide my way. There is little to distinguish the memorial garden from other landscape designs, rendering it generally invisible. Students and faculty pass by almost constantly without ever paying attention to the garden as there is little about this space that designates it as a garden. In that sense it is both visible and invisible, made up of the visible stuff of our bodies, yet lacking in meaning as a visible thing. Nothing in its material presentation draws one's attention to the garden as garden or to the problem of Japanese internment. The lack of a clearly defined boundary highlights the tension present in gardens between their borders and the surrounding space. The garden is a contradiction by being both bounded and unbounded. It is only in the projected meaning as a place for remembrance, as a bounded space, as a garden, that such ideas begin to emerge.

The plaque next to the garden describes its purpose and calls attention to the guiding principle for its existence. According to the plaque, "this is sacred land." Why is it sacred? Because "Before World War II a community of Japanese and Japanese Americans lived" here. This community, which included a significant number of U.S. citizens, was removed, "incarcerated and held behind barbed wire for three or more years without a crime and without due process." The plaque seems to implicitly claim that we *should* remember the tragedy of Japanese American internment during World War II and that we can do so through the planting of a garden.

A positive interpretation acknowledges the gesture as a sign of shared grief over past injustice. It acknowledges the possibility of future growth and prosperity, a genuine blooming of community and health. A less positive interpretation acknowledges the bounded space intended, and even necessary, for garden elements, and thereby recognizes the invisibility of the garden itself, which often promotes forgetfulness. Out of sight, out of mind after all. This "memorial garden" is seemingly designed to be forgotten.

The garden as a space of forgetting has similarities to the disappearing American Mall. In his monograph, *Thinking Like a Mall*, Vogel claims that we must abandon our ideas about a nature that is distinct from humans, pristine and wild beyond our grasp. Instead of attending to a nature that is distinct from our actions, either as a wilderness preserve or as a noumenal realm of things-in-themselves, we ought

to focus on the actions of humanity. Vogel offers a radical version of “social construction” by highlighting that our environments are literally constructed by humans. Social construction is not the cultural or linguistic constitution of reality, but the material building of environments – It is not an idea, it is a doing. Vogel’s main concern seems to be about orienting environmental philosophy toward a consideration of what it means to “live *in* an environment in a sustainable and ecologically healthy manner” (Vogel, 2015, p. 6). It is only when we consider the actions and practices of human communities, that we can break the limitations of a dualism that places humans beyond the realm of nature. To quote Vogel, “we might prefer an environmental theory that begins with where (and who) we are, begins, that is, by accepting our condition and trying critically to understand and to improve it, rather than one that pines nostalgically for an Edenic age that knows all too well can never be recaptured” (Vogel, 2015, p. 29).

Vogel’s invocation of an Edenic age is interesting. Eden, as we know, was a garden, a paradise in which humans flourished and had dominion over the earth. Not only was Eden pristine, it also required no work and no practice. Vogel rejects this Edenic ideal not only because there is no pristine nature to be recaptured, but also because humans do perform practices and these practices necessarily change the environment. That is, they build the environment, constructing it materially via their practice. Vogel is careful to point out that humans are not in a position of ontological supremacy. Humans do not have a grip, either epistemologically or ontologically, on the whole of the material world. It continually exceeds our intentions, manifesting outcomes no human practice foresaw or projected. Thus, while the environment is a social construction built by human practice, it is also, at the same time, wild.

It is here that we can consider the non-Edenic garden as promoting cultivation as a virtue of our material practices. According to Robert Pogue Harrison, a constitutive aspect of the human condition is that we act with care, and “no one embodies the care-dominated nature of human beings more than a gardener” (Harrison, 2008, p. 25). For Harrison, care is a governing mode of engagement with the world. Our capacity to care marks our involvement with the world and manifests our desire “to become part of the world, to enter the flow of time, to achieve form and come into appearance” (Harrison, 2008, p. 17). It is important to note that care for Harrison both leads to a construction of the world, in Vogel’s sense of material construction via our material practices, as well as the articulation of what it means to be human. This

is, perhaps, most clear when Harrison claims that “humans are fully human only when things matter. Nothing was at stake for Adam and Eve in the garden until suddenly, in one decisive moment of self-revelation, *everything* was at stake” (Harrison, 2008, p. 9).

As humans, our care for the world engages us with the world. We change the world by cultivating it in various ways through various practices. We construct the world through building malls, flushing toilets, driving cars, marking wildlife preserves and tending gardens. We are constituted as humans by our involvement in activities where something is at stake, and it seems compellingly evident that there is something at stake when we engage in practices related to our surrounding environment. Stakes are manifested when we understand that our epistemological reach is limited and that the processes of the material world lead to conclusions beyond our intention or foresight. We can look to major shifts in weather patterns, climate change, and a rise in carbon levels in the atmosphere as indicators of processes that exceed our intention. But the garden is also a place where we can see how the relation of care can constitute both the material world and the humans involved. Care for the garden, though a seemingly mundane activity, reveals the stakes of our relation to the environment and how the environment exceeds our intentions.

When we care for something, be it a cat, a power plant, a child, or a garden, we do not adopt a position of absolute control or mastery. We cultivate, promote, guide, and nourish, but we do not dominate. Caring for a garden requires that we attend to the needs of the garden, such as water, sunshine, and the occasional pruning, without expecting the garden to follow an exact plan of growth. Surely gardens have boundaries that are kept by the gardener. In fact, according to Harrison, gardens are “defined by their boundaries” given that “[a]lmost all the words for “garden” in world languages have etymons linked to the idea of fence or boundary” (Harrison, 2008, p. 56). But the boundaries of the garden are intended, or at least assumed, to be exceeded because “care is constantly being thrown back upon the limitations of its powers of action, is constantly reminded of its own inefficacy and essential passivity when it comes to phenomena like weather, blight, parasites, and rodents” (Harrison, 2008, p. 28). I argue that this is evidence of a material world that remains, in Vogel’s terms, wild beyond our intentions.

The garden is not merely the plants, flowers, bushes, and boundaries of its design. It is the wind, the activity of bees, the shining of the sun, and the frequency of rain. The garden is an enviroing space,

dynamic, curated, and wild all at the same time. Gardens are, to quote Harrison, “like gateways to other worlds or other orders of being: not gateways for you to pass through but through which you may be called upon or visited, without moving from where you stand” (Harrison 54). This is because the garden is constituted by the larger environment, including the mood of the human visitor that enters its boundaries. The garden is in one sense determined by human activity in that humans have literally built the garden through constructing a space to be used, tilling the ground, planting seeds, and tending to the growth of the garden’s inhabitants. But in another sense, the garden grows beyond these intentions.

Like Vogel, Irene Klaver names this aspect of the material world that continually exceeds our epistemological grasp and the scope of our material practices, wild. Klaver notes that using language of wildness often invokes ideas about nature that render it as ontologically distinct from humans. But rather than a strict boundary between humans and nature, the wild should be thought of as a material affordance. Like Harrison’s description of the garden, the wild opens new worlds that we may be called upon to visit. Unlike Harrison, Klaver argues that the affordances offered by the wild reveal an invitation to take up practices alongside the environment. In her article “Accidental Wildness on a Detention Pond,” Klaver describes a detention pond that has exceeded the scope of the city’s intentions. The intended flood prevention mechanism has exceeded its design to act as a home for a lively, active, and “varied community that thrives in the relatively unstructured, inadvertent wildness of the place” (Klaver, 2015, p. 54).

For Klaver, the wild calls us to join in and partake of a community that thrives beyond the scope of human intention, leading her to claim, following Maurice Merleau-Ponty, that intentionality is operative in between human subjects and objects. Intentionality emerges from the interaction between subject and object and thereby introduces what Klaver calls “situational agency.” The city planners did not just create a detention pond. They have produced a situation or an occasion for ducks, fire ants, waterways, rain drops, municipalities, and religious communities to perform a situational agency. Practices are performed as a result of the situation, the interactions, and the relations rather than from a singular human subject.

In light of these claims about wild practices, exceeded boundaries, and non-localized agency, it becomes difficult to locate the garden in the Japanese Remembrance Garden on Seattle University’s campus.

Putting away the projected meanings prescribed by the plaque, the space does not call to me or to those passing by as a garden, as a memorial, or as related to the travesty of Japanese internment. It does not seem organize other agencies to act alongside and with it as garden or memorial. However, by highlighting certain aspects of gardens as excessive, as collaborative, and as hybrid spaces, it becomes possible to imagine and experience this space as a proper memorial. I argue that through tensions in the visible and the invisible, as well as between boundaries and excess, the garden, and this garden in particular, becomes an appropriate object of wonder and a potent space for material memory. That is, the garden exceeds the intentions of the gardener, and the attention of those who pass by, taking on a vibrancy that manifests beyond the limit of projected meaning.

Returning to Harrison’s claim that gardens are etymologically defined by their boundaries, we can turn our attention to the tension between the boundary and the content of the garden. What, after all, is a garden if not a defined space filled with well-organized and managed objects? Gardens can be filled with flowers, plants, vegetables, stones, or other objects. In that sense, the objects in the garden do not define the garden. It is the bounded space, the organizing principle, the clear distinction between garden and not garden that provides definition. I argue that gardens are defined by their boundaries not because they remain within those boundaries, docile and obedient. Rather, gardens are defined by their boundaries because they necessarily exceed those boundaries. As such, a garden is a contradiction of excess and restraint.

In *Reinventing Eden*, Carolyn Merchant gives us good reason to think that the garden metaphor has been used to promote narratives of conquest and control. According to Merchant, the story of the Edenic garden “has propelled countless efforts by humans to recover Eden by turning wilderness into garden, “female” nature into civilized society, and indigenous folkways into modern culture. Science, technology, and capitalism have provided the tools, male agency the power and impetus” (Merchant, 2003, p. 2). As an example of Merchant’s claims, the botanical garden is a demonstration of our ability to master seasons, climates, and ecosystems by putting diverse groups of plants together in the same space. We thereby make the garden a kind of product for consumption. This echoes Merchant when she says that “Today’s incarnations of Eden are the suburb, the mall, the clone, and the World Wide Web” (Merchant 2).

It is interesting to imagine the intended meaning of the Japa-

nese Memorial garden in these terms. We are invited to remember the internment of Japanese Americans. We are invited to remember this event because of the excessive desire for control. In some sense we can think of Puyallup, a staging ground for the distribution of interned Japanese Americans south of Seattle as a kind of nursery, a readying stage before the inauguration of the internment gardens. But we can also appeal to the excess of the garden. Approaching the garden in spring, the smell of this excess is evident. The garden reaches out, the surrounding air pregnant and fecund with new life. As Harrison claims, beyond its defined boundaries “the garden also courts the presence of the surrounding context. What the eye sees here is not confined to what appears within the enclosure” (Harrison 58). The sun shines, the bees spread pollen, and the worm swims through pools of dirt. The boundaries of the garden are exceeded by the life of the garden just as the boundaries of internment have been exceeded by the lives of those Japanese Americans incarcerated and interned.

In *The Visible and the Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty’s uncompleted last work, the tension between the visible and the invisible is drawn out in terms of perception. For Merleau-Ponty, analysis of this tension reveals what he calls “a possibility, a latency, and a flesh of things” (Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 1968, pp. 132-133). The world is a latent opening for interaction, a space made available for, and one revealed to be already lost in, intertwined engagement such that when I look at the world, “one cannot say if it is the look or if it is the things that command” (Merleau-Ponty, *The Visible and the Invisible*, 1968, p. 133). It is important that the meaning of the world is not a layer of projection by consciousness. The world is not for me, available as an object, but a project to which I am a contributor among many. In this sense, it is unclear if the attention I give to the garden is commanded by my desire to look at pretty flowers, at the arrangement of the large stones, or if the garden has called me to attention. Nor does the call need to be limited to the perceptual availability of the garden. The fact that it is a memorial for Japanese Americans interned during WWII also calls to me as a Japanese American, in many ways demanding my attention.

If we accept the claim that gardens are generative practices in which I, as observer or gardener, participate alongside other agencies, then my own agency is not absolutely constitutive of the garden as garden. Rather, I collaborate and am pulled into dialogue with the garden as actor. This is, in part, what David E. Cooper, calls the “epiphany”

of “The Garden.” In his *A Philosophy of Gardens*, Cooper identifies a “co-dependence” between gardener as agent of human intervention, and the natural place of the garden. For Cooper, the garden is meaningful by “showing itself” as this relation of co-dependence. According to Cooper, there are two equal sides of this co-dependence. On the one hand, we find the dependence of the gardener on the natural space being organized. That is, “The Garden exemplifies the massive, but often unrecognized dependence of human creative activity upon the co-operation of the natural world” (Cooper, 2006, p. 137). This is the central tenet of what he calls his “modest proposal.” The second half of this co-dependence, what he calls his “immodest proposal,” takes up the dependence of nature on the human gardener. Ultimately Cooper gestures toward a sense of mystery, going so far as to claim that “The Garden...is an epiphany of man’s relation to mystery. This relationship is its meaning” (Cooper, 2006, p. 145).

This becomes a focal point if we turn to Japanese stone gardens, most associated with Zen Buddhism, as a structural example. In the Heian (794-1185) period of Japan, gardens consisted of flowers, trees, and fish alongside sand, rocks, and water. These gardens, to quote François Berthier, “would exemplify the Buddhist teaching of the incessant cycle of death and rebirth, while also displaying the ephemeral character of this world in which everything continually changes” (Berthier, 1989, p. 5). Life and death were on display via plants and flowers and fish and birds, but the permanence of stone stood in direct contrast to these cyclical symbols, a reminder that there are numerous timescales at work in any assemblage. By the Muromachi (1336-1573) period, gardens were stripped down to rock and sand. According to Berthier, the monks of the Muromachi period rejected the “transitory phenomena” of the Heian period as “worthless appearance” and “stripped nature bare in order to reveal its substance” (Berthier, 1989, p. 5). This stripping nature of transitory phenomena was a means to contemplate the bare essentiality of humanity and the self. The physicality of the austere garden promoted a contemplation that did not rely on the activity of reason. Further, we see the role of the garden as agent in the claims, made in the *Sakutekei*, to “follow the request of the stone.” For Cooper, this sense of co-dependence marks a stark contrast between the practice of gardening and that of architecture. According to Cooper, “While the responsible architect will heed the natural environment in which his building is to be placed, the aesthetic quality and ‘atmosphere’ of the building is not dependent on detailed attention to

the ‘requests’ made by the particular plants, stones, pools of water, and so on which occupy the site” (Cooper, 2006, p. 138). In the Japanese garden, then, not only do we see the co-dependence of humanity and nature, but we see a possible break between gardening and architecture.

While Cooper’s epiphany, and his subsequent hardline between garden and architecture, establishes a unique sense of mystery in the work between gardener and garden, it maintains them as distinct poles. That is, while the garden shows up as actor in Cooper’s sense, it does so alongside the gardener as a separate agency. Maria Voyatzaki extends and radicalizes the spirit of Cooper’s claim in terms of New Materialisms and architecture, and as such also softens the disciplinary distinction set up by Cooper. Voyatzaki claims that the history of architecture has recently moved from an explicitly anthropocentric mode to a non-anthropocentric one. According to Voyatzaki, the anthropocentric mode was built on a “polarisation between life and matter” that has “led humans to believe that the only source of vitality was the soul or the spirit, thus stifling their opportunity to discover and explore other living powers” (Voyatzaki, 2018, p. 2). By contrast, the non-anthropocentric movement in architecture has led “the binary opposition between the given and the constructed” to be “profoundly reconsidered and replaced by a non-dualistic understanding of the natural and the artificial, of the human and architecture” (Voyatzaki, 2018, p. 12). In so doing, “The boundaries between the natural and the artificial cannot be clearly defined and have become increasingly blurred as a result of recent technological and scientific advances” (Voyatzaki, 2018, p. 12). Voyatzaki’s conclusion seems to be that the barrier between the human actor and the non-human agency becomes blurred and potentially non-existent. This blurring of boundaries challenges Cooper’s disciplinary distinction between gardening and architecture by making the distinction between the material of architecture just as “alive” as the material of the garden. According to Voyatzaki, “The main design issue is no longer to create an artefact to imitate or represent outstanding human traits, but to embody in the materiality of the building new forms of perception, cognition and intelligence for the purpose of self-organization and for generating the artificial life of a building” (Voyatzaki, 2018, pp. 13-14).

Voyatzaki and New Materialism, of course, have not been the first to challenge the distinction, either hard or soft, between the human and nature. In fact, there have been numerous attempts to reject

the subject-object distinction that grounds modern science and modern metaphysics. Merleau-Ponty, for example, argues that we live the world prior to knowing the world and that our bodily acts engage us in an ongoing constitution of the meaning of the world. As such, we are intimately wrapped up in the world, entangled and entwined to the degree that an objective view of the world is not possible (Merleau-Ponty, *Perception*, 1962, pp. xviii-xix). Karen Barad has argued for a philosophy-physics that takes the Copenhagen view of quantum physics seriously. The Copenhagen view holds that quantum objects do not exist in any specific state prior to measurement. As such, in *Meeting the Universe Halfway*, she argues that phenomena are constituted by intra-action, whereby no object is concretely established or existent prior to its relation to other objects but are mutually constituted in that assembled relation. To quote Barad, “there aren’t little things wandering aimlessly in the void that possess the complete set of properties that Newtonian physics assumes (e.g., position and momentum); rather, there is something fundamental about the nature of measurement interactions such that, given a particular measuring apparatus, certain properties *become determinate*, while others are specifically excluded” (Barad, 2007, p. 19).

What both Merleau-Ponty and Barad allude to is the possibility that the material world is constitutive of both meaning and action. For Merleau-Ponty there is a kind of operative intentionality that is “already at work before any positing or any judgment” (Merleau-Ponty, *Perception*, 1962, p. 498) and can be described as an “antepredicative unity of the world and of our life, being apparent in our desires, our evaluations and in the landscape we see, more clearly than in objective knowledge, and furnishing the text which our knowledge tries to translate into precise language” (Merleau-Ponty, *Perception*, 1962, p. xx). I argue, along with Klaver, that action is the relation between subject and object to the degree that the world acts through me as much as I act upon the world. For Barad, her commitments to the Copenhagen view of quantum physics leads her to argue that agency itself is located in the assembled phenomenon of intra-action. According to Barad, “in contrast to the usual “interaction,” which assumes that there are separate individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, their intra-action” (Barad, 2007, p. 33). Agency, then, materializes out of the intra-action of phenomena, thereby extending agency beyond human subjectivity.

Along with Merleau-Ponty, Klaver, and Barad, I argue that we can find this kind of distributed or situational agency in the writings of Nishida Kitaro. Specifically, I appeal to his work on *basho*, or place as helpful for discussing both material agency and wonder in the rock garden. In the essay “Basho,” Nishida offers an explicit critique of Kantian intuitionism. Rather than stop at the transcendental unity of apperception, Nishida claims that there is a kind of tripartite relation of the subject to the object. At the very base of this tripartite relation is what he calls true or absolute nothing. To quote Nishida, “True nothing must be that which envelops such being and nothing; it must be a *basho* wherein such being and nothing are established. The nothing that opposes being by negating it is not true nothing. Rather true nothing must be that which forms the background of being” (Nishida, *Place & Dialectic* 55). In the Kantian relation between subject and object we reduce the object to perceptual experience and negate epistemological access to the thing-in-itself. But, Nishida claims, to stop there, at the transcendental unity of apperception, would be to neglect the place, to neglect *basho*, in which experience occurs at all. In a lengthy quote, Nishida claims that to know must primarily mean to envelop within. But when the enveloped is external to the enveloping, just as we can think of material objects as implaced in space, it means nothing other than that it simply *is*. [But] when we think of the enveloping and the enveloped as one, something like an infinite series is established. Accordingly when we think of that oneness as endlessly including matter within itself, we can also conceive what is endlessly at work, a pure act. But we still cannot say that it is the knower. However once we think of it as further enveloping such things implaced within itself, we can speak of knowing for the first time (Nishida, *Place & Dialectic* 54).

I argue that Nishida is invoking a kind of middle voice here. That is, the knower and the known are brought together in a relationship of knowing such that the unity is not centered on the knower. Rather, *basho* knowledges them both. Place, therefore, knows the subject and object relationship and it becomes possible to claim that the world knows me. Rolf Eberfeld expands on the use of the middle voice, claiming that in the Japanese language “the subject can be dropped without further ado and, moreover, the middle voice can determine the expression at multiple levels. The omission of the subject is actually nothing special, but rather the *normal case* for the perception of a happening. Nishida proceeds from this form of experience and develops a philosophizing that time and again links itself back to this “subjectless” action

in the sense of a middle voice” (Eberfeld, 2011, p. 275). Eberfeld goes on to characterize the use of the middle voice, saying “it is a matter of describing a place in which the seeing and the seen would arise in an action without the occurrence of a subject-object split” (Eberfeld, 2011, p. 276). Perhaps like Barad, there is no self that is distinct from the act prior to the act. Rather, in *basho* there is an ongoing worlding, a knowledge constituted by the inclusion of various phenomena, and various levels of phenomena.

Returning to the rock garden, stripped bare and austere, it is possible to exemplify a subjectless wondering. In the pages of the *Sakuteiki*, the oldest known guidebook for the aesthetic of the rock garden, the author instructs the gardener to heed the desires of the rocks themselves, to “follow the request of the stone.” In his discussion of the *Sakuteiki*, Marc Peter Kean claims that when the text was written, “stones were perceived as animate objects” (Takei & Keane, 2008, p. 4). The stone, silent as it may seem, calls to the gardener, and thereby gardens through the gardener. What Keane describes is a kind of geomancy, which is, according to Keane, “a catchall expression for a complex group of interrelated concepts that were used to explain the existence and inner workings of all manner of phenomena” (Takei & Keane, 2008, p. 59).

Wonder is most often invoked in one of two ways: either wonder is an epistemological inquiry, a wondering about something as a means to knowledge about that thing, or, as Mary Jane-Rubenstein has argued, wonder is the dangerous and dizzying realization that “the philosopher stands exposed to that which he cannot master; that which, in turn, threatens to disable the sort of mastery one expects of philosophers” (Rubenstein, 2008, p. 4). A major difference between the two is that the wonder of inquiry is easily overcome and dismissed. We wonder as a means to knowledge. Knowledge then overtakes wonder, which may lead to a new level of wonder, but always with the end of knowledge. The second type is an ongoing expression of something uncomfortable and unstable. Knowledge always undoes itself, thus leading not to knowledge but to more wonder. When we read these two kinds of wonder through Nishida’s concept of *basho*, along with the claims about a Japanese middle voice, we get a strange synthesis of the two kinds of wonder. That is, instead of an inquisition of the world by a conscious subject separate and distinct from the object, we get a world inquiring through the entangled phenomena of subject and object. Here wonder occurs in the in between, operative prior to conscious projec-

tions of meaning and separation. In response to wonder, we experience a bodily immobilization, a brief moment of relational reorganization. We are struck dumb and thereby allow for the previously mute world to sing through us.

In *Stone* Jeffrey Jerome Cohen offers his own take on geomancy and the agential power of stones to constitute meaning, and to power action. According to Cohen, his book is “something of a thought experiment, attempting to discern in the most mundane of substances a liveliness. Despite relegation to a trope for the cold, the indifferent, and the inert, stone discloses queer vivacity, and a perilous tender of mineral amity” (Cohen, 2015, p. 6). Like Voyatzaki, Cohen participates in the ongoing development of New Materialisms and affective ecologies. His major claim is that rocks and stones have provided the condition for meaning and action and have thus participated in the process of becoming. The temporal scales in which stone acts is, perhaps, too foreign to our own to truly understand the fecundity of this mute matter. But at the basic level, if Barad’s claims about intra-action are accurate, then our own agential powers are entangled with the very earth on which we reside. In this sense, we can see the allure of Nishida’s philosophy and the claim that together we world.

Much of what Barad and Cohen attest to is the idea that the material world is active, generative, and even agential. Our ability to do otherwise, to enact our agential powers relies upon the mutual intra-action of material bodies and assemblages. It is here that we see wonder at work, where we take seriously the dizzying, un-grounding experiences of wonder, and allow for non-human, non-conscious agencies to participate in active wondering. In the middle voice of Nishida’s philosophy, we can say that world wonders me. That I do not wonder separate and apart from the object of my experience, but that together we, the emergent assemblage of intra-acting phenomena, wonder together.

The contemplation of a stone, like all small wonders, is a potentially disruptive activity. The stone participates in a vastly different time scale than the human. As such, the stone excludes the human from its narrative; the stone reminds us of our own contingency and the relative brevity of our lives. The stone garden does not call us with bright colors and the buzzing of life like the botanical or vegetable garden. But it calls us all the same. It calls us to explore our horizons of temporal existence, to slow down and engage in experiences rather than consume them. If the project of the garden is to capture nature, to control it, and to manipulate it with our calculative actions, then the stone garden fails. It

fails because it expels our intentionality, our transcendental selves, and challenges us to embrace a distributed self that is found in the *basho* of true nothing.

Surely, we can consume the garden like any other piece of art. But the rock garden is perplexing because it is neither a truly bounded experience, nor is it wholly unbounded. We can walk past, accept its premise as a garden of rocks, understand its historical, cultural, and religious significance, and forget about it within 30 seconds. But if we listen to the rocks, if we let them speak and act with and through us, we become capable of accepting temporal time scales that diminish our agential significance as *the* agential actor. As Cohen puts it, “when stones are examined as something more than fixed and immobile things, as partners in errantry, then facts likewise begin to ambulate. After the bedrock of reality reveals its unrelenting slide, then perception, cognition, and environmental sensibilities shift. The nature of nature changes” (Cohen, 2015, p. 12). Cohen goes on to claim that for those who take notice of the temporal scale of stone, “its temporal non-coincidence is profoundly, productively disorienting” (Cohen, 2015, p. 16).

The wonder of the rock garden is generative in that it promotes a reorganization of relationality and activity. It offers a kind of wild materiality that strips the human subject of absolute intentionality manifesting in a world full of unintended consequences. The rock, by itself, does not have agency. However, it may be the case that without rock we would also fail to have agency. We enact our agency through and between our relation with the material world. In this sense, our own agency is dependent upon our constitution of meaning and action through rock, through earth, what Cooper called the epiphany of the garden. Agential activity is distributed across planes of relation. Wonder allows us an opportunity to reorganize and redirect our part in the ongoing becoming of the material world. As such, the rock garden, which calls us to contemplate the uncomfortable facts of vast time scales and our own impermanence is generative in our own acting otherwise than we do. If we can accept that the humble rock in the garden is capable of activating wonder, not strictly “in” us, but through and with us, we can begin to hear their silent song, which Jason Wirth has called “the song of all beings” (Wirth, 2011, p. 291). The *basho* of true nothing is the antepredicative unity of the world, full of latent and undetermined meaning. Even if our immediate goal in promoting wonder is knowledge, it is a knowledge prior to the split of subject and object, an operative inten-

tionality and a wondering in the absolute mirroring of the world.

It may be a bit of a stretch to claim that the intention of the gardener and the designation by the university as a Japanese memorial garden can call to me in the same way that the color of the flowers or the arrangement of the stones can. But I argue that the intentionality of the garden object has already been distributed. The call that I receive from the garden is not my own intention, not my own projection, but an invitation to a dialogue with a material space that holds a material memory.

When I first arrived in Seattle I toured the campus with the hope of getting familiar with my new surroundings. It was then that I first noticed the Japanese Memorial Garden on the campus map. Because of the construction underway on and around campus, the map was less accurate and less helpful than intended. It took me almost three weeks of less than arduous searching to finally find the Memorial Garden. It was only when I spotted the small plaque next to the garden that I became confident that I had found what I was looking for. After finding it, I stopped at the garden as often as possible. I introduced students to the garden, all of whom were shocked to discover that they had walked past it numerous times without ever realizing that it was there.

As I investigated the garden more thoroughly, I found that I did not have a good grasp of where the garden begins, and where it ends. However, as I have argued, it is this lack of knowledge about their boundaries that allows for and promotes a latency of interaction. It is only because of the visible invisibility of the Memorial Garden that I brought students to it. It is an invitation for revelation, a phenomenological conversion of the space in terms of our attention.

According to Harrison, “gardening brings about a transformation of perception, a fundamental change in one’s way of seeing the world, call it a phenomenological conversion. No longer does the eye stop at the surface of nature’s living forms; it looks to the depths in which they stake their claims on life and from which they grow into the realm of presence and appearance” (Harrison, 2008, p. 30). When one attends to the garden, the complexity and abundance of activity begins to manifest. Once I have pointed out the garden as a garden and as a memorial, my students are able to *see* the space differently. Their phenomenological conversion is enacted by the projected meaning and opens a dialogue that thereby exceeds their intentionality.

The garden is an activity generated by interactions of sun and bee, weather pattern and economic development, gardener and donor,

cultural narrative, city planning, architectural design and so on. The meaning and the material existence of the garden always exceeds the bounded space of the garden. But this is only clear if attention is given to the garden. Sometimes this happens through aesthetic appreciation. Flowers bloom with bright and beautiful colors, drawing my eye and my nose to investigate. But in the case of the Japanese Memorial Garden on the Seattle University Campus, there is no exuberant color, no showy display of nature’s brilliance. It is the plaque, or the campus map, or the concerned citizen that must draw our attention to the Memorial Garden. But once drawn, the opportunity for a phenomenological conversion demonstrates its power. Here it is not just the eye that moves past the “surface of living forms.” It is not just the bees and the weather that become apparent collaborators in the garden. It is the community of people, the historical reality of Japanese internment, and the material uncanniness of the place that surges forth and brings to bloom new meaning for the bounded space of the garden; a new horizon and depth of meaning is laid bare.

As mentioned, the Japanese Memorial Garden seems designed to be invisible. It blends into the broader landscape and calls little attention to itself other than a humble plaque. This invisibility mirrors the tension between visibility and invisibility in race relations. I focus here specifically on such tensions in the Japanese American community for what I take to be obvious reasons. For decades the Asian community in the United States has been called the model minority. It has been argued that the myth of the model minority was developed as a response to the “crisis” of Japanese internment (Kaibara, 2014, p. 6). We have integrated well into the economic narrative of hard work and prosperity, offering specialized services, goods, and opportunities. In many ways the model minority label is built on the very invisibility of this community. Helen Kaibara has argued that this was a deliberate technique used by Japanese cultural elites around the turn of the 20th century to help Japanese Americans blend into society more easily (Kaibara, 2014, p. 6).

Being a deliberate technique, this engineered invisibility is not the same as the invisibility of whiteness described by philosophers of race like George Yancy. In *Black Bodies, White Gazes* Yancy claims that whiteness is invisible because it has been established as a transcendental norm (Yancy, 2008, p. 3). It is the measure of normalcy and thereby acts as judge for all abnormality, all abject visibility, all otherness. The white body is “unmarked, unraced, and [taken] as the human *simplic-*

iter” (Yancy, 2008, p. 3). Neither is the Japanese community visible in the same way that Yancy claims the Black body is visible. It has not been criminalized and made dangerous through the idea of a “black essence” (Yancy, 2008, p. 3). Rather, the Japanese community is both visible and invisible, stuck between the standard of normalcy and abject otherness; it is a safe otherness, an unseen otherness, an otherness that blends into the surrounding race scape. But because of this visible invisibility the Japanese community is rarely attended to, rarely made the focus of scrutiny in race relations. We can, perhaps, appeal to phenotypical markers to justify such a place of visible invisibility. Junichiro Tanizaki claims that the Japanese skin is a whiteness made sallow through the ugly tint of yellowness. We are almost white, but not quite, “tinged by a slight cloudiness” (Tanizaki, 1977, pp. 31-32). Tanizaki goes on to compare this cloudiness, which is “as plainly visible as dirt at the bottom of a pool of pure water,” to the “limpid glow” (Tanizaki, 1977, p. 32) of the Westerners skin. Ultimately such a comparison leads Tanizaki to claim that “when one of us (Japanese) goes among a group of Westerners it is like a grimy stain on a sheet of white paper” (Tanizaki, 1977, p. 32). It is a visibility that is out of focus, fuzzy and peripheral, neither background nor foreground.

In 1941 there were roughly 130,000 Japanese Americans living in the United States. On February 19, 1942, Executive Order 9066 was signed by President Franklin Roosevelt and led to the internment, and ultimately the incarceration, of most of the Japanese American community. According to Patricia Wakida, “After an average of about three months, internees were moved into isolated prison camps surrounded by barbed wire, where they were kept under armed guard for most of the duration of the war” (Wakida, 2000, p. xii). Like gardens, these internment camps are defined by their borders and boundaries. They were uprooted from their “wild” homes and planted in a defined space designed to promote a sense of conquest and control. But like gardens, the Japanese American community exceeded the limits of those bounds. There is a robust Japanese American community in both California, where I grew up, and Seattle, where I recently lived. Reparations from the U.S. government in 1988¹ have surely helped, but the excess of those internment gardens have bloomed not by design, but despite it.

While certainly significant, the story of Japanese internment is markedly invisible in the larger story of U.S. history. Our visible invisibility has led to confusing circumstances because we do not seem to quite fit into any specific place. We are not what George Yancy calls

1. In 1988 \$20,000 and a letter of apology from the president were given to survivors of Japanese Internment. This was less than 10% off the calculated value lost during that time (Hohri 399)

the “racialized figure against the white background” (Yancy, 2008, p. 9) or the focus of racialized stigma². I do not mean to downplay the importance of Yancy’s arguments, or the necessary foregrounding of the Black body as essentialized by the white gaze, but I do point out the marginalized importance of the Japanese American experience that is more like a fuzzy figure in the background, un-highlighted, unremarkable. This is particularly clear when I remember hearing my Japanese American grandfather tell stories about joining the U.S. army after the bombing of Pearl Harbor. During training he was sent to a large U.S. city for a week. One night, while out on the town he had to use a public restroom. Confused about whether to use the “white” bathroom or the “colored” bathroom, he decided to ask a police officer for guidance. The officer looked at him and told him to hold it. Even though he was clearly an American soldier, there was no place for him in the public space. He was visibly invisible, neither white nor Black.

Returning to the memorial garden I notice a Japanese Maple tree that is much larger than any other I have ever seen. I wonder who tends the garden and how much care is given to the cultivation of the garden as a memorial garden. Ultimately, I wonder what it takes or what it means to cultivate remembrance. Does it require foregrounding the garden or the thing to be remembered? Can the two be separated? The play between the visible and the invisible is endless but rearranging our attention may help to bring those fuzzy peripherals into the foreground, if only for a moment, to highlight the forgotten and the marginalized. On one of our class visits, a student remarked that the plaque naming all the donors and the plaque describing the inspiration for the garden are the exact same size. His comment presents a new layer of meaning and a new seeing generating a suspicion about what kind of remembrance is intended here. Regardless, we can think of the garden as a gift, given by donors with intentions to memorialize their generosity, given by the gardeners that designed the space, given by the flowers that bloom and the birds that pollinate, given by the sunshine and the soil. In the *Sakutekei* we are told to “follow the request of the stones.”. In this sense, it may be possible to extend the request of the placard stones beyond the garden boundaries, promoting generosity and an attention to the invisible visibility floating beyond the sedimented layer of meaning, to embrace the phenomenological conversion of the garden and to re-member as an opening to an embodied dialogue.

2. This change somewhat during the COVID-19 Pandemic and the rise of violence against Asian and Pacific Island communities. But this too highlights the lack of difference between those communities from outside sour.

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THE HETEROTOPIA OF THE GARDEN: THE GARDEN AS AN ARCHITECTURAL SKETCH TO THINK ABOUT SOCIETY THROUGH THE CONTRIBUTION OF MICHEL FOUCAULT

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THE HETEROTOPIA OF THE GARDEN

The interdisciplinary condition of the subject, whether in the correlation between the disciplines of philosophy, architecture and gardens, or the correlations of the themes within the disciplines themselves, requires a certain level of latent complexity of multidisciplinary exchanges. And it is in this interdisciplinarity that spaces can express a mutable morphotyped matrix, composed of different elements which can be of, for example, social, physical, or biological nature. Thus, spaces can *be* something, i.e., express themselves at different levels that allow the appropriation of a way of *being*. And it is important to understand how a space can *be*, to free itself from some preconceived rules that may trivialize its physical and phenomenological potential in the territory. And it is this position that we think gardens carry throughout history, on the heritage of a form of architectural *drafts* of different morphotyping insertion of urban and social design, that writes a way of *being* in society and the territory.

Thus, the question arises, if any space can correspond to an appropriation of a way of *being*, why could garden spaces assume this privileged position in social and urban conditions in the territory? How does heterotopia help to read this situation? And how can a space create social structures?

To approach a position towards these questions, it is important to understand the number of disciplinary fields that we name when posing these issues. This designs an interdisciplinary web that can be appropriated by other disciplines to further continue the investigation of this topic and to contribute to a more precise reflection on this possibility. Thus, we name the disciplines of philosophy, botany, sociology, anthropology and phenomenology, considering that some subjects will take more specific notes that make the field of action more circumscribed in each of these areas. The complexity is visibly latent in the correlation of

these subjects, so it is important not to approach them in a generic way that may induce a trivialization of concepts, and because of this situation, some readings are mentioned in footnotes to bridge the knowledge to other disciplines that could further explain the topics dominate discussion.

Complexity thus characterizes a form of relationship, which implies the mastery or control of different disciplines to organize complex theoretical structures.¹ Thus, the interaction between different fields of research is useful to create a multidimensionality of the knowledge, without necessary sectoring it into different scientific areas, as Morin confirms. (cf. Morin, 1977)²

A certain level of complexity is needed to think about the territory, seeking to establish realistic bridges with hermetic urban conditions. In this sense, we agree that forms of *being* are involved in the production of urban and social structures, whose relations depend on the morphotypological conditions of spaces. Thus, the way a space *exists* is deeply linked to the way it expresses itself in its urban conditions, involving a set of relations between artefacts of masses and voids. And so, understanding the urban facts and the interposed relations between spaces is fundamental when thinking about social structures.

The individual cannot only exist without his existence influencing his environment, and vice versa. Existence implies a certain degree of relationship, in which an exchange of stimuli between the environment and the individual is presupposed. These relations may be more or less intense, juxtaposing temporal axes which in turn are implied in the condition of existence of matter. *The complexity is visible* and characterizes the socio-spatial paradigm, which in any case justifies the confusing urban apparatus despite the effort to objectify it.

In this way, spaces contribute to urban dynamics in certain particular forms that sectorize functions and concepts that articulate programs between built masses. Also, the functional properties of the space work as a matrice of the social design that relates function to cultural behaviour, namely in the ways these spaces present themselves to society. Thus, the use of space and the way it is recognized structures heterogeneous relations in the way it is occupied. And therefore, establishes a programmatic condition for the space that is associated with a mode of use, predicting a morphotyping narrative of the place. We have therefore a network organization of complex information of function, use, and management that characterize the intensities of the relations. In this sense, a space may have a functional and social and even phys-

1. This essay is eminently theoretical juxtaposing ideas and concepts that further investigate the topic of concern.

2. MORIN, Edgar, 1977, *O Método. I. A Natureza da Natureza*, Portugal, Publicações Europa-América. *Ibid.*

ical reality and not have a real location, which characterizes *utopias*. *Utopias* function precisely by the absence of a connection to a physical place, which refers to the real space of society, in an aligned or inverted way, i.e. to an image of idyllic or fateful society, being mostly non-existent spaces in a real sphere.³ (cf. Foucault, 2013)

On the contrary, *heterotopia*, which is a possible contrast to *utopia* in a generic way, has a real place, which works as a kind of “human geography” concept. *Heterotopia* thinks of the social space through the idea of the representation of thematic places, that are capable of juxtaposing real spaces and the introspective relation within society, recognizing the social relations of these spaces. In this sense, various degrees of reading are necessary to understand the different disciplinary layers of the space, aggregating a complex atmosphere that integrates specific ways of analyzing a sociological field associated with a space of representation, that is, a *thematic space*. Heterotopia expresses a social sphere namely in the imagination of the mind, while utopia designates an unreal space, not being able to concretize a social space.

We can understand that throughout the world, cultures create their own heterotopias in different forms and expressions. Every place produces its own narrative of a physical, sociological, and psychological design that may correspond to a singular heterotopia that contrasts concordances that are, in principle, incompatible to coexist in the same place. And it is in this sense that we relate the concept of heterotopia to the idea of the garden, in the way that it makes possible that multiple realities coexist in the same space.

The garden is a place that progressively accumulates layers of interdisciplinary knowledge that produce a social space. It is traditionally a dominated system, organized and recreated by the human presence of domesticated representations of recreational typologies, which today takes form as, for example, urban parks, greenhouses, cultivation gardens, community gardens, and didactic gardens, among others.

The garden is integrated into a system that serves the community, according to logical models using urban strategies that validate the consolidation of these structures. They can take on different forms and times in history, linked up with an exo-temporal axis, that juxtaposes with the other times of the city. It is expressed dynamically and may represent a capital, either collective or individual, structuring a system of collective and individual spaces.

It is a biophysical system, and therefore alive, that allows the existence of other forms of life, encompassing several biotopes in an

3. FOUCAULT, Michel, 2013, *O corpo utópico, as heterotopias*, Postafácio por Daniel Defert, nº1 Edições, São Paulo.

extensive green mass made of movement and matter in interaction. It is an artefact that relates to the morphology of the urban layout, of axes of perspectives and visual experiences that understand a progressive sequence of open spaces, reinforcing the environmental discourse in the urban project.

The traditional Persian garden is a sacralized place that is structured in a rectangular shape. In each corner are figurative elements representing the ‘four corners of the world’, in which the centre of this rectangle is the most important place representing the ‘navel of the world’. The water fountain marks this moment, being surrounded by vegetation that symbolizes this ‘type’ of microcosm. Here the ‘urban fragment’ of the garden becomes the central point of the world, and even of the cosmos, symbolizing a kind of perfection in a physical space. According to Foucault, the garden would be the oldest and most universalizing heterotopia of different times since the dawn of antiquity. It becomes a form of concordance between human existence and the world, in an impulse of self-referential appropriation through the desire to construct a symbolic dimension of its experience.

This means that the existence of the garden as we know depends on the human organization that constructs an intentional discourse in society.

The garden would aim to represent perfection as an unattainable human characteristic, which some tried representing the utopia of perfection, namely the Anglo-Chinese gardens. In Kyoto, a serene atmosphere of depth and introspection is sought to be represented in pocket-sized gardens where the lawn is replaced by gravel, decorated with stones of different sizes, recreating the spiritual symbolic values of the transgression of the relationship between the human and the intelligible.

Even in the earliest records of the appearance of the garden, there is the mythical and religious garden of Eden of the Israelites, Eridu of the Assyrians, Ida-Varsha of the Hindus and the sacred forest of the first Italics. The garden was taken as a form of relation between the individual and the world. Since early history, the ‘fertile’ field has been connoted as a gift of life providing nourishment to individuals.

The garden of the East is represented as a territory that aspires to the perfection of society and the world and is closely linked to cultural structures. It represents a heterotopia of spaces-captivity that extends to today’s models in other formats, such as the cemetery and the zoo, corresponding to certain temporalities. In this sense, heterotopia is

usually related to temporal lapses visible in urbanistic interventions when a temporal cut is exercised. The relation of heterotopia with time characterizes the action of some spaces that involve themselves in an idea of time, such as museums or libraries. The garden may also keep an idea of time, juxtaposing a succession of several times, namely in the functional repolarization that accompanies some urban interventions.

Although the garden is often built on interior spatialities and enclosed margins, it builds the city and recomposes a qualified social environment in the urban mesh. Even the enclosed gardens of extreme rationality such as the French garden of Versailles, which exposes a utopia of an idyllic city within the city itself, experiments a utopia of labyrinthic paths intersected in illusory perspectives, almost as the imagery of Piranesi’s engravings of “Carceri d’Invenzione”.

The formal configuration of gardens underwent a mutation that accompanied the change in societies’ thinking. The garden also served an opportunity to question functional and social models of the cities in development, mainly during the industrial revolution, drawing a history of humanity.

The industrial revolution stated, among many other things, an interesting progress for the models related to the insertion of the garden in urban and social dynamics, related to the growth of cities.

It is after the industrial city that gardens open extramurally and relate to the urban mesh outside of the private property layouts. Gardens and parks become part of urban design and thinking, designed accordingly to the hygienist and sanitary theories. Here, a need to qualify urban life brings back the need to open naturalized free spaces for urban planning, due to the sanitation crisis associated with population densification segregated in city centres. Thus, several signs of progress in the consolidation of the ecological mesh in urban planning emerged. Frederik Law Olmsted, at the end of the 20th century, advances with the aggregation of urban parks in search for large connected green systems of the city, in a *continuum naturale*. Other ideas this thought such as the *greenways* in the USA in 1995, leading to the *parkways* – articulated system of green spaces. This idea preceded other proposals such as the Emerald Necklace in Boston in 1870, connecting the parks of Boston Common and Franklin Park (the two largest parks of Boston), in a network that took different forms from tree-lined streets to small and medium parks to permeable areas. Soft mobility systems were also rethought in these interventions promoting better connections and alternatives to road traffic.

Meanwhile, in Europe, utopias related to the management of the city-countryside dichotomy were being developed seeking to reverse the practices of the compact city. These utopias propose an organization of articulated regional nuclei delimited by large green belts which aimed to control urban expansion preserving their patterns of identity. This was Ebenezer Howard's proposal, which sought to reinterpret the dispersed state of the territory in articulated planned systems.

In the early decades of the 20th century, Gorge Kessler in Kansas City and Charles Eliot in Boston, precede the wave of reforms that would attempt to address the fragmentation of green spaces with the articulation of connected urban parks.

At the same time, in Europe, Le Corbusier thought of La Ville Radieuse in 1935, thinking about the territory as a ground of activities organized by urban functions of precise forms. The architect proposes a city of high-rise buildings and wide circulation routes where urban parks and gardens were added to these functional layers serving the plots connected by motorways. In La Ville Verte, Le Corbusier would have already come close to the idea of the city as a large garden, which he had considered in other earlier plans, such as for the city of three million inhabitants, which proposed the garden inside and outside the blocks. In La Ville Verte, these blocks were disintegrated considering that the city is in a garden, instead of the garden being in the city.

The progressive reform to meet new demands of the contemporary city marked several of the 20th-century reforms, which put into perspective thinking about open spaces in what was the "(...) enormous expansion, in the 20th century city, of open space and, in particular, of public open space."⁴

The thematics move in a critical sense towards the city as a totalitarian system of networks of matter in interaction, where new ways of thinking about the urban project integrate the management and preservation of ecological recourses generated. Thus, sustainability becomes an increasingly expressive concern in urban planning. Over the years this panorama has intensified the relations between the landscape and the ecology, rethinking the qualities of the organization of cities. The individual starts to be thought of as part of the environment instead of embedded in an environment.⁵

This relationship undergoes metamorphoses over time, diluting with the disciplines of philosophy and phenomenology, in the ways of understanding the individual's position in the world and society.

According to Bernardo Secchi⁶, open spaces were constituted as

4. SECCHI, Bernardo, 2015, *Primeira Lição De Urbanismo*, São Paulo, Perspectiva, p. 103. Free translation by the authors of the original text "(...) enorme expansão, na cidade do século XX, do espaço aberto e, em particular, do espaço aberto público."

5. From Francis Bacon to René Descartes, to Immanuel Kant, to Baruch Espinoza, and later Martin Heidegger, M. Merleau-Ponty, Edmund Husserl, among others.

6. SECCHI, Bernardo, 2015, *Primeira Lição De Urbanismo*, São Paulo, Perspectiva.

places for experimentation and application of new ideas, which would once have been the function of the garden. They reorganize opportune discourses on how to physically experiment spaces that represent a certain degree of community, *representing* social values. (cf. Secchi, 2015)

How does the garden represent a space of society in the urban mesh?

According to Marc Augé⁷, gardens were often mentioned even in romantic texts as places of conversation, dialogue, friendship, and narrative, communicating their sense of community. (cf. Augé, 1992),

According to Harrison⁸, many classics of literature and philosophy often mentioned a genetic, almost organic connection between gardens and forms of conviviality. (cf. Harrison, 2008), The narrative of the place feeds the illusion of a transparent nature in the form and use, whose origins are often associated with the symbolism and cultural connotation that is recognized in it. The fact that the discourse aligns itself with predictable activities, claims a social heterotopia (of syntax), which expresses a group identity. There is a confrontation of internal tensions that challenge the state of its boundaries, transcending its internal configuration reaffirmed in an intramural atmosphere.

From the outset, this enclosure serves the place almost as a gateway to a new enclosure, which enhances it by creating a filter between what is inside and what is outside, intensifying its internal relations. An atmosphere is inscribed on a surrounding fantasy that occurs from its tradition, being possible to consider an intelligible myth of the societies.

An imagined (social) space, grounded in the human psyche, intersects with a real space, which interprets those cultural designs that allow it to *represent itself* as a space of social production. As in the metaphor of the mirror used by Michel Foucault⁹, there is an imaginary manifestation of oneself in the reflection, in a fantasy figure that has a real physical expression, and it is between this illusory image and the real representation that the heterotopia field is created. (cf. Foucault, 2013).

The idea of identity is thus imminently linked to the reflection of an existing physical body, and in this sense, it becomes possible for the space to participate productively in these designs.

The way these spaces potentialize diverse uses could solve some conceptual problems of the urban plan, namely in the way the space

7. AUGÉ, Marc, 1992, *Non-Places, Introduction to na Anthropology of Supermodernity*, London: Verso, New Left Books.

8. HARRISON, Robert P., 2008, *An Essay on the Human Condition*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

9. FOUCAULT, Michel, 2013, *O corpo utópico, as heterotopias*, Postafácio por Daniel Defert, nº1 Edições, São Paulo.

can represent the society in transition, conceptualizing a cultural transition to the way urban relations between systems are interpreted. In this sense, the garden can designate a potential engine of intervention in the city that works with the signs of territorial identity to create social dynamics. The garden can theorize the possibility of conceptualizing an image of the quality of the social sphere of the city, coupled with (urban) functions of recognizable urban elements.

Thus, we recognize the garden in its objective (rational) valence, which articulates scales, densities and morphotypes of hierarchical systems that re-establish coherence and order in the metropolis, and also, the garden as a subjective valence, as a space that produces social structures. It is important to understand the garden's dual condition, which allows it to act not only as a functional artefact to the urban fabric and ecosystems but also as a conceptual artefact. It is this duality of perspectives that can root the theoretical structures to a real place, therefore, objectifying the existence of these relationships. On a similar note, it is possible to understand that these abstract (subjective) relations have a concrete relationship with the individual, which is characterized on a physical and psychological level. The individual gives certain symbolic meanings to a place, adding the weight of his own experiences. And it is this fertile world of senses and meanings that is formed between the lines of the interaction between the individual and the garden, establishing a dialogue.

Naturally, each culture creates its dialogue with the world having identifiable forms that distinguish the designation of its meanings. Thus, each society will normally have a complex set of references expressed in its cultures, in which individuals interpret the world. This means that the notion of culture is fundamental to interpret the way that a group of individuals relates to city spaces. When one changes the geographical location also changes, as a rule, the relation of that group of individuals with the space, understanding that there are different bonds of cultural expression associated with the places of the city.

Edward B. Tylor defines culture as “the whole complex which includes knowledge, belief, art, law, morals, custom, and any other capacities acquired by man as a member of society”¹⁰. (cf. B. Tylor, 1871) Clifford Geertz defines it as “(...) historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge and activities in relation to life.”¹¹ (cf. Geertz, 1989).

10. B. Tylor, Edward, 1871, *Primitive Culture*, 2012, Cambridge University Press, p. 1.

11. GEERTZ, Clifford, 1989, *A interpretação das culturas*, Rio de Janeiro: LTC.

Cultural values also sustain a pertinent notion of collectivity, represented in facilities, streets, squares, parks, monuments and meeting places. The city is, or should be, a representative space that constructs a given subjective time and meaning of the society.

According to Collin Rowe and Fred Koetter¹², a city is designed to expose objects/episodes or to serve as ‘scaffolding’ to these objects/episodes. Just as modernism had overvalued ‘scaffolding’ and thereby disdained its objects, the city must articulate networks of structured moments, in a poetic entanglement of meaningful images that enhance the urban experience. (cf. Rowe e Koetter, 1978),

The city, in a certain way, can be read as an articulation of representations (“signs of recognition” according to Bernard Huet¹³), organized by the individual and integrated into logical systems of structure. (cf. Huet, 1984). According to Norberg-Schulz, “The aim of symbolization is to free the meaning from the immediate situation, becoming a “cultural object” (...), with which individuals can identify themselves. The relationship between territory and society intensifies in the individual's participation in the environment, to which the culture acts as a vehicle, which dictates certain traits of appropriation of a group of individuals to that territory. (cf. Norberg-Schulz, 1980)

Does the garden have the capacity to instrumentalize a representation of culture?

The temporal, sociological and historical context draws a more objective idea of the garden. Temporal because it exists in time and coexists in a timeline from early antiquity to the present day. Time is a very important parameter in the construction of the garden, both physical and psychological time. It also takes part of the cultural structure because culture is also made in time, and the garden synthesizes a certain time of the city in the historical axis, beyond the urban. The garden is inhabitable in space and time and is recognized as a catalyst of the temporal dimension in the city. Biological time, physical time and psychological (and perceptual) time, complexify the natural landscape by introducing a fantastical, somewhat enigmatic dimension to the garden.

Sociological because it works on a sense of community and serves society. In addition to qualifying the urban fabric and experiences, it inscribes a certain way of living, and above all, a way of perceiving those experiences. The capacity of the garden to concretize itself as a space that creates community is largely represented in the image that

12. ROWE, Colin, KOETTER Fred, 1978, *Collage City*, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England.

13. HUET, Bernard, *A Cidade como Espaço Habitável (alternativas a carta de Atenas)*, 1984, in AU - Arquitetura e Urbanismo, ano 2, n. 9, dez./jan. 1986/1987, São Paulo, Ed. PINI.

this society has of the garden, and therefore, in most cases, the perceptual image (and consequently shared between the elements of society) works in a fundamental way on the concept of the space.

Historical because it synthesizes a journey throughout history, which relates to time and to the sociological context, insofar as it interposes values and practices over time that remain in the inheritance of certain symbolisms and functionalities. Thus, the garden works on history in a sense of permanence in which it materializes concepts and physicalities that are possible to remain in time, through its temporal, sociological and historical context. The presence of the consolidates the essence of history and creates successive points of reference cut out in time. These concepts survive in time and endure as essential expressions of society, of timeless places that are fixed in the individual's memory.

This psychological sphere of space, which determines a social space, is therefore eminently abstract and it is in the expression of its qualities that cultural associations to a commonplace are materialized. To *practice* space is to mirror the identification of self-image, putting into action the behavioural structures of the place. Space as a *practice* is an interesting premise for thinking about the heterotopic place, insofar as it specifically defines how the individual relates to that very space and launches a pertinent structure that involves social designs.

[TOWARDS AN ONTOLOGY OF THE GARDEN]

And how can the individual be beneficial to read the space?

The theory of form, or the Gestalt theory¹⁴, "(...) German gestalt and perception organization theory (...)"¹⁵, which is the understanding of forms as a set of images that build a concept. Not only are the separate elements understood as an independent image, but also an association between them. It is a methodology used namely in the field of the psychology of form, to interpret certain cognitive perceptual patterns of individuals.

The relation between the figure and the background is important to understand the total image, thinking the relation of the fragment in relation to the landscape and the fragment in relation to other fragments. The urban plan structures image-background relations in the organization of certain representations, that order not only functions but also establish meanings. Thus, *representation* becomes a methodology fundamental to *gestalt*, which centres on certain qualities of the

14. From the German word meaning form. Gestalt emerged further in the disciplines of psychology of form, in order to evaluate certain perceptual abilities of the individual, related to the way he or she apprehends certain images.

15. CORBEIL, Janine, POU-PARD, Danielle, *La Gestalt*, Santé mentale au Québec, Article, vol. 3, no1, 1978, p. 61-84. Authors' free translation of the original text "(...)théorie allemande gestaltiste et organisationnelle sur la perception".

real image.

Representation as a design tool fertilizes the relationship between the ways of living and the ways of designing those same interactions. The garden represents rationally and symbolically a subjective reality present as a concept of social construction that becomes concrete in its representation.

Merleau-Ponty¹⁶, relates the landscape and the individual as a product of the nature of perception, in processes generated by the interaction of the body and mind with the environment, as in Cézanne's letters and the symbiosis of the artist and the painted landscape. (cf. Merleau-Ponty, 1999). According to the author, the landscape locates a prism between perception and geography, and it is through the perception that the individual intervenes in the landscape, apprehending an image. In what concerns the *perceived space*, the individual merges into the landscape creating new landscapes related to his experiences coexisting with landscapes from other times (past), which transcend his perceptive field. Merleau-Ponty adds other variables related to the ability to create an image of the environment such as *temporality*, the way we apprehend sizes, shapes and distances associated with certain meanings, and the necessary ambiguity of the different cognitive and perceptual capacities according to the personal life experience of the individual. In Merleau-Ponty's perspective, the *observer* should not objectify a consciousness, but rather problematize certain circumstances by understanding the object. In this sense, the disciplines of logical formalism are notably excluded from the thought of human experiences and are not particularly viable instruments when it comes to assessing subjective results related to the relational dynamics present in the city.

In this way, Merleau-Ponty separates two key concepts about the object under investigation, its *real representation*, and its *apparent representation* – a product of the perceived form.

Perception is a fundamental part of the apprehension process, but it does not represent the whole interpretative capacity of the individual. The interaction of other elements must be able to *perceive* an image. Perception is described in Gestalt as "(...) above all, an active process of mental organization. The act of perceiving is no longer an isolated physiological act, but a process of discovery, of invention, which in turn modifies the inner mental experience."¹⁷

It is a process of the mind that interprets reality, understanding the relationships between forms and context, through sensory stimuli, cognitive stimuli and those linked to the intellect and culture of the

16. MERLEAU-PONTY, Maurice, 1999, *Phenomenology of perception*, São Paulo: Martins Fontes.

17. CORBEIL, Janine, POU-PARD, Danielle, *La Gestalt*, Santé mentale au Québec, Article, vol 4, no1, 1978, p. 61-84, p. 64. Authors' free translation from the original text "La perception est d'abord et avant tout un processus actif d'organisation mentale. L'acte de percevoir n'est plus un acte physiologique isolé, mais un processus de découverte, d'invention qui modifie à son tour l'expérience intérieure mentale."

18. MORIN, Edgar, 1977, *O Método. I. A Natureza da Natureza*, Portugal, Publicações Europa-América.

19. (continued) "From this, we know well, result the innumerable errors of perception, which come to us from our most reliable sense, that of sight. To the error of perception is added the intellectual error. Knowledge, in the form of a word, of an idea, of a theory, is the fruit of a translation/reconstruction by means of language and thought, and is therefore subject to error." In MORIN, Edgar, 2000, *The seven knowledge necessary for the education of the future*, São Paulo: Cortez, Brasília, DF: UNESCO, p. 26.

20. LYNCH, Kevin, 2017, *The image of the city*, Lisboa, Edições 70.

21. *Ibidem*, p. 13.

22. RAPOPORT, Amos, 1997, *Human Aspects of Urban Form, Towards a Man-Environment Approach to Urban Form and Design*, Urban and Regional Planning Series 15, Oxford, Pergamon Press.

23. KEPES, Gyogy, 1944, *Language of Vision*, Chicago, Paul Theobald.

individual. According to Edgar Morin¹⁸, "All perceptions are at the same time translations and brain reconstructions based on stimuli or signals captured and encoded by the senses."¹⁹ (cf. Morin, 1977). The strong visual component of *gestalt* arrests a visual understanding of forms, whereas perception needs stimuli (visual, tactile, auditory, olfactory, of movement or form), to generate an image about events. Kevin Lynch²⁰ also adds to this list "(...) kinesthesia, the notion of gravity, and perhaps those of magnetic or electric fields."²¹ (cf. Lynch, 2017)

The individual needs a certain degree of imagination and self-consciousness to be able to interpret certain codes rehearsed by the body as means responsible for responses to the surrounding circumstances. In this sense, we understand that there are external and internal factors of the individual, which jointly involve a fertile sphere of information exchange, that we will call the *communication process* between the *observer* and the *garden*.

According to Amos Rapoport²², the relationship between *person-environment* should be the fundamental pillar of urban construction, in which the inhabitant is namely the central piece of the urban game. The author investigates how behavioural, cultural, and psychological processes allow the individual to think about the space. According to Rapoport, the urban environment is a product of relational spheres (social, cultural, and physical) between artefacts and people, as systems that influence themselves. *Perception*, for the author, is the way the individual connects and experiences the environment, and is also its first degree of understanding of reality, followed by cognition that builds and organizes the information of the events. (cf. Rapoport, 1997)

Perception and *representation* turn out to be two irrefutable constants within the epistemological construct defended by the notion of heterotopia - they are constituent elements of an existing reality and of a common reality acquired in one's imaginary - in the perception of its function. Gyorgy Kepes in *Language of Vision*²³, explores the perception of the image as a language that synthesizes a concept, working the human experience as a methodological instrument. Thus, he organizes certain terms that constitute his project elements such as textures, colours, physical sensations, memory, among others related to the intellect of the individual. His idea is generated around the systematization of vision as a means of communication, as a language that represents the experience of the individual in the city. The *observer* is then an interpreter and observer, analyzing what he looks at in an analytical

way of *seeing*, enjoying a beneficial double condition of his intellectual capacity. (cf. Kepes, 1944)

Gordon Cullen²⁴, uses the same analysis methodology based on the instrumentalization of the human experience as a way of intervening in the city, in which he approaches various urban situations, step by step, reviewing the impact of their spatialities on the individual's journey. He sectionalizes three guiding concepts in order to operate on these recorded images: the *optic*, the *place* and the *content*. (cf. Cullen, 2006)

Optics are related to serial vision, which consists of a register of certain visual sequences of urban spaces, and is therefore linked to *perception*. The *place* is related to the spatial qualities, it is about the capacity of certain spatialities to produce a spatial notion (a location), which is exemplified in expressions such as "I am here", "I am going there", and "I am in here".

The *content* is related to the characteristics that identify the place, such as physical and sensory qualities. The author analyses in detail concrete local cases such as enclosures, courtyards, squares, focal points, and spatialities such as grand perspectives, animism, among others, understanding the impacts of different spatialities on the experience of the city. In this sense, the different urban spatialities organize reference structures, framing a series of functional, behavioural and symbolic organizations, with which the individual can identify.

The symbolic experience is the experience with which the individual identifies and produces a greater sense of belonging, structuring our fundamental relationship with place. It is how we project part of our own cultural identity in space, and become familiar with the environment we inhabit - an abstract entity that makes use of the interaction between physical spheres to compose an intelligible field that influences in some way the experiences of the individual. The place for Norberg-Schulz²⁵, is closely linked to the notion of identity, which has an emotional impact on the individual and translates his ways of living the space. (cf. Norberg-Schulz, 1985)

The significance of a place is related to a dependence on values associated with the forms that create thematic spaces and organize social constructions. For the author, the possibility of intervening in the place is related to the possibility of identifying and characterizing it, understanding the matrixes that structure the space in order to be able to interpret it. Thus, the *structure* and *characterization* of the place are important data to draw an understanding of its environment, and

24. CULLEN, Gordon, *Paisagem Urbana*, Edições 70, São Paulo, 2006.

25. NORBERG-SCHULZ, Christian, 1985, *The Concept of Dwelling: On the way to Figurative Architecture (Architectural Documents)*, Rizzoli, New York.

therefore, to understand to what extent this spatiality creates a meaningful urban experience.

The decharacterisation of some places in the city causes a weak possibility of identification with the place, resulting in the alienation of the inhabitants living in innocuous spaces of little emotional impact. *Identification* is how the individual becomes familiar with a certain place, projecting his beliefs and memories.

The act of inhabiting is, in this sense, the primordial way that the individual has of relating to the environment, understanding how he exists in the world, having certain organizations with which he interacts. Thus, the environment is *represented* to the individual by the way he *perceives* it, moulding the space to his needs, and creating symbolic forms for his activities. In this way, space functions not only as a structure of physical form, but as a system that is something, and thus holds an *identity*. *A place as a living space*.

According to Norberg-Schulz²⁶, everyday life processes a complex intrinsic order, which the mind organizes into systematizations, that is, generalities by *repetition of similarity*. The space and the form of the space work together to express the social functions of that place, for example, a square expressing a gathering space and a street expressing a passage space. The forms translate an agreement with certain social understandings that identify a proper environment and, according to the author become “explained”, expressing certain interpretations of the world. (cf. Norberg-Schulz, 1985)

The forms can represent different disciplinary fields, they can be objects of study of phenomenology, semiology, or science, obtaining a level of interpretation about the world, “explaining” certain motives for their compositions. The image is thus not restricted to the function, but partially *represents it* through a meaning understood from a composition of identifiable forms. More important than the forms themselves are the spaces between these same forms, as in the gestalt that contrasts form and background. We speak of a sequence of processes of colour, form, movement and perceived texture, which act together articulating the images by their meanings.

And how can images of the city be important to the construction of the garden?

The images of the city are here an abstract concept that we appropriate to talk about the memory of the places in the city, which perform

26. *Ibid.*

certain images to which we associate a concept and a function. But one can also observe that the term ‘images’ refers to *representation*, insofar as it materializes a certain function/concept.

However, ‘images’ do not necessarily correspond to a set of formal appearances, which are neither mentioned nor sought after throughout this discourse, but rather an approximation of what these designs can mean and interpret.

The garden can take many forms, it can be a kindergarten, a cultivation garden (vegetable garden), of aesthetic or artistic motif, which can be conceived at the level of a work of art, a scent/sensation garden, a vertical garden, a landscape garden, a botanical garden, among others. And in each culture, and in each individual, different *representations* take shape when thinking about the place of the garden. To take a practical case, the Germanic peoples, unlike the peoples of the South, inhabited dense, cold, rainy forests in the North, while the peoples of the South inhabited warm, irrigated oases. And so, they will naturally have different images associated with the same term. These representations are then deeply related to culture, in the reconstitution of the same images that this group of individuals experience. Thus, we can oppose realities, without including formal objectives, which manifest themselves in the tension between the pretentious and the innocuous. The shared images, serve to understand the perception that a human being will have of a particular garden, and how the community in which he is inserted manages to characterize it and dictate its behavioural norms. Therefore, it characterizes the way how he can identify and express himself in these spaces - in essence, how he can experience them memorize them.

Marc Augé²⁷, develops some ideas concerning the anthropological space as a space of identity and relations with history, constructing forms of the complex social space. Thus, he proposes that the specific appearances of certain garden styles make sense when they are also observed in terms of use and function. In this way, a referential group of formal characteristics that establish a garden ‘type’ is pertinent when understanding the complexity of anthropological space as either a grand aesthetic place or a recumbent place. (cf. Augé, 1992)

According to Harrison²⁸, the cultivation garden (the community garden) linked to the idea of cultivation and growth, nurtures the idea of identity and belonging in society. The so-called ‘community garden’ is a public place whose soil is harnessed to produce food through the cooperation of communities. (cf. Harrison, 2008)

27. AUGÉ, Marc, 1992, *Non-Places, Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity*. London: Verso, New Left Books.

28. HARRISON, Robert P., 2008, *Gardens, An Essay on the Human Condition*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

The garden is, in this case, a binding element for which society works together, profoundly changing the way in which this group of people connects. It is an element capable of creating a sense of community, and it is through the garden that certain forms of conviviality capable of corresponding to collective intentionality are generated. Not only is it beneficial to the qualification of a residential neighbourhood, but it can also profoundly transform its associated urban dynamics.

The garden then becomes in this case a phenomenon, an anthropological artefact that is disseminated in culture, in time and in space. It is a complex system capable of theorizing a culture, which is fundamental to sketching the relationship between the individual and the landscape.

We think it is somewhat limiting to call up certain formal designs of the gardens, and therefore the associated 'styles' are not mentioned in the essay. We only refer to 'styles' as designs of form, which contextualize a particular meaning/objective, creating a contextual plot for their action. We designate them as an intentionally designed physical appearance, being part of the human's intentional discourse related to the garden. The spatial manifestation of these elements rehearses a given construction of a pictorial and sensorial plot in the service of empirical formal regularities. A 'style' is thus intended to represent a type of organization of nature that gives reason to a universalizing perfection. The garden then has inexhaustible representations and meanings, which are incorporated in a final sense and understood in the relationship between the individual and nature, transcending its metaphysical condition. This condition is observed throughout history, progressing more and more towards a symbolic representation.

The 'style' interprets a way of reading a culture on the fascination of its history in large compositions that seek to honour a close to an artistic degree. The garden design emphasizes an artificiality denominative of the individual's condition of dominance, evolving beyond its boundaries. The artificiality represented is antagonistic in two measures: firstly, in the plasticization of a natural and non-linear (subjective) organism, whose domination will certainly configure a degree of distance from itself; and secondly in the antagonistic relationship that artificiality creates in a symbolic search that is intended to rehearse a serene sphere of truth in its forms. This projected plenitude is sought in the gardens of the East and also explored in the Renaissance project. This artifice-nature hybrid condition characterizes one of the forms of existence of the garden and depends on a spatial organization.

The artistic intervention that inaugurates pictorial compositions in classical paintings represents the first forms of gardens, which comes close to an essay of the aforementioned dominated artificial narrative.

The concern for the cultivation of the natural landscape is perpetuated in a symbolic, intentional, ethical, and presently ecological dimension. The incubating prominence of the garden's heritage matures the fantasy that is generated around the concept of the garden. This process culminates in a representation of the symbolisms of cultures.

The garden is a generator of a communal idea of *common identity*. We seek to find its value beyond its physicality – notwithstanding the importance of this attribute that allows the connection with the individual and is an obligatory basis for the creation of spatial and sensory relationships – admitting the referential axis of meanings that it presents in the communities. The generated idea of identity relates to the capacity of the garden place to expose its own meanings and the meanings that are impregnated in the humanized nature of its intentionality. It allows a common construction of the simultaneous experience of various realities that share the same concept: the illusion of the garden as a collective space of society, which aggregates the participation of individuals from that same community in the collective construction of a social place that includes human relationships on the natural surface.

We refer to the idea of the garden's place, as a central character of its importance in cities.

The idea associated with a community construction of a social space lived in the natural environment - whose symbology accords certain principles to its perception as a space of health, oxygenated, of contact with nature, which allows the well-being of the individual - in a thematic place that addresses the common circumstance of all these meanings integrated in the city, as a place of the individual's own expression in its urbanistic creation. Various times and circumstances come together, which converge in an encapsulated reality of the system of those same societies.

The ontological action of the garden space in communities consists in the reconstitution of a reflection of itself, of the expression of its meanings. The intersection of the unreal space, which consists of the projection of a certain sociological, historical, and cultural context, associated with a space, presents itself as a utopian manifestation encapsulated in its reflection, heterotopic due to its possibility of concretization in the sociological space, which we may indicate as a body of culture experimentation, as a reflection of its structures.

29. *Ibid.*, p. 45.

30. HUNT, John D, 2000, *Greater Perfections; the Practice of Garden Theory*, London: Thames & Hudson Ltd.

Harrison²⁹ adds that “(...) many classics of world literature and philosophy state in more figurative terms: a genetic, almost organic, connection between gardens and forms of conviviality.” (cf. Harrison, 2008)

The garden’s place allows several activities, some of them without a specific definition, and others repeatedly associated with the expected activities of the place, constituting together a behavioural trace associated with the place. The tolerance of the space towards the flexibility of the activities, rehearses the same sensation of behavioural flexibility, allowing the shared confluence of different experiences. In this way, the mental association we make of certain codes related to a certain place, allows us to group a set of expected characteristics and behaviours, whose ambience becomes easier to be quickly acquired, due to the concordance of the mental image created with the correct correspondence of the visualized physical image. We experience, therefore, repeatedly, the same actions associated with the same places, which allows our easy orientation and understanding of the world and its organization.

Hunt³⁰, refers that the garden deliberately becomes a territorial “inside”, which draws a surrounding barrier that stimulates the understanding of what is outside and therefore implies an inner and an outer atmosphere, inherent to its cultural spatial and temporal context. (cf. Hunt, 2000). Nevertheless, the garden builds the urban fabric and is capable of proposing important debates in the consolidation of territorial structures. Moreover, thinking about scales, distances and landscapes from the representation of a system to the representation of a fragment (because often the garden can represent a fragment of the fabric) are important to operate in the knowledge of urban and environmental facts because sometimes the landscape is understood by the representation of a fragment. In this way, the ecological structure (structure of “greens” and “blues” of the urbanization), crosses the identity of the territory in environmental systems of recognizable urban forms, sometimes organized and recreated by the human presence of domesticated representations, where the ordering and functioning of the city are important to integrate thinking about environmental facts.

The ‘image’ of the environmental structure is notably more ambiguous, which opens the possibility of operating as an important element of transition, the connector of images between the memory of the city, in the figure-background relation. It is important to consider the ability to be able to conceptualize a cultural transition to the way urban relations between systems are interpreted, mainly in the ways of life of the

inhabitants, working a biopolitical system (of space, politics, and life).

We understand the key role of these spaces as engines of urban intervention of recognizable elements, conceptualizing an image of the quality of life of the social sphere. Thus, one can constitute the hypothesis of articulating different scales, densities and morphotyping of hierarchized systems that provoke transitory dynamics in the living of cities that re-establish order and coherence to the city.

Finally, we think of the garden as a phenomenon that connects the heterotopias of the city, representing a large social thematic circle that is urbanization, above all marked by its sociotechnical systems.

The idea of the community construction of a social space with local expression unites the expression of time and space in an opportune encapsulated reality of that society. But arguably one of the most interesting qualities of the garden space is that it prefigures a place of choice for individuals in the city, even if oblivious to the whole dimension around it. It is in this prefiguration that we truly see the impact of what the garden produces, spatially, in the way it moves certain individuals to seek garden spaces in cities, and even to associate them with an idea of a common and sustainable quality of life. It becomes a kind of ‘happy’ and ‘universalizing’ heterotopia that is found in all cultures and seems to have the same relevance in different parts of the world. The ‘images’ they disseminate work on these feelings of community, which naturally change in tone depending on the culture.

There is undoubtedly a point in this question that incorporates the location of a paradox of the abstraction of humanity that manifests itself in the metaphysical order, in cultural organizations. But also, throughout history, the succession of events of the way in which the individual deals with his own existence, and with the existence of the world, seeking to disseminate a certain timeless permanence of his existence is quite evident.

The garden is an important starting point for thinking about society.

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ON FEAR, SPACE AND MOVING LANDSCAPES: THE CASE OF THE ACHUAR GARDEN

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It is in today's context of environmental anxiety, that spatial practices adjacent to conservation biology argue for a reconfiguration of both peripheral landscapes and urban ecosystems, challenging distinctions between domesticated nature and wild spaces. At the same time, and while having played a significant role in questioning this nature-culture dichotomy, the much-discussed ontological turn in anthropology is reinstating it with a newfound sense of cultural urgency. Through the combined approaches of landscape studies and anthropological theory, this paper examines the ways that mythic narratives are negotiated in anthropological accounts of the garden. Situated within the dense Amazonian Forest divided between Peru and Ecuador, the gardens I am putting under examination are those belonging to the territory of the Achuar peoples, managed in the logic of a regenerative alteration between cultivation and fallow that allows for plots of land to remain untended for large periods of time, letting them fuse back into the forest. I will argue that such a situated practice of intermittent management produces a system of landscapes that move in space and time, and that this symbolic exchange between garden and forest suggests alternative schemes regarding the practice of gardening, and how it might relate to our contemporary state of environmental precariousness. Drawing evidence from the ethnological accounts of Philippe Descola and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro, two of the most prominent representatives of the ontological turn in anthropology, I will seek to understand the ways in which the Achuar regulate prohibition and proximity to the forest, turning their gardens into complex arrangements of vegetal matter and cultural memory.¹ French anthropologist Philippe Descola's systematic critique of the nature-culture divide imparts to the Achuar the status of a counterexample, their gardening seen as suggesting alternative political ecologies that transcend locality.² Viveiros de Castro's observations on the particular sense of danger that is prominent in Amerindian thinking, allows in turn for a renewed understanding of the spatial implications of fear, resonating with contemporary environmental anxieties.

In his work on the anthropology of landscape, Descola asks

1. See Philippe Descola's presentation for the Edward Westermarck Memorial lecture, October 2015 titled "Landscape as Transfiguration", and Eduardo Viveiros de Castro's presentation at the National Museum of Rio de Janeiro, Spring 2012 titled "Immanence and Fear".

2. For an overview of the issue of political ecology, see Porto-Gonçalves Carlos Walter, Leff Enrique. (2015) *Political Ecology in Latin America: The Social Re-Appropriation of Nature, the Reinvention of Territories and the Construction of an Environmental Rationality*, *Desenvolvimento e meio Ambiente*, Vol. 35.

3. Descola, P. (2016). *Land-scape as Transfiguration*. Suomen Antropologi: Journal of the Finnish Anthropological Society, Vol. 41, No 1, pp. 3-14.

4. Descola 2016, pp. 4.

5. *ibid* pp. 5.

6. *Ibid*.

whether Achuar gardens are landscapes in the first place.³ The spaces in question are sustenance gardens not corresponding to the Western conception of what a landscape is. Descola specifically questions the possibility of the concept of landscape being valid to cultural groups not possessing pictorial or visual ways of describing the natural environment. He thinks that such, mostly western ways of conceptualizing landscapes are problematic since they presuppose an objectified presentation of the natural environment. Such understandings are either “extensionist” (meaning that they attempt to oversimplify what a landscape is at the point where any sort of humanly modified environment qualifies as one) or “comprehensive” (describing extremely detailed and complicated approaches that turn the understanding of landscapes into an exclusive and highly specialized discourse).⁴ Descola proposes to abandon them both in favor of alternatives that focus on the process through which the natural environment is “transformed” into landscape.

The term “transfiguration” is used to describe the deliberate alteration of a place in such a way that it becomes a tangible representation of another.⁵ The transformative conception of landscape requires three conditions:

- the transformation must be implicit and purposeful
- the act of transformation must not be strictly utilitarian, meaning it must not be aimed exclusively at optimizing the site in terms of efficiency or productivity
- and finally, the completion of the act must produce a clear sense that a change has occurred on the part of the actors, and that the transformation is complete.⁶

In Achuar gardens, the anthropologist notices patterns of signification that transcend their status as sustenance gardens, putting them through transformative processes. He specifically identifies two enabling factors testifying to such a transformation.

- The almost imperceptible modification of the forest by humans, and the tendency for the garden to be cultivated in symbolic imitation of that forest, as the two seem to operate according to the same ecological principles
- The Achuar’s interaction with the spiritual world and how that communication relates to gardening

Using fallow and relocation, members of the Achuar communities are able to identify sites that appear to have been cultivated two or three generations ago, recognizing them by their richness in beneficial plants. This long-term human modification never becomes particularly extensive but remains manageable from a community that retains

memory of the areas already gardened in the past and don’t need to constantly clear new parts of the forest to garden. Nunkui, the female spirit, is responsible for plants found in the garden, while Shakaim, the male spirit, is responsible for forest plants.⁷ It is he who indicates the most suitable location for the opening of a new garden, initiating its establishment. Descola observes the analogies between Shakaim’s garden, (the forest itself) and the Achuar garden that is modeled after it. The transplanting of forest species into the man-made gardens is systematic, while plants that grow in them are easily acclimatized back to the forest while it is recovering through fallow. The two practices of tending to plants (forest plants being tended by Shakaim, and garden plants being tended by the Achuar) blur the distinction between what is spontaneous and what is planned in a way that, according to Descola, makes it impossible for any nature-culture dichotomy to thrive.⁸ Domesticated versions of the forest species are simply bestowed to the humans by Nunkui, and it is only through her mediation that their maintenance is possible.

In Nunkui’s myth, transgression is punished by the removal of the plants, and different versions of the myth give different accounts of the ways that the dissatisfied spirit decides to remove the plants from the gardens. In some of them the plants are withdrawn into the earth, while in others they become too small or turn into forest species, with some versions even specifically listing the correspondent pairings between the lost horticultural species and the forest species they will transform into.⁹ Nunkui’s mercy restores some of the seeds and the cultivation can start again. Management is now conditional. The myth serves as a reminder that the catastrophic removal of species remains an ongoing possibility. Descola observes that the experience of previously tended gardens reinforces this belief, as it makes evident the garden being reclaimed by the forest, lapsing back into Shakaim’s domain. The Achuar modify parts of the forest in ways that are implicit and distinguished by complex symbolic thinking, while also emphasizing a collective ethos with aesthetic implications. The conditions of the transformative practice are met, therefore the Achuar garden is a landscape, but one whose ontological condition is a constant state of vigilance. The garden’s symbolic absorption from the forest is seen as terminating the very process that transforms the area under consideration into a landscape.¹⁰ The gardens in question are also extremely gendered, as the plants are only cultivated by women. They are understood as their children and enter into deeply personal relationships with them, talking to them or using

7. *ibid* pp. 8.

8. *ibid* pp. 11.

9. See Descola 2016

10. *ibid* pp. 12.

magical singing to affect their growth. The most valuable vegetal child of the Achuar is the manioc, a plant that despite its nutritional value, is also considered to possess vampiric abilities. Since the plant is farmed in order to produce sustenance and is therefore consumed daily, the garden is understood to be a dangerous place for the human children. The Manioc is believed to display vengeful tendencies towards the human children, being able to absorb their blood. Such associations are closer to those the Achuar make between predator and prey, reproducing and subverting associations that belong to the domain of the forest. If the mythic menace of the garden's absorption by the forest was not pervasive enough, the threat of the manioc plant comes from the inside, rendering mythic phobia even more tangible.

A great part of Descola's work is centered around the description of four ontological schemes that define the ways human societies relate to the natural world. The Achuar are representatives of the animistic scheme, the other four being naturalism, totemism and analogism.¹¹ Animism considers matter and natural appearances as discontinuities that conceal a continuous interiority lying beneath the sensible surface. This idea outlines the main convergences and divergences between Descola and the Brazilian anthropologist Eduardo Viveiros de Castro. Descola reports, that an animal's form is an envelope and a collection of movable attributes, that once shed, reveal an anthropomorphic person.¹² Viveiros de Castro also describes the body as a mere envelope, a clothing which conceals an internal human form usually only visible to the eyes of the particular species or to certain trans-species beings such as shamans.¹³ In his descriptions, Viveiros de Castro specifically insists on the element of perspectivism, the idea that in an animist system communities of living creatures construct perspectives and that communication between them refer to the adoption of a different perspective from the one typically belonging to their species.¹⁴ Their understanding of the physical body as nothing more than a removeable shell that can conceal the creature's inner human from other species, is an aspect of animism that the two theorists agree on. In Descola's account however, culture's status as representation is not particularly challenged. Viveiros de Castro thinks that his French colleague acknowledges material difference in amerindian conceptions of the physical body but doesn't fully realize its ontological potential.¹⁵ The perspectives he refers to are not representations, since they do not take place in the mind but are located on the body, referring to affects that diversify bodies between species.¹⁶ What a body feeds on, how it communicates, where it settles,

11. Descola, P. (2013) *Beyond Nature and Culture*. Chicago, IL and London: The University of Chicago Press.

12. *ibid* pp. 133.

13. Viveiros de Castro, E. (1998). *Cosmological Deixis, Amerindian Perspectivism*. The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, Vol. 4, No 3, pp. 471.

14. *ibid* pp. 469.

15. On the Descola-Viveiros de Castro "controversy" see Latour Bruno, *Perspectivism: 'Type' or 'bomb'?*, at, *anthropology today*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (Spring 2009), pp. 1-2.

16. Viveiros de Castro 1998, pp. 478.

whether it sets up packs.

What Viveiros de Castro calls a body is a constellation of modes of being that constitute a specific nature.¹⁷ It's culture that is singular and natures that are numerous. Each animal or plant is "within culture", that is, it occupies a perspective corresponding to that which the human community sees itself as occupying. The perspective's adoption is foundational to one's inclusion in the community, and its loss may amount to an unintentional renunciation. Viveiros de Castro notes, "that there is no such thing as blood for one species and beer for another. But there is a beer/blood continuum which we recognize as one of the unities that characterize the man/jaguar multiplicity".¹⁸ For Viveiros de Castro, cannibalism and predator-prey articulations are also addressed in mythic narratives. If there is a single universal principle in the thought of the Amazonian peoples, he thinks, it is that of a deductive similarity between humans and animals found in mythology.¹⁹ Myth refers to a state of being in which bodies and names, souls and affects, self and Other, intertwine and corporeal illusion is lifted. The common reference point of all creatures is not man as a species but rather humanity as a condition.²⁰ This constitutive personhood is at the heart of another mythic account, the story of Pu'uito, the first anus, that the anthropologist uses in order to build an entire argument around nutrition and the predator-prey scheme.

The myth of Pu'uito describes a pre-physical stage of existence where every life form is considered to be a person. The Pu'uito is at once a primordial, angelic anus, but also a singular entity, an individual.²¹ The myth recounts the founding incident of Pu'uito being captured, severed and distributed among the ancestors of all animals. At this protean stage, species are not distinct from each other, nor is a nutritional hierarchy discernible. The mythic incident describes the common thread of the entire animistic framework, that is, the belief in a single and continuous spirituality that runs through multiple corporealities. Pu'uito's distribution is not uniform as the pieces are chaotically dispersed and often fixed on the body of the animals in different positions. The representative of each animal species is attributed with a distinct anus that differentiates it from the rest. For the Brazilian anthropologist, this establishes the existence of each species as a distinct multiplicity.²² A common feature of corporeality, that of possessing an anus, is attributed in every being, creating difference and then sealed by an act of violence that functions as social contract. The organ in question leaves its intensive existence and becomes extensible through social

17. He refers to it as habitus, *ibid* pp. 478.

18. Viveiros de Castro 2012 pp. 96.

19. Viveiros de Castro 1998 pp. 471.

20. Original reference in Descola, P. (1986). *La Nature domestique: symbolisme et praxis dans l'ecologie des Achuar*. Paris: Maison des Sciences des l'Homme. pp. 120. Viveiros de Castro refers to this older text by Philippe Descola in his own text, Viveiros de Castro 1998, pp. 472.

21. Viveiros de Castro 2012, pp. 92.

22. Viveiros de Castro 2012, pp. 92.

sharing. It is the moment of a social existence of the anus before its drastic privatization and withdrawal from the social sphere. As Viveiros de Castro notes, every species has an anus because every species has a mouth, and it is through the mouth that the game of who eats who, the most critical relationship between species is established. In Viveiros de Castro's perspectivist worldview, all encounters between species are understood through a dialectic of seeing-being seen and eating-being eaten.²³ Since every creature is considered human, cannibalism is inevitable, but the sense of danger that the anthropologist is describing lies deeper than such a superficial realization. It stems from the fact that any creature capable of claiming a sense of personhood, can also lay claim to a predator's gaze.

When venturing into the forest looking for sustenance, either gardening or hunting, all associations between humans and predators need to remain incomplete to not reverse the hunter-prey dynamic. To avoid a full encounter with a jaguar and therefore the possibility of being devoured by it, one learns to assimilate the jaguar's perspective as her own. When fully realized, such an exchange might mean a complete abandonment of the human perspective that is similar to madness. It is therefore a question of how much can one walk into the enemy's shoes. For the Brazilian anthropologist, the essence of a western experience of transcendence is based upon a condition of "Friendship" or *φιλία*. Citing Deleuze and Guattari, Viveiros de Castro argues that "Friend" always refers to a specific relation to truth, so much so that in the Western context it constitutes the most decisive condition for the articulation of thought.²⁴ Friendship is identified with knowledge as evidenced by the first component of the word "Philosophy". What then, he wonders, would a world look like, where it is the enemy and not the friend functioning as a transcendental determination?²⁵ What is it like to inhabit a world that is constantly reconfigured under the perspective of the enemy's gaze or by the balancing act of acquiring, even for a fleeting moment, the enemy's perspective? Such a world does not operate in terms of sameness. Differences interconnect rather than divide. Hostility is not understood as the negation of friendship but becomes a positivity in itself. In such a world, he notes, the enemy is both "Self" and "Other".²⁶

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The accounts of the two anthropologists describe incidents of human communities meeting non-human entities. In both descriptions a

drastic rearticulation of otherness is sought. For Descola, otherness is located in the broader context of animist thought, between bodily discontinuity and continuity of spirit. For Viveiros de Castro, animism is formulated as a condition of multiple natures that sees liberating potential in the discontinuity of bodies. For Paulo Tavares, the problem of multiple natures is a matter of political order upon which the formulation of alternative political ecologies is judged. Colonial modernity's problem is not so much that it eliminates cultural diversity, but that it fails to include any political ecology that does not validate the singular Earth-object upon which it was built.²⁷ The valid political question, then, is not how culturally tolerant this global humanity can be, but how modernity could accommodate those 'different natures'.²⁸ As Leff and Porto-Gonçalves point out, 'within the broader context of sustainable management and environmental economics, one can discern two radically different versions of political ecology, one that develops within the regime of dominant economic rationality and one that is based on the ecological dynamics of cultural identities, aiming towards an alternative ecological rationality and shifting emphasis on a social appropriation of the natural.'²⁹

In today's condition in its many forms and shapes, from the sustainability debate and the concept of environmental legislation to the Anthropocene discourse and humanity's reconfiguration as a geological agent, Achuar horticultural practices allow for certain perspectives that can be understood in our own cultural context. Facing the constant risk of their gardens dissolving back into the forest, the Achuar transform their environment in terms of a delicate and reversible spatial production. Through the conditions set by the global climate emergency, western landscape practice is also lapsing into a similar state of precariousness. Juxtaposing the moving gardens of the Achuar with the rigidly structured landscapes of western experience, raises the question of whether there are similar perspectives to be found within emerging practices of ecological reconstruction and alternative approaches to land management. The Achuar's tending practices reflect a community engaging with a shifting environment that is material and tangible, their understanding of landscape indicated in part by nonhuman temporalities. Our condition would request a similar 'entropic' gardening, one that juxtaposes large-scale, top-down planning to a subtle intentionality, that is local but also particular, and therefore potentially global.

23. Ibid pp. 96.

24. see Deleuze, G. & Guattari, F. (1991). *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* Paris: Minuit. Viveiros de Castro is referring to the last work that Deleuze and Guattari cowrote, *Viveiros de Castro 2012*, pp. 103.

25. Viveiros de Castro 2012, pp. 103-104.

26. Ibid pp. 104-105. A fuller argument can be found in the scholar's most celebrated work: Viveiros de Castro, E. (2014). *Cannibal Metaphysics: For a Post-Structural Anthropology*. Minneapolis, MN: Univocal Publishing.

27. Tavares, P. (2012). *On the Earth-Object*, in Pereira, G. (ed) (2012). *Savage Objects*, INCM, Imprensa Nacional Casa Da Moeda, pp. 227.

28. Ibid pp. 228

29. Porto-Gonçalves & Leff pp. 67

A NEO-CONSTRUCTIVIST'S VISION. ZAHA HADID'S DESIGN OF FREEDOM SQUARE AND ITS MOAT GARDENS IN NICOSIA, CYPRUS

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CONSTANTINOS V. PROIMOS

INTRODUCTION

In the words of Zaha Hadid Architects who won the competition for the refurbishment of Eleftheria (Freedom) Square in Nicosia, Cyprus (2005-2021), their plan is a “historically significant architectural intervention” which aspires to connect the old town, fortified by the Venetians, with the modern city and “can become a catalyst to unify the last divided capital of Europe.”¹ The refurbishment, covering an area of 35300 square meters, proposes “a bold vision of coherence and continuity,”² according to the architects (1st image, photorealistic rendering of Freedom Square). In one of her interviews, Zaha Hadid (1950-2016) described this vision for the square: much in contrast to the green line that divides the city, the moat becomes a green zone, a necklace that surrounds and unifies the city in both sides of the wall while simultaneously becoming the central park of Nicosia, exactly like the Central Park of New York, London’s Hyde Park and Tuilleries Gardens in Paris. This new park of Nicosia will be an open, public space at the heart of the town” (Pantazopoulos, 2021).

The square is still under construction although most of the work, in fact, more than 90%, that includes the gardens, the pathways and the fountains, has been completed. The square, especially viewed from high up, sprawls like a gigantic, horizontal, monumental sculpture involving marble, cement, yellow soil and water, along with local flora like olive trees and cypresses. Several modern sculptures appear in strategic spots. The lightning system designed in accordance with the latest technology, has also been implemented as well as three elevators and a large ramp, connecting the bridge with the gardens and making the project friendly to people with disabilities (2nd image).

The square has always been an important site for the city. In the past it used to be called Metaxa square and it was renamed Freedom Square in 1974. It is indeed in the center of the city, right next to the Venetian walls of the fortified old town and next to the Town Hall (3rd image: past view of the square). The square has always had a promi-

1. See <https://www.zaha-hadid.com/masterplans/eleftheria-square/> accessed 19/11/2022.

2. Ibid.

nent place in the collective consciousness of Cypriot people: it is the site where political manifestations and athletic events take place and the place where the *Occupy Buffer Zone* Movement started on the 15th of October 2011. Furthermore, this is the place where the official admission of Cyprus in the European Union was celebrated. The square started as a bridge, connecting the old town with the new and then was transformed to a square which has never been uniquely for pedestrians. Whenever there has been a major event the car traffic has been redirected.

TOWARDS A NEW DYNAMICS OF ARCHITECTURE BASED ON TECHNOLOGY AND THE EARLY MODERNS

Since 1982 Zaha Hadid has been voicing a concern to “create a new dynamics of architecture” by recourse to randomness, “a pure mathematical order and thinking which is guided by logic” as well as to arbitrariness which “has no underlying conceptual logic” (Hadid, 2006, “Randomness vs Arbitrariness,” 279). A perennial and repeated reference for Hadid is Kasimir Malevich’s writings and manifestoes, springing from an accrued sense of urgency due to the triumph of technology, marking a new era for humankind. Such triumph produces an “exhilaration which is yet to be matched in architecture” and is expressed as a need for inventiveness, imagination and interpretation or reinvestigation of modernity (Hadid, 2006, “The Eighty-Nine Degrees,” 280). Hadid insists on following the path opened by the early modernists not in order to resurrect the early moderns but to develop their thought further (Ibid.). In the catalogue of her complete works, Gordana Fontana-Giusti and Patrick Schumacher refer to a series of terms that may be employed to explain Hadid’s architectural practice: explosion, compression, swarm, aggregation, pixelation, carved space and excavation (Hadid, 2006, “Explosions; Compressions; Swarms; Aggregations; Pixelations; Carved Spaces; Excavations,” 364, 365). Such terms indicate the shape of things designed and Hadid’s sculptural vision of architectural entities (4th image: The Hong Kong Polytechnic). We can see in several details of the project of Freedom Square how these terms are employed to denote and describe Hadid’s design.

Hadid’s practice is also referred to as parametric design, which is the type of design based on algorithmic thinking. Such parametric design is processed automatically from known to unknown, once key parameters of the project are specified, usually in 3D CAD building

software. Parametric design allows the construction of complex geometries and structures which would be hard to design in hand, although Hadid has been notorious for getting the inspiration for many of her designs through the old fashioned, manual exploration of form.

In the 11th Architecture Biennial in 2008, Patrick Schumacher presented a parametricist manifesto under the double title: *Parametricism as Style-Parametricist Manifesto*. There he celebrates “systematic, adaptive variation, continuous differentiation (rather than mere variety) and dynamic, parametric figuration (which) concerns *all* design tasks from urbanism to the level of tectonic detail, interior furnishings and the world of products” (Schumacher, 2008). Parametric design reflects “the heterogeneous society of the multitude” and has the task to “develop an architectural and urban repertoire that is geared up to create complex, polycentric urban and architectural fields which are densely layered and continuously differentiated.” Parametric design addresses the demand for “an increased level of articulated complexity” and is the “great new style after modernism.” Style is here meant as a design research program which is born and then eventually refuted, exactly like the architectural theories. Schumacher completes his manifesto by displaying five agendas to reveal new aspects to the parametric paradigm: he thus refers to the “scripted association of multiple subsystems,” to “parametric accentuation,” “parametric figuration,” “parametric responsiveness” and “parametric urbanism.”³

3. All quotes come from Schumacher's manifesto.

FUTURE VISIONS AND PAST REMEMBRANCES

However, the early moderns to whom both Schumacher and Hadid make reference to, never thought of their work merely in terms of style. Whether one refers to Malevich, Naum Gabo or perhaps Le Corbusier himself, the pioneers of early modernism had a social and political vision as well as a humanistic philosophy about the world that motivated their artistic experiments (Burger, 1984) (Le Corbusier, 1923). It is quite disappointing that such a sociopolitical and philosophical vision features very little and quite indirectly in Hadid's or Schumacher's views. Although reference is made to the complex society of the multitude, thereby inferring the conclusion that the close embrace of technology carries a promise to address the increasing complexity of contemporary urban societies, the idea is not elaborated or further exploited. It is true however as David Goldblatt argues that “however the founders of modern architecture saw things, modern architecture was

first understood as a style” (Goldblatt, 1998, 92). Goldblatt apparently refers to the *International Style* exhibition at the New York Museum of Modern Art in 1932, curated by Philip Johnson which was much later matched by the 1988 *Deconstructivist Architecture* exhibition in the same museum, curated again by Philip Johnson with Mark Wigley and featuring Zaha Hadid with Coop Himmelblau, Rem Koolhaas, Peter Eisenman, Bernard Tschumi, Daniel Libeskind and Frank Gehry.

Deplete from a sociopolitical vision for the future, it comes as no surprise that Schumacher's and Hadid's views have a very selective, if any, relation to the past. Hadid's projects are essentially amnesiac, save for the reference to the early moderns whose work path needs to be followed through. Of course, the yellow soil inserted to match the Venetian wall colors and local flora, demonstrate some kindness, generosity and consideration towards the old town and its fortification walls. Furthermore, the flower beds as well as the moat garden arrangement, in general, is reminiscent of French baroque gardens in the sense that they are utterly designed, i.e. submitted to human control. However, other than these, the Freedom Square project develops on its own accord, without regard to the memories of the square or any memories whatsoever. Architects like Elena Kozakou-Limpouri as well as Stella Evangelidou point to the inadequate consideration given to the monumental military walls of Renaissance Nicosia both by Hadid's design as well as by the terms with which the architectural competition was mounted (Ευαγγελίδου, 2005, 55). They further stress the fact that the square does not encourage interaction among the citizens and does not take under consideration the city climate, scale and materiality. This amnesiac charge which has caused a great stir in Cypriot society, is the most serious criticism to Hadid's project and features prominently in all the heated debates that have not stopped since Zaha Hadid Architects won the competition. Other criticisms which have appeared in media and newspaper reports, pertain to the type of flora selected that does not offer shade, to the lighting spots on the floor of the square on which pedestrians stumble and the lighting polls which may be blinding at night and are generally positioned on all the wrong places. Criticism is also addressed to the contractors because the square floor has already started to look dirty and worn out, the obelisk bench color has faded away and the function of the fountains and the gardens leaves quite a lot to be still desired.⁴ Essentially, the reception of the project in Cyprus has created two camps, those who are critical and those who are in favor. The latter argue that it was high time to see an architectural project

4. «Νέα Πλατεία Ελευθερίας, μια πρώτη εντύπωση» Η Καθημερινή Κύπρου, 2/1/2021, <https://www.kathimerini.com.cy/gr/kypros/nea-plataia-eleytherias-mia-pr-wi-entyposi>, accessed 27/6/2021.

of the Hadid studio caliber in Cyprus whereas the former complain about the cost of the project and its amnesiac stigma. The discussion still goes on, even today.

If one were to turn to phenomenology in order to understand not solely Hadid's architectural intervention as an array of objects but also its framework of meaning and intelligibility, namely what makes such an intervention possible in the first place (Zahavi, 2019), one would need to inquire into the notion of place and its character, in order to assess Hadid's project more objectively. For the quest assigned to Hadid Architects was to redesign a square, or, in other words, refurbish a place which was already charged with layers of collective and national memory. Christian Norberg-Schulz in his 1976 seminal essay "The Phenomenon of Place" stresses the importance of the environmental character of place which he calls the essence of place (Norberg-Schulz, 1996, 414). By place he means "a totality made up of concrete things having material substance, shape, texture, and color. Together these things determine an 'environmental character' which is the essence of place" (Ibid). Place means more than location and comprises of character, indicating how things are and this is why we often speak of the spirit of place or the character of place (Norberg-Schulz, 1996, 418). All places have character. "To some extent the character of a place is a function of time; it changes with the seasons, the course of the day, and the weather, factors which above all determine different conditions of light" (Norberg-Schulz, 1996, 420). A character is a complex totality and things are destined to explain "the environment and make its character manifest" (Norberg-Schulz, 1996, 421). Dwelling presupposes identification with the environment (Norberg-Schulz, 1996, 424) whose meaning is hidden and is revealed or brought to the fore by building (Norberg-Schulz, 1996, 422). Does the plan of Hadid architects pay heed to the multilayered memory of the place in which it is implemented or does it reveal the meanings invested in this place by disclosing its character? These are the questions that may be asked from the point of view of Norberg-Schulz's theory. We made this detour to claim that according to Norberg-Schulz, Hadid's Freedom Square misses this prior identification with the environment and thus misses the character of place altogether, amnesiac as it is. Hadid's critics could find in the above mentioned Norberg-Schulz's writings an avid supporter.

Contrary to Norberg-Schulz, Martin Heidegger's phenomenology of place is amnesiac and constructivist, for it is not at all dependent upon the notion of character of place nor does it consider the meaning

of the environment as hidden, brought up by building. The meaning of the environment does not exist before the building is erected. This means that the meaning of the environment is created anew every time another building is erected. In his famous 1951 essay "Building, Dwelling, Thinking" Heidegger gives the example of the bridge in order to explain how locations and places spring from material, human made things like the bridge in a way that is arbitrary, in the sense that things are not at all prior dependent on the character of the place that Norberg-Schulz refers to.

To be sure, the bridge is a thing of its own kind; for it gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it. But only something that is itself a location can make space for a site. The location is not already there before the bridge is. Before the bridge stands, there are of course many spots along the stream that can be occupied by something. One of them proves to be location and does so because of the bridge. Thus a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge. The bridge is a thing; it gathers the fourfold, but in such a way that it allows a site for the fourfold. By this site are determined the localities and ways by which a space is provided for (Heidegger, 1971, 154).

Hadid's Freedom Square design proponents could find support in Heidegger's radical and constructivist conceptualization of place.

CONCLUSION

Nicosia's Freedom Square is an architectural event which has produced a great number of debates and quarrels. For many years now it has been the most discussed architectural project that Cyprus has ever embarked upon. People have been divided between the enthusiasts of the project, exhilarated at the latest technology employed and the sculptural qualities of Hadid's design and the critics who accuse it for its extremely high cost, surpassing many times its original budget, its disconnectedness from the local society and history (Foster, 2004, 164), and perhaps its populist tendency "to have architecture become a sign that overwhelms context" (Ibid.). Critics of Hadid architects' refurbishment of the square point to all those buildings which become signs overwhelming their context: the Beaubourg, Centre Pompidou in Paris, France by Richard Rogers and Renzo Piano et al and, even more prominently, Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Museum at Bilbao, Spain (5th image: Guggenheim Bilbao, 1997). Phenomenologically speaking, the division between the advocates and the critics of Hadid's design in Freedom Square has its correspondence in the difference between

Christian Norberg-Schulz and Martin Heidegger with regard to the generation of place and the determination of its character (Proimos, 2022).

The verdict is apparently far from being reached. It seems that the conflict delineated is between the old world which still demands its share of attention and the new world which solicits our consideration without regard to the past. Deliberately or not, the Freedom Square project has led people to think and question what the role of a square should be. From this point of view alone, Zaha Hadid Architects' intervention is quite significant and corresponds indeed to the agenda of deconstructivist architecture as it leads both its users and designers to question the assumptions of its own making.

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ON THE CARE OF NATURE: ENVIRONMENTAL ETHICS AND THE NATURE OF RECOGNITION

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Since human beings live in cities and have political institutions, the garden is an essential anthropological issue. Since then, through a synthesis with human sensibility, nature has been a matter of expression, as the title of our colloquium reads. Moreover, as long as it is a fundamental anthropological issue, the garden is also an Idea in the Kantian sense. The garden exposes *in concreto* the anthropological idea of the reconciliation between reason and nature, in which the primary beneficiary is sensibility. The meaning of the garden is apprehended in sensibility. It is felt as a place of refreshment, peace, and an encounter with oneself mediated by an encounter with nature.

Regarding nature, gardens do not admit any relationship of domination but of cultivation. The garden is loving nature, and its time measure is slow cultivation and vegetal growth, rest, and love. The garden is a Kantian anthropological idea because nothing bad could be said about it. The garden is an unconditioned (*Unbedingtes*), and it exposes to our sensibility the background where the human body and reason are reconciled.

However, if thinking of gardens as a matter of expression leads us to this anthropological idea, this same thought leads us to the issues of the "care of nature" and "landscape and nature." By resorting to Hans Jonas's classical work from 1979, *Das Prinzip Verantwortung*, I will briefly focus on some philosophical issues underlying the very idea of the garden or, in more general terms, underlying care and landscape as two specific modes of relationship between human reason and nature, the practical and the perceptive ones. For this purpose, I will begin by approaching the ethical problem of caring for nature; then, I will address the metaphysical foundations of environmental and nature ethics. Third I will present some basic definitions of the concept of recognition; as a conclusion, I will mention some practical concepts regarding the care of nature.

TECHNIQUE, ETHICS, AND METAPHYSICS

We could find an initial theoretical orientation in the discussion about

the ethics of caring for nature in Edmund Husserl's epistemological conception that divides the sciences between technical, normative, and theoretical. According to this division, any technique is blind without a normative science that 'normalizes' (in Husserl's terminology) its epistemic sphere – and, if one takes this blindness to its ultimate consequences, technique becomes monstrous. Any action, technical or any other, lacking a normative definition of good and bad, if not even of the good and the evil, is contrary to the same human ends this action or technique is supposed to promote. By contradicting its own purposes, a technique without a normative science covering its field of action is, according to Husserl, epistemological nonsense (Husserl, 1975, §§4-16).

Nevertheless, any normative science that defines good and bad requires a theoretical science since no normative determination is possible without sufficient conceptual and theoretical definitions regarding its object. One cannot establish norms for an object whose concept is unknown or insufficiently defined. In other words, without a concept about the human being and at least presupposing some theoretical and ontological status for nature, it is impossible to build an ethics for nature. The application to the ethics of nature of these epistemological definitions by Husserl, which, although trivial, are so often neglected, requires a reflection linking technique, normativity, and metaphysical theory. As expected in any well-grounded ethics, this link is present in Hans Jonas's work on the ethics of responsibility.

Jonas wants to tackle the lack of normative knowledge regulating the relationship with nature, which turned the technique that has become hegemonic in the contemporary age into a threat. Following the philosophical consensus that spans much of the 20th century, the technique's "promise has turned into a threat" (Jonas, 1984, p. 253). Reason, either because it changed its nature in Modernity, or because it was flawed since the beginning, failed the promise to free humanity from nature's destructive face and has instead transformed itself into a curse and even into a greater threat than the natural ones, that humanity has always faced.

Until the last quarter of the 20th century, there was no ethics or a policy capable of 'normalizing' our conduct towards nature. This conduct has never been submitted to a comprehensive normativity but only to the specific one evaluating the technical results of the technique. According to Jonas, since the hegemony of technique "changed the essence of human action" (Jonas, 1984, p. 15), it is necessary to broaden the foundations of ethics. That change in the essence of the technical

action that creates "a new species of nature" (Jonas, 1984, p. 33) results above all, it seems, from the transformation of the technique into industry and consumption. Moreover, it corresponds to a change in the understanding of nature. Jonas shows that the Earth was always conceived as inexhaustible, "tireless," and "ageless" (Jonas, 1984, p. 19), unshakable by any human action, an element to which all our efforts inevitably return, and in whose stability all human actions were again reabsorbed. In Modernity, on the contrary, Earth has two central functions: a storage of materials to be exploited and forces to be channeled, and a sink.

ON THE INSUFFICIENCY OF CLASSICAL ETHICS, ACCORDING TO HANS JONAS

For several reasons, classical ethics could not respond to this technical transformation. In the first place, ethics was limited until then to the domain of human praxis and to what human beings owe to one another, or to themselves, excluding any thorough reflection on *techné*. That was because the technique was generally supposed to be a mere means to human ends. That means are transformed into ends, and that this transformation of technical means into ends in themselves is what we call culture, and therefore the assemblage of means constitutes human culture, is a phenomenon already described by Hegel. However, he did not draw from this fact ethical consequences regarding the relationship with nature. Heidegger, later on, was probably the first to understand the metaphysical dimension of technique, and that technique entirely alters contemporary ontology. Secondly, except for medicine, *techné* was always understood in classical ethics as "ethically neutral" (Jonas, 1984, p. 22). This neutrality depended on the assumption that the means remain only means and do not irreversibly take the place of the ends towards which they were initially intended.

Consequently, a third factor made classical ethics inadequate to normalize technique. Namely, human beings did not consider themselves affected in their substance by the technique (Jonas, 1984, p. 22). On the contrary, however, Jonas reminds us that in what concerns human beings, "sein Können ist sein Schicksal" ("their power [to act] is her destiny") (Jonas, 1984, p. 252). The notion that her action makes the human being – conceptually, ethically, and nowadays, also technically – gives today a new meaning to the principle that every action reverts upon its agent. If classical thought understood this as the prin-

ciple of habit resulting in the acquisition of virtues or vices, today, with the hegemony of technique, its application extends indefinitely. Technical action transforms its subject.

Another factor contributing to the insufficiency of classical ethics is that the technique's horizon of consequences exceeds the moral meaning traditionally attached to the action and its proximate predictable consequences (Jonas, 1984, p. 22), which used to guide the judgment about actions. The horizon of the technique's effects far exceeds common sense or even science's predictive capacity. Therefore, the classic concept of assigning responsibilities (Jonas, 1984, p. 22) must be revised and much broader. Finally, the technique has a cumulative, irreversible and automatic character (Jonas, 1984, p. 27). This character obliges to consecutive actions and steps with no possible return to some underlying nature that, as mentioned above, would balance and eventually frustrate the effects of human actions and into which all our actions return. Jonas considers, on the contrary, that nature must be understood as "having something like a moral claim on us – and not only for our sake, but also for her own sake and in her own right" (Jonas, 1984, p. 29). This implies, so Jonas, to "extend the recognition of 'ends in themselves' beyond the human sphere" (Jonas, 1984, p. 29).

The care of nature, according to Jonas, cannot be based on the universality and reciprocity of human reason that gives norms to human relationships (see Apel, 1996). One of the reasons for the inadequacy of classical ethics regarding the care of nature is that it was only human ethics, a purely social normativity. The normativity of a social type, which bases on reciprocity, equality, and recognition of mutual rights and duties by rational partners, is not enough to establish an ethics of respect for nature. Its scope could, at most, reach an environmental consideration, which excludes nature herself. That is, it does not attribute a specific value to nature but only in terms of the interests of human beings.

Moreover, as far as its extension is concerned, classical ethics suffers from another limitation. On the one hand, as said, nature cannot enter into relationships of reciprocity. On the other hand, future generations cannot be partners in such reciprocity. Therefore, the ethics of reciprocal demands and mutual recognition of rights must be transformed and extended to ground the moral requirement of care and responsibility.

As a first assessment, we should remark that problems regarding both the future and nature cannot be addressed by an ethical theory

exclusively based on reciprocity or socially based normativity. This first result confirms the epistemological scheme initially sketched, according to which any normative science must ground on a theoretical one – science understood, of course, as founded knowledge in general. So, a moral imperative to act so that there can be a future for humanity requires metaphysical claims about being, humanity, and the status of future generations. Furthermore, a moral imperative commanding the care for nature must ask why moral subjects should care for beings, namely, natural beings that do not belong to the moral sphere, do not have duties, cannot represent rules, and to which guilt does not exist. Only through theoretical knowledge – of an inevitably metaphysical type – can nature be given a value or a status that morally obliges us. What kind of respect can nature demand from humankind? Based on what? Jonas recalls that "nature as a human responsibility is certainly a novelty for ethical theory to ponder. What kind of obligation is at work in it? Is it more than utilitarian interest? Is it simply prudence that commands [...] not to cut off the branch you are sitting on?" (Jonas, 1984, p. 27)

One possibility is, of course, to try to grant "rights" to nature and its products. However, granting nature rights means bringing it into the domain of reciprocity and moral demands, rights, and duties. Even if taken under guardianship, it does not seem possible to grant nature the status of a person with moral or legal interests of its own. The idea of simple reciprocity, or even virtual and vicarial reciprocity, seems thus inapplicable to nature since it is not a moral agent.

A METAPHYSICAL ANSWER TO THE CRUX OF THE ETHICS OF NATURE

Jonas calls this problem "the *crux* of the theory" of responsibility. In order to solve it, the so-called naturalist fallacy must be rehabilitated: since nature is no moral agent, it must be possible to ground values on simple beings (Jonas, 1984, pp. 234, 146). In other words, the *vexata quaestio* of environmental ethics, i.e., to know if the imperative of respect for nature is based exclusively on human interest and, therefore, a moral issue accessory to human reciprocity, or if it can rest on nature's intrinsic value.

Jonas answers that nature has a purpose and value of its own. That nature has an intrinsic value is a metaphysical claim based on ontological concepts, which obliges a digression through the field of meta-

physics and the grounds of the naturalistic fallacy.

Jonas starts by questioning our interest in the existence of future humanity. However, that interest is not a biological drive for reproduction nor a prejudice in favor of the particular human species. Neither is it based on the same reasons requiring the preservation of any other species. This interest is based instead on an ontological privilege of being over non-being. However, this does not mean that human beings should be identified as the essence of being in general, as preferable to non-being, resulting in an even more radical anthropocentrism than the technical one Jonas seeks to counter. The “existence imperative” (Jonas, 1984, p. 90) of humanity and the obligation of maintaining the human species, together with its conditions of existence and its concept, which now technology and the destruction of nature are threatening, is not an imperative of a Promethean self-self-affirmation.

On the contrary, it means the imperative of maintaining the very possibility of ethics and moral duty as such. What is morally imperative to preserve, as an imperative of self-preservation, is not the human being simply, but her moral status of being capable of duty. In the ethics of the future and responsibility, it is not a question of a moral but of an “ontological imperative” (Jonas, 1984, p. 91). The ontological imperative precedes the moral one, and it is only sustainable on the basis that being in itself encompasses value and meaning. Although our responsibility is both towards nature and the human species, our imperative is towards the “idea of the human being” (Jonas, 1984, p. 91), which comprehends its corporality and embodiment. Therefore, the fundamental ethical responsibility is maintaining the conditions for this same human responsibility to exist. The value of human beings is, formally, to be the bearer of values or moral requirements (cf. Jonas, 1984, p. 392). According to Jonas, being is the “capacity for value [which] is itself a value, the value of all values” (Jonas, 1984, p. 100). And that is the only reason why the “absolute privilege of being over non-being” must be admitted (Jonas, 1984, p. 96-97).

For the theory of value, this means that being is a kind of value, and value is a kind of being. The human being is the one who assumes the ethical obligation of valuing being in general and must therefore preserve it before thinking about transforming or destroying it. Therefore, the primary ethical claim is not a claim for reciprocity but for responsibility for being. However, this does not imply refusing the value of freedom, as opposed to being, even in its negative aspects, that may sometimes be superior to being itself. On the contrary, freedom is a

mode of being that, although standing out and free from nature, is also a value already present and immanent in it.

Although the proof of the imperative to care for nature presupposes the obligation to preserve the human future, it should not be considered anthropocentric, as it is only through the preservation of nature that human freedom, which is part of it, can also be affirmed. Alternatively, looking at the issue from the inverse perspective: nature appeals to our sensibility in gardens, but also in nature’s sublime in general because it expresses the value of nature – and nature is a matter of expression. The question of being or non-being of nature is thus not morally neutral, indifferent to any valuation. Thus, Jonas concludes that “an indifferent being would only be a more imperfect one, because tainted by the mark of meaninglessness, a form of nothingness and actually unimaginable” (Jonas, 1984, p. 156). Thus, being receives meaning through its ends, nature has its own ends, and ethical responsibility is human’s most specific position of ends.

Therefore, the responsibility theory rests on nature and human beings as values in themselves, not on reciprocity towards nature. An anthropological constant and an ontology of being as purpose and value are thus at the basis of the ethics commanding the care for nature that makes us cultivate gardens.

These metaphysical definitions explain the seeming paradox that it is precisely humanism that morally and politically obliges us to maintain and conserve what is not human, namely nature. Jonas states this “paradox” regarding the relationship between humans and nature as follows: “precisely that nature which has not been changed and not used by man, the «wild» nature is the «humane,» namely that nature which speaks to man, and that nature which is made completely subservient to him is absolutely «inhumane»” (Jonas, 1984, p. 372-373). By denaturalizing and industrializing nature for his service, e.g., in forests that are no more than monocultures of invasive species trees, or uninterrupted fields that do not leave any space for biodiversity, man surrounds himself with the inhuman and threatens to succumb to it. If Jonas emphasizes the sublime aspects of nature – i.e., wild and untouched nature – we should not lose sight of the most harmoniously beautiful aspect expressed in the gardens. The same paradox is apparent in gardens: what speaks to the human being is what is not exclusively or primarily human. The seeming paradox says that the human only finds herself in nature and its preservation and cultivation.

Despite their sharp distinction to nature, human beings recognize

their community with it, regardless of how much freedom and history may have modified them. In caring for nature, humanity finds her congeniality with it, and it is also because of this congeniality that human beings find themselves morally obliged to care.

The imperative is to leave essentially untouched what humanity received, the link between past and future generations, who can, from this perspective, participate and oblige us in the form of moral mutualization. However, moral mutualization is not reciprocal in the contractual sense and does not derive primarily from utility maximization but from responsibility for something entrusted to us. We are thus nature's trustees ("Treuhand") (Jonas, 1984, p. 232). Many of the most important things to which human beings are attached inevitably do not result from their choice or will, things they cannot contract. Just as humans are not born in reciprocity, nor do they die in it, humans have to laboriously cultivate and let grow the ethical, political, and cultural conditions for reciprocity and recognition.

CONCLUSIONS: OIKOPHILIA AND THE "HALF-EARTH" PROJECT

Like these mutual and pre-reciprocal relationships, the relationship with nature is also the object of human being's *pietas*, of "gratitude, pity, respect and reverence" ("Dankbarkeit, Pietät, Ehrfurcht") (Jonas, 1984, p. 74). Normally, nature ought to be an object of love for what is our own – although also strangely alien – according to the "*oikophilia*" urged by Roger Scruton (Scruton, 2012). The loss of this feeling is an impoverishment of rationality. If we may, partially and in some respects, refuse *oikophilia*, for example, regarding some specific points of society and culture, the overall absence of *oikophilia*, especially regarding nature, is a remnant of a "Baconian" technical project of mastery (Jonas, 1984, pp. 251ff.) that, once having brought humanity up to technical and industrial modernity, became at the same time more than a promise, a threat of devastation. Moreover, it should be remarked, for the sake of brevity, that the nature threatened by this blind technical ideal refers not only to nature outside us but also to nature as present in our morality and our bodies. This one ought to be respected and cultivated so much as the other.

If reciprocity, under the form of the market, is instrumentally useful, its moral value is strictly limited to that usefulness. Regarding the insufficiency of the ethics of reciprocity to understand the relationship with nature, we should recall Paul Ricoeur's words that "market, one

might say, is reciprocity without mutuality" (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 359). According to Ricoeur, one should distinguish reciprocity and mutuality. Reciprocity rests on mutuality, i.e., "every form of what is priceless whether it is moral dignity, which has a value but not a price, or the integrity of the human body, and the noncommercialization of its organs, to say nothing of its beauty, or that of gardens and flowers or the splendor of natural landscapes" (Ricoeur, 2004, p. 367).

Nature, for humans, is not a subject of reciprocity but of mutuality. It is, therefore, a heritage asset entrusted to the care of human beings as a gift and a responsibility. These undermine their own rationality if they reduce it to a simple indifferent means, a source of resources or a sink. Therefore, Jonas comprehends caring in the definition of responsibility: "responsibility is the *care* for another being, recognized as an obligation" (Jonas, 1984, p. 391).

In conclusion, I would like to suggest that grounding ethical duties toward nature in nature's own interests and purposes is not incompatible with the merely environmental conception, which grounds an ethical stance toward nature in the interests of humanity—in other words, caring for nature and the future is not incompatible with the idea of reciprocity as a major, although secondary, source of moral obligation.

The ethics of reciprocity rests on the intersubjective recognition between persons. On the one hand, we should recall the paradox mentioned above, that the fully humanized landscape is inhumane and does not need ethical care, albeit, on the contrary, the untouched landscape is an object of moral obligation—and remark that the seeming paradox results from the core of the ethical and anthropological structure of recognition.

The seeming paradox implies that only mutually independent subjects can perform the act of recognition. A reference to the first analyses of the recognition between subjects would be in place to understand what is at stake. Hegel and Fichte show that the relationship of recognition requires reciprocal autonomy, lest it becomes a purely natural relationship, i.e., of subordination, which would hinder the moral and ideal recognition structure.

According to Hegel, the mind recognizes itself in nature, so the relationship between nature and spirit must be a relationship of mutual independence. It is, therefore, a relationship of mutual liberation. If the spirit is spirit only insofar as it frees itself from nature, nature must also be posited as independent from the spirit. As Paul Ricoeur recalls, only in mutual reserve is there something valuable to be recognized

(Ricoeur, 2004, pp. 397, 401).

The care of nature as independent from man is thus a necessary element of the recognition relationship, and ethical responsibility for nature is thus an integral part of human reason. Our *motto* could therefore be that *the nature of recognition implies the recognition of nature* specifically as an object of ethical obligation and responsibility.

Within this general framework, the care of nature, according to Hans Jonas, advises us the consideration of some “examples worthy of imitation,” namely the “greatest nature protection parks and wilderness reserves on Earth – those in the United States” (Jonas, 1984, p. 373). Therefore, as a practical and political conclusion, I would like to mention Edward O. Wilson’s conservationist “half-Earth” proposal (Wilson, 2016) as an ethical, anthropological, and philosophical imperative, which advises the drastic global expansion and deepening of large areas of nature protection (cf. Ferry, 2021, pp. 183ff.).

I conclude by suggesting that to conceive a garden, one must keep in mind these thoughts - or at least similar thoughts.

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THE GARDEN AS MICROCOSM AND COSMOS

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“We must cultivate our garden”. (Voltaire, 2008, p. 169) This is the closing sentence of Voltaire’s *Candide, ou l’optimisme* (1759), a symbolic odyssey –and parody- of the 18th century, a time when ‘Europe’ was being formed partly by its extension to the ‘new world’ (the Americas) and the concept of ‘cosmopolitanism’ was being formulated. After a series of tremendous and terrifying adventures around what was considered to be ‘the world’ at that time (killings, rapes, earthquakes, shipwrecks, betrayals, slavery etc.), *Candide* ends up with a bunch of miserable and exhausted companions in the suburbs of Constantinople and decides that it is time to cultivate their garden! Why do I choose to start with *Candide*? Because Voltaire, with this final dictum, introduces us to the following problematic: he forces us to think about the distinction between a ‘globalized’ -and rather dangerous- landscape and the return to a local -and protected- environment, that of the garden. With the following difference: Voltaire contrasts the global with the local, including the garden in the latter; he is critical of the anarchic cosmopolitanism of the 18th century, whereas he praises the local cultivation of the garden. I, on the other hand, want to maintain that the garden offers us a means and an opportunity to think of the two together: I want to maintain that the garden connects us with the wider world -the *cosmos*-, with nature, even with the universe, through our occupation with and cultivation of a *microcosm*. One could also express this by saying that the garden connects *economy* –the way to deal with issues of the home (in Greek, *oikos*)- with *ecology* –a discourse and action related to nature and the environment, a connection with the outer and wider world.

The notion of the garden as cosmos and microcosm has been expressed by another, more contemporary, French thinker, Michel Foucault, in his essay “Of Other Spaces” (1967). As opposed to a *utopia* which offers a fictional or imaginary model, the garden provides us with what Foucault named a *heterotopia* –that is, an alternative, but *actual* environment:

The heterotopia is capable of juxtaposing in a single real place several spaces, several sites that are in themselves incompatible. [...] Perhaps the oldest example of these heterotopias that take the form of contradic-

tory sites is the garden. We must not forget that in the Orient the garden, an astonishing creation that is now a thousand years old, had very deep and seemingly superimposed meanings. The traditional garden of the Persians was a sacred space that was supposed to bring together inside its rectangle four parts representing the four parts of the world, with a space still more sacred than the others that was like an umbilicus, the navel of the world at its center (the basin and water fountain were there); and all the vegetation of the garden was supposed to come together in this space, in this sort of microcosm. As for carpets, they were originally reproductions of gardens (the garden is a rug onto which the whole world comes to enact its symbolic perfection, and the rug is a sort of garden that can move across space). The garden is the smallest parcel of the world and then it is the totality of the world. (Foucault, 1984, p. 6)

One of the arguments that have been put forth against the garden –on the one hand as an artificial culture, on the other as a connection between the local and the global- is the emphasis on native land and unmediated nature. In other words, the notion of culture or cultivation which Voltaire praised, in this case counts as a source of negative intervention to what we could, metaphorically, name ‘local colour’ (*couleur locale*, *τοπικό χρώμα*) or, here more literally, ‘local land’ (*τοπικό χώμα*). In order to elucidate -and counter- this point, I draw on two contemporary theoretical sources: garden and nutrition theorist Michael Pollan’s “second nature” and landscape architect Gilles Clément’s “planetary garden”. I want to concentrate on the issue of plant migration, and how that issue offers us an ‘opening’ to the world.

In his book *Second Nature: A Gardener’s Education* (1991), Michael Pollan takes issue with a view propounded by H.D. Thoreau in *Walden; or Life in the Woods* (1854), an American utopian text of the mid-19th century, which does not project an imaginary state but proposes a «return to nature». (Pollan, 1991, chap. 6) In the chapter entitled “The Bean Field”, Thoreau deals with the issue of the human cultivation of nature which he considers as a hostile intervention. Here the garden refers to a small culture or area of cultivation around a hut, basically involving growing vegetables for survival. At the beginning of the cultivation of beans for sustenance, Thoreau claims as his assistants the dews and rains which water the soil and the fertility of the soil itself; while his enemies are worms, cold, woodchucks and weeds. It is in the context of *weeding* that Thoreau sets an important moral question in relation to human intervention in nature: “But what right had I to oust the various weeds, and break up their ancient herb garden?” (Thoreau, 1995) So, what is he suggesting we should do? On the one hand, we cultivate the land since this constitutes part of human needs; yet at the

same time we respect the needs of other organisms –the beans also exist for the woodchucks, the weeds for the birds, and so on. Thoreau is known for his view that *in wilderness is the preservation of the world*. Yet, in the specific chapter, there seems to be no clear answer to what a gardener should do with the weeds. Perhaps to let them grow alongside with the beans, a fact which may destroy the bean field, ruin the crop, endanger (human) survival.

Thoreau’s ambivalence is brought out by Michael Pollan in *Second Nature*, which was greeted as ‘a modern Walden’. Pollan acknowledges Thoreau’s influence in the formation of his own ideas. However, when he put those principles into practice in the cultivation of the bean field he created in his own garden, allowing the weeds to grow alongside with the vegetables, he discovered that the following year the weeds had taken over the ground and there was no crop. The wild had ousted the tame. So, Pollan abandons the policy of non-intervention and sides with weeding and cultivation:

To weed is to bring culture to nature –which is why we say, when we are weeding, that we are *cultivating* the soil. Weeding, in this very sense, is not a nuisance that follows from gardening, but its very essence. As I learned in my flower bed, mere neglect won’t bring back ‘nature’. (Pollan, 1991, p. 115)

By the end of his discussion Pollan has reversed Thoreau’s dictum, now maintaining the opposite, that *in human culture is the preservation of wildness*. (Pollan, 1991, p.114) Pollan especially relates gardening to nutrition and forging a better quality of life. The motto of his book *The Omnivore’s Dilemma* is “Eat food. Not too much. Mostly plants”; and, if possible, cultivate them in your garden. (Pollan, 2007)

How does the above debate relate to our topic? What Pollan brings out is that the ‘wilderness’ that Thoreau praises may not be as wild as all that. Thoreau considered the wild weeds to be part of nature, whereas his tended beans were part of civilization. The local and the indigenous is presented as nature, whereas cultivation and gardening –that is, culture- as foreign and violent intervention. But as it turns out, culture is inescapable, even at the ‘ideal’ Walden. Pollan points out that much of the flora and vegetation in the Walden landscape was as acculturated as Thoreau’s beans; most of the weeds that came up in his garden were alien species, brought over to America, in one way or another, by the colonists, whether by targeted or accidental plant migration; for example, via birds or in the soles of the shoes of immigrants. (Pollan, 1991, p. 110) So, what seemed local and native was in fact, at least part-

ly, migratory and foreign –that is, a connection to the wider world.

Here I would like to return to my point about the relation of the cultivation of the garden with the wider issues of globalization, migration and colonialism, the relation of the indigenous with the immigrant, of the local with the foreign; as well as the tendency to identify the indigenous flora (plants) with the ‘natural’ and the native, in contrast with the imported/foreign vegetation which tries to ‘impose’ itself from outside, and ‘against nature’. Yet, how unmediated can nature be? How close to the so-called ‘wild nature’ can we ever get –or return? The answer seems to be: it is *impossible*. ‘Pure’ nature is but a myth –a myth connected to the claim of the ‘natural’ as the local, the native, the authentic, the indigenous, and –later- the national. So, the quest for a ‘return to nature’ and the hymn or praise of the ‘truly native’ vegetation seem to be connected to a type of parochialism, as well as xenophobia; whereas the migration of plants and the cultivation of the garden relate to an ‘opening’ to the world, to a wider ‘globalized’ landscape; but also to the evils incurred by colonialism and foreign-based intervention.

One solution seems to lie in the active consciousness of the tension between the two extreme situations: on the one hand, isolation in the local, on the other, engulfment in the global; and the solution may lie in the negotiation of a balance between the two. Maybe the best known supporter of this balance today is the French landscape architect Gilles Clément, who designs and plants his ‘planetary garden’ (*jardin planétaire*) playing on the double meaning of the term based on its Greek etymology: both *πλανητικός* (*planetikos*), ‘of the planet’ or the *cosmos* and *πλάνητας* (*planetas*), of the errant, the migrant, the wanderer, It is a ‘garden in movement’, with vagabond and migratory plants from various regions of the earth (or planet), which are allowed to grow next to the indigenous vegetation, investigating the possibilities of cohabitation (*symbiosis*) and widening the horizons of biodiversity. (Clément, 2008) Clément asks: “How can we bring about a future rich enough in tolerance to conceive of spaces where nature collaborates with humankind rather than be seen as an obstacle to our desires?” (Clément, 2005, p. 78) The proposed answer is: “To do as much as possible with, and as little as possible against.” (Clément, 2012)

I would like to illustrate the above discussion by reference to two examples that concern the Greek landscape and its relation to the world: first, to a transfer from the Greek microcosm to the wider *cosmos*; and secondly, from the wider world to the local microcosm.

The so-called “English garden” forms a kind of its own, which

flourished in the 17th and 18th centuries, in correspondence with British exploration and colonization. Stephen Harris, head of the Oxford University botanical gardens and herbarium, outlines the story of how this happened in two fascinating books: *The Magnificent Flora Graeca* which follows the expeditions of John Sibthorp, one of the first professors of botanology at the university of Oxford; and *Planting Paradise: Cultivating the Garden 1501-1900*, which traces how many of the plants of the Mediterranean, but also from other parts of the world, found their way to the English garden. The original *Flora Graeca* is a ten-volume folio publication of the plants of Greece in the late 18th century based on the collection of plants from the Near East realized by Sibthorp and documented by the Austrian painter Ferdinand Bauer. It was highly influential in bringing back specific specimens and information on Mediterranean plants, many of which eventually found their way to the English gardens. As Harris points out:

Plants in the English garden reflect the boot-prints of the British across the globe and the personal relationships between individual botanists and gardeners. Naturally, British and European native plants are well-represented in the English garden, but the exotic is constantly found to be more alluring than native species, and the diversity of plants cultivated in the average garden includes representatives from almost every continent. (Harris, 2007, p. 13)

To go back to my question: How unchanged can a landscape –or a place (*topos*)- remain? How indigenous or ‘original’ can its flora/vegetation be? How ‘clean’ can a culture –a cultivation- be? How far or how much can we separate the native from the immigrant, the local from the global? We have just seen an example of how local flora has extended its reach to the wider world, leading to the complex multicultural mixture that constitutes the core of the English garden. I would now like to turn my attention to the opposite movement, that is, from the wider world or *cosmos* to the local garden or microcosm, by presenting two works by two contemporary Greek artists: Nikos Papadopoulos’ *Flora Filopappou: From City of Rocks to Garden* (2018) and Natasa Biza’s *A Plan for Planting* (2014).*

With his title, *Flora Filopappou*, Nikos Papadopoulos plays with a reverse correspondence: if *Flora Graeca* traced how plant specimens from Greece found their way to the English garden, *Flora Filopappou* follows how plants from various parts of the world ended up in a Greek garden. He takes as his example the hill of Filopappou in the center of

Athens, which was so barren that in the 19th century it earned the title of “city of rocks”, and shows how through a series of transformations, which include the migration of plants, it became a lush garden. Using the contemporary artistic practice of constructing an archive, Papadopoulos collects and juxtaposes pictures which show the hill then and now [Figs. 1 and 2]. Papadopoulos aims to show that despite the original aim of planting the area surrounding the Acropolis (which includes the Filopappou hill) with autochthonous plants going back to ancient Greece, the result is a mixture of flora, both from the indigenous pool but also from a variety of places around the globe, turning the specific landscape into an example of a ‘planetary garden’. By following the stages of the hill’s planting development and tracing the trajectories of plants, Papadopoulos discovers that the flora no longer has the originally desired, exclusively native character but rather that of a mixture or combination of local and global, since only two thirds of the hill’s vegetation is indigenous, the remaining one third being migratory and immigrant. I have selected here some of the artist’s drawings from the artist’s book and the exhibition *Flora Filopappou: From City of Rocks to Garden* in order to illustrate the narrative involved: A lone middle-aged man sits on a rock of Filopappou hill, gazing out to a rather deserted and indeterminate landscape, reminiscent of Caspar David Friedrich’s *Wanderer above the Sea of Fog* [Fig. 3]. In the 15th century, Christopher Columbus’ expeditions spark off the discovery of the so-called New World, one result of which was the transfer and exchange of exotic plants, including the prickly pear cactus [Fig. 4]. A major obstacle in the travel of plants was the insalubrious conditions on the long boat journeys (salt water, lack of light, gnawing by mice and rats). The solution came in the form of the Wardian Case [Fig. 5], invented by the naturalist Nathaniel Ward in the early 19th century, a kind of miniature hothouse made of a wooden or metal frame and glass, that could protect the transportation of seeds and plants in their long and perilous sea journeys. Papadopoulos traces this history (Papadopoulos, 2018, pp. 21-23) and brings a sample of the Wardian case to settle on the Filopappou rocks [Fig. 6]. A new view is now offered to the lonesome spectator/wanderer, through the transportation medium of the Wardian case, alluding to the vegetal treasures whose travels it enabled [Fig. 7]. The emergence of a new landscape, lush instead of rocky, with the contribution of migratory plants from all over the globe which have settled in this new place or home together with the indigenous plants, creates a new and complex identity [Fig. 8].



FIG.1



FIG.2

FIG.1 N. Papadopoulos, Comparative documentation of Athens, 1917 and 2015. *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2018

FIG.2 N. Papadopoulos, Comparative documentation of Athens, 1920 and 2015. *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2018.

FIG.3 N. Papadopoulos, Drawing from the artist book *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2010-18, pencil and ink on paper, 40x30cm.

FIG.4 N. Papadopoulos, Drawing from the artist book *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2010-18, coloured pencil and ink on paper, 40x30cm.

FIG.5 N. Papadopoulos, Drawing from the artist book *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2010-18, pencil and ink on paper, 40x30cm.

FIG.6 N. Papadopoulos, Drawing from the artist book *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2010-18, pencil and ink on paper, 40x30cm.

FIG.7 N. Papadopoulos, Drawing from the artist book *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2010-18, pencil and ink on paper, 40x30cm.

FIG.8 N. Papadopoulos, Drawing from the project *Flora Filopappou: A Journey from the City of Rocks to the Garden*, 2017, ink and pencil on paper, 55x75cm.




FIG.3



FIG.4



FIG.5



FIG.6



FIG.7



FIG.8

Natasa Biza is motivated by a similar interest to investigate the alleged purity of an indigenous population via *A Plan for Planting*, concentrating on another area at the foothills of the Acropolis, the Ancient Agora or market place. Biza also uses photographic material to illustrate how barren the area was until the middle of the 20th century [Fig. 9], tracing the steps that were taken in the collaboration between the Greek state (here represented by Queen Frederica and King Paul) and the American School of Classical Studies at Athens which was initially responsible for the excavations and the landscaping of the area, based on a distinct policy of planting it with indigenous plants dating from Ancient Greece [Fig. 10]. Cement plaques were made and placed in front of the plants, with their scientific name in Latin and in Greek; and a booklet was published with a history of the local flora [Fig. 11]. However, what Biza noticed in her walks was that there were several plants that bore no name; specifically, plants that were not recognized as local but had found their way to the site [Fig. 12]. In an attempt to redress the injustice, Biza wrote a letter to the head of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, listing some of the immigrant plants with their place of origin and suggesting that plaques should be made for them too [Fig. 13]. As no reply was forthcoming, Biza decided to make the plaques herself and place them in front of the immigrant plants ... [Fig. 14]. Part of the work included the documentation of this process; another part involved the remaking of the booklet *Local Lore of Ancient Greece* in such a way as to include the incoming migrant species [Fig. 15] as well as a map to highlight their signage and location in the Ancient Agora [Fig.16]. In this way, Biza's work highlights "the paradoxes that arise out of the national and international significance of the ancient Greek classical heritage, as well as the politics of memory and oblivion accompanying the national search for 'roots' and 'continuities' in time and place." (Rikou & Yalouri, 2014, p. 59)

FIG.9 N. Biza, Documentation of the Agora site, Athens, 1954. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014. (a) Girl guide planting tree, 12.12.1954; (b) Queen Frederica and King Paul at the Agora for the inauguration of the tree planting project, 04.01.1954; (c) Queen Frederica planting a laurel tree at the Agora, 04.01.1954. Source: www.agathe.gr.



FIG.10



FIG.11



FIG.12



FIG.14




FIG.13




FIG.15




FIG.10 N. Biza, Recent view of the Agora, Athens. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.

FIG.11 Booklet *Garden Lore of Ancient Athens*, published by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1963. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.

FIG.12 N. Biza, Recent view of the Agora with non-indigenous palm tree. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.

FIG.13 N. Biza, Letter sent to James Wright, director of the American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 8 May 2014. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.

FIG.14 N. Biza, Documentation of the intervention at the Agora site. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.

FIG.15 Front pages of the book *Garden Lore of Ancient Athens*, indicating the artist's intervention (left). N. Biza, *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.

FIG.16 N. Biza, Plan of the Agora showing where the signage was placed, indicating the plants that were not indigenous to Greece. *A Plan for Planting*, 2014.



FIG.16

Having presented the garden as a microcosm which provides us with an occasion to open out to the wider world or *cosmos*, I want to close with some remarks on the functions involved in cultivating a garden. These include:

- the planning and occupation with natural materials, like digging, pruning, planting, watering, weeding, etc.
- the consistent care, the patience and persistence that any cultivation requires
- the enjoyment of gathering the fruits of one's efforts and the sharing with others
- the pleasure gained from various activities that can be performed in the protected environment of a garden, such as walking, thinking, conversing, playing, relaxing, daydreaming
- the creative or artistic aspect of cultivation, incapsulated in the Greek term *καλλιέργεια*, a combination of *kallos*=beauty and *ergon*=work
- the aesthetic enjoyment derived from seeing the flowers and their often amazing colours and shapes, the combination of plants, the overall lay-out
- the respect and humility which relate to the understanding of the possibilities and limits that natural materials and conditions impose on us
- the familiarization with decay and death –typical of organic matter-, but also of how to face and bear it
- the hope and optimism which relate to the expectation –but also to the certainty- of the recurrence of blossoming and flowering
- the prospect of a better quality of life (*εὖ ζῆν*) based on the relationship between cultivation and nutrition/sustenance
- and, more related to our context, the familiarization with the possibilities of co-habitation (symbiosis) of the indigenous/the native with the stranger/the foreign, of the local with the migratory.

In the garden all these practices interrelate and contribute to viewing it as a microcosm which sets the stage for the relationship between human and nature or world. Going back to Foucault, *the garden is the smallest parcel of the world, but also the whole world*.

* All images are reproduced by courtesy of the artists.

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MACHINE VERSUS GARDEN – THE IDEAS OF METROPOLIS AND REGIONAL CITY IN THE THOUGHT OF LEWIS MUMFORD

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INTRODUCTION: GARDEN VERSUS CITY: CHANGING IMAGES OF NORTH AMERICA

North America, this unconquered large and uninhabited terra incognita, in the cultural geography of the European colonizers of the 18th century, was described with an oppositional national pair: it was a threatening wilderness with unknown dangers and, simultaneously, it was an earthly incarnation of Paradise, a cornucopia, an ideal garden. These images of North America were associated with different, antagonistic conceptions of human nature. The idea of wilderness was very compatible with the Puritan ethos and religious anthropology. Human soul burdened with original sin and consequently full of sinful human instincts, and the wilderness, in the moral geography of the Puritans were put into parallel: both needed a continuous and unrelenting control, discipline and transformation: in the case of soul it was exerted by Christian virtues, while, in the case of wilderness, by hard toiling. The Puritan ethos prescribed a strenuous work for the believer. The conquering and transformation of sinful instincts and that of wilderness were mirror images of each other. (Marx 1964) The machine was an obvious means for the domestication of untamed wilderness; the ideas of an activist human anthropology and a self-disciplined human community proved a very suitable hot bed for a technological society emerged in the 19th century. At the same time it was an inner tension between republic values and the abundance produced by continuously developing technology. Classic republicanism emphasized the simple, Spartan way of life as a warranty of Republican ethos; the richness and a consumerist way life as concomitant phenomena of the dominance of the Machine needed a reinterpretation of Republican idea adjusting it to modernity. (Kasson 1976)

At the same time, the idea of the garden involved an epicurean ethos based on the passive enjoyment of the gifts offered by the generosity of nature. However, the idea of natural garden, according to which North America is an earthly embodiment of the heavenly Paradise described in the story of Genesis, is different from the garden as a result

of human labour. The bucolic idyll as the referential framework of the 18th century North America involved a tripartite cultural and moral geography. There were three regions in this mental map: the humanized nature, i.e. the man-created garden is in intermediate position; it is bordered by the untamed wilderness and the human artefact, the city. Similar tripartite cultural-moral geography appears in Shakespeare's *The Tempest* where Gonzalo represents the naturally given Eden, while Caliban is the representative of the brutal forces of the wilderness. Shakespeare refuses both options: the white magic of Prospero creates a garden based on the equilibrium between nature and civilisation. (Marx 1966, pp. 62-63)

THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF MUMFORD INSPIRED BY FREUDIAN IDEAS AND THE NOTION OF EQUILIBRIUM

Lewis Mumford (1895-1990) was an outstanding figure of the first generation of American cultural criticism emerging after the turn of the 19-20th centuries. (Blake, 1990, Miller, 1986) The opposition of Caliban and Prospero plays a central role in his historical philosophy inspired by the theory of Sigmund Freud. Mumford applies the Freudian psychoanalytic theory of the three layered human psyche to the field of history. The triad of id, ego and superego appears in his conception as the triad of the levels of instincts, rationality, and human culture; the latter, i.e. the Freudian superego plays a positive role in his theory: it humanizes the raw instincts taming them by cultural values. Mumford, being deeply influenced by the experiences of the two world wars, transforms the Freudian notions according to the logic of his theory: Caliban is the embodiment of the elementary human vitality; a basic moving force behind human action. At the same time its barbarism and cruelty must be controlled and refined by Prospero, i.e. cultural values. Human rationality is the last result of the confrontation of Caliban and Prospero. Mumford's essential innovation is the introduction of the notion of equilibrium which plays a central role in his ecological approach. Equilibrium is a regulator mechanism of living organisms, and human communities, from civilisation to cities, which are living organisms for Mumford. If Caliban gains upper hand, civilisation is re-barbarising. If Prospero gains upper hand, civilisation is stagnating. Both ways are blind alleys: the narrow path between them is a well-balanced civilisation in which Caliban is harnessed by Prospero, i.e. instinctual vitality is tamed by cultural values. (Mumford 1972, p. 342)

This conception, in another version, appears in Mumford's philosophy of technics: the gravest failure of our modern technological civilisation, according to him that it proved unable to assimilate machine into the fabric of human culture. There is a telling remark in his book entitled *Technics and civilisation* "The gains in technics are never registered automatically in society (...) the careless habit of attributing to mechanical improvements a direct role as instruments of culture and civilization puts a demand upon the machine to which it cannot respond. Lacking a cooperative social intelligence and good-will, our most refined technics promises no more for society's improvement than an electric bulb would promise to a monkey in the midst of a jungle." (Mumford, 1934, p. 215)

CITY, TECHNOLOGY, CIVILISATION: PATRICK GEDDES AND MUMFORD

Lewis Mumford, in his first book, gave a sketch of a renewed civilisation whose historical mission is the replacement of the old power civilisation based on Palaeolithic steam-technology was inspired by the idea of garden created by human mind and hand. (Mumford 1923) He imagined a network of small sized towns living in a mutually beneficial relation with their social and natural environment. Town and countryside, it was the core of his green utopia, are together constitute an ecosystem. The main source of inspiration of Mumford was Patrick Geddes, the Scottish biologist, sociologist and one of the most significant city planners of the British Empire who was invited for completion of city-reconstructions of more than fifty cities from Jerusalem to Bombay. (Meller, 1990) Geddes, as a role-model of generalist, who did not restrict himself for a limited part of human knowledge, was a first imprint concerning city-reconstruction for the young Mumford. The problem of city-reconstruction became acute in the late 19th century as a consequence of rapid urbanisation all over the industrialized world: congestion, overpopulated megapolises, slums, nature-pollution etc. Geddes strove for a synthesis of an evolutionist biology interpreted in vitalistic manner and empirical sociology; it resulted in an eco-sensitive cultural criticism with a holistic approach. The first city-reconstruction planned and exerted by Geddes was that of Edinburgh. His main principle of city planning was conservative surgery. The central idea of Geddes, the region as a terrain of ecological symbiosis between city and her environment, was one of the most important imprints of Mumford's

intellectual socialisation. Another imprint came from his personal life. Briefly: Mumford, who spent the years of his childhood and adolescence in a human sized New York with the belts of gardens and bustling effervescent streets, a theatre of mixing neighbourhood cultures. (Miller, pp. 25-46) The conception of city in the thought of Mumford went through modifications during his long life but at the bottom of it the mental picture of the old New York before the building of sky scrapers was a lasting element.

THE IDEA OF THE GARDEN CITY AND THE RENEWAL OF POWER CIVILISATION

Mumford was reading the book of Ebenezer Howard, the British urban planner entitled *Garden Cities of To-morrow* (Howard, 1902). Howard's main intention was to cure the overpopulation of London resulted in congestions, air pollution and other well-known maladies of modern metropolises. He tried to reverse of the migration from countryside to the city, which was an ever accelerating process taking place the second half of the 19th century onward, and to distribute the population of metropolis among city-gardens. Howard resumed the idea of the premodern polis with a restricted population and territory. The starting point of his conception was to connect city planning with a social reform aiming to put an end to the uncontrolled growth of megapolis rooted in the ideology of laissez faire and the practice of fenceless capitalism. City planning, Howard argues, must be completed with a moderate social reform giving publicly owned common lands for the municipal authorities and entitling them with the right in decision-making concerning city development. Garden city, in his conception, is based on the lifting the countryside into the structure of the city; gardens and parks are organic parts of the city in this conception. He imagined a network of medium sized towns separated from each other with a greenbelt, i. e. agricultural territory. Mumford, interpreting Howard's theory, emphasizes that the core of it is a reunion of the city and her region into a well-balanced organism ensuring both for the city dwellers the advantages of country life and the amenities of city-life for the inhabitants of rural areas.

The correct interpretation of the Mumford's conception concerning urban planning is only possible by putting it into the context of his cultural critique. The target of his cultural criticism, from the beginning of his carrier, is the derailment of American civilisation after the civil

war of 1661–65. This conflict, according to him, was a watershed in American history; it was a struggle between two kinds of slavery. The South was the representative of the slavery of man over man, while, in his interpretation, The Yankee North, in spite of its undeniable democratic political arrangement, was a representative of the slavery of machine over man. It is important to point to the fact that Mumford was a deeply committed republican democrat, a follower of the idea of Jeffersonian democracy based on smallholders. At the same time he was convinced that American trust-capitalism fostered by the 19th century gigantomaniac paleotechnology, distorted and falsified the political institutions of the American democracy. The evolution of the American city, according to him, was reflected the derailment of modern American civilisation, the protagonist of modern technological power-civilisation striving for the domination over nature by ever sophisticated technological means.

The historic model of the ideal city for Mumford is the village of the 18th century New England, an organic settlement of this geographical, economic and cultural region:

(...) all the inhabitants of an early New England village were co-partners in a corporation; they admitted onto the community only as many members as they could assimilate. This co-partnership was based upon a common sense as to the purpose of the community and upon a roughly equal division of the land into individual taken in freehold, and share of common fields, of which there might be half a dozen or more (...) The just design, the careful execution, the fine style that brings all the houses into harmony no matter how diverse the purposes they serve – for the farmhouse shares its characteristics with the mill, and the mill with the meeting house – was the outcome of a common spirit nourished by men who had divided the land fairly and who shared adversity and good fortune together (...) Consider the village itself. In the center is a common, a little to one side will be the meeting house, perhaps a square barnlike structure, with a hipped roof and a cupola (...) and adjacent or across the way will be the grammar school. Along the roads where the houses are set at regular intervals is a great columnar arcade of elm trees. (...) Would it be an exaggeration to say that there has never been a more complete and intelligent partnership between the earth and man than existed, for a while, in the old New England villages? In what other part of the world has such harmonious balance between the natural the social environment has been preserved? (Mumford, 1924, pp. 3, 6, 9.)

However, Mumford mixes the idea of garden city of Ebenezer Howard with settlement-form of the New England village which is, for him, was the historical predecessor of garden city. The regional city, of course, cannot be a mechanic copy of the New England village, it would

be impossible; but it must be based on the same principles. It presupposes an alternative city-planning following the aspects of communal-ity, instead of profit-seeking and land-speculation, and an emphasized ecological sensitiveness.

When Mumford explains his theory on city planning he associates it with the sharp critique of the theory and practice of American suburb. It is surprising at first hearing: however the suburb with its green areas and gardens seems to be an escape-route from the over-congested metropolis. Mumford's objections against American suburb highlight the preferred values behind his conception of city-planning. Suburb, according to him, is really an escape route. Moreover, it is a real option only for the middle classes and inaccessible for the other segments of the inhabitants of the metropolis. Suburb in the form it was realized, according to him, became a segregated community, as he writes it "a green ghetto dedicated to the elite." It lacks the reach variety of city-life coming from the mixture of different social strata with their cultures, life-styles and customs. City, in his conception is a multitude of meeting points between strangers – it is the core of city as a social artefact. Suburb does not meet this criterion: it is a dormitory for its inhabitants who for work and cultural activities have to commute to the metropolis. Suburb, in his interpretation, assures a good physical environment at the expense of social deficiencies. (Mumford 1962, p. 494) The Mumfordian critique of suburbia is fed on his cultural criticism imbibed with a strong republican commitment:

Each member of Suburbia becomes imprisoned by the very separation that he has prized: he is fed through a narrow opening: a telephone line, a radio band, a television circuit. This is not, it goes without saying, the result of a conscious conspiracy by a cunning minority: it is an organic by-product of an economy that sacrifices human development to mechanical processing. (...) Suburbia offers poor facilities for meeting, conversation, collective debate, and common action—it favors silent conformity, not rebellion or counter-attack. So Suburbia has become the favored home of a new kind of absolutism: invisible but all-powerful. (Ibid. 512-13)

REGIONAL CITY AS A KERNEL OF A NEW, GREEN CIVILISATION

However, Mumford was far from a lonely daydreamer; the context of his conception, in the 20s, was the debate between the two groups of American city planners: metropolitans and regionalists. (Dalbey, 2002, Thomas, 1990) Metropolitans accepted that congested metropolis as an

unavoidable development of the dynamics of modernity and its swelling unstoppable – they were prognosticating megapolises with more than 20-30 million inhabitants. They remained within the paradigm of capitalist-technological modernity and believed that the maladies of metropolis could only be palliated but could not be eliminated. Their opponents, the regionalists believed in the viability in a civilisation-paradigm: the regional city, in their conception, could have been a kernel of a new green civilisation replacing the power centred old one hostile to nature. Their main idea was decentralisation and denied the city planning must serve the needs of capitalist-technological rationality and it must be accommodated to market. They connected city planning with the idea of overall economic and social reform. Their organisation, the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA) was established by renowned architects and urban planners as Clarence Stein and Henry Wright, and Benton MacKaye the forester, planner and conservationist in 1923, They elaborated overall reform plans which for some years seemed to be a potential option. Lewis Mumford after joining the group became their speaker and ideologue. Later, in the years of Roosevelt administration, some representatives of the group became advisors to the federal government but the hoped historical breakthrough failed: the idea of regional city remained a utopia. But Mumford, at least of the first period of his intellectual period believed in the reality-transformative power of constructive utopias

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FRAGMENTS OF A DISCOURSE: BETWEEN FORM AND EMPTINESS – TRACES OF THE JAPANESE GARDEN’S “INTERVAL”

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Japanese exotic scenarios summons Westerns to a kind of an intuitive feeling, like a recognition of a pre-existing reality – almost like a culture that seems to exist before time itself.

As Bruno Taut suggested in 1958, in the traditional Japanese atmospheres, “(...) *our eyes think*.” (Taut, 1958, p. 114)

In the West, Aristotle’s ontological ‘architecture’ suggested only 2 hypotheses – ‘to be’, or ‘not to be’. These, disregarded the third alternative that, *in-between*, lies in the middle, ‘neither being, nor not-being’ – which Aristotle considered, but denied, calling it ‘the third excluded’ (Aristotle, 2015).

Therefore, Aristotelian logic entails the impossibility of a proposition being in this *intermediate* space. So, what could ‘be and not be’, or ‘neither be, nor not be’, would be outside of Western’s scientific knowledge system.

Architecture is made of walls, floors and ceilings.
In Japan, it is made of what’s in-between.
It is a space that doesn’t exist, but you have to see it.
It doesn’t exist before, nor after – it is in-between.¹

The Japanese ideogram ‘間’ represents an untranslatable conception, whose meaning only exists in Japan. Like others, this is a concept inhabiting the particular Japanese sense: although everyone knows it, they’re not capable to express it precisely.

As a precept (apparently) transversal to all Japanese culture, this notion contains this boundary-space of *in-between* existence, this (im) precise *intermediary* universe, overlooked by Western’s approach, commonly based upon a (merely) oppositional-dualistic abstraction.

Firstly, this essay is born from the assumed risk of a translation. On the one hand, because of the danger in betraying the original, but above all because this is perhaps an impossible translation, since it tries to translate an ideogram whose significance only exists in Japanese language.

As Alan Fletcher puts it, “(...) *the Japanese have a word for this “absent space” which gives shape to the whole. In the West, we have*

1. Japanese architect Shinichi Ogawa, addressing to the author in his Tokyo office (2013).

neither word, nor term. A serious omission.” (Fletcher, 2001, p. 331) Therefore, there have been several translations, all of them with different ‘nuances’: ‘gap’, ‘distance’, or simply ‘space’.

At first, if it is evident that the notions of ‘void’ and ‘emptiness’ are directly linked to this concept, and that some translations propose, simplistically, only these ideas, in reality, inspecting some of the main cultural aesthetic Japanese compendiums, one understands that the closest meaning of the term inspires much more complexity.

In fact, it generally suggests “(...) *a space between 2 parts, intermediate, not only in its physical and 3-dimensional aspect, but superseding it for a more sensitive, intuitive and empirical universe, also linked to the notion of time.*” (Kâto, 2007, p. 52, translated by the author) Thus, although this principle may be physically associated with this ‘emptiness’, it diametrically diverges from the more common Western notion, of total nothingness – on the contrary, this ‘emptiness’ fundamentally represents a concept of ‘absence’, of something that does not reveal itself, but whose ‘presence’ is manifested by its potentiality.

Thus, bearing in mind the spirit of its multiple translations, this essay chose the word *interval* as the more approximate to name this concept – but above all, to try to interpret and represent it.

Curiously, some Western thinkers seem to have pursued similar directions, although not referring to Japan, nor to the concept itself. Sartre, for instance, speaks of the *between* as a space full of presence and possibility: “(...) *that nothingness carries being in its heart.*” (Sartre, 1993, p. 81)

So, exploring this concept invites us to scrutinize precisely that remaining *in-between* space, of the simultaneous and contradictory, occupied by what can be ‘one and the other’, or ‘neither one, nor the other’. The intangible character of potentiality and ambivalence of this *interval* arises an aesthetic which emphasizes, for instance, the blank spaces not drawn on paper, the pauses in theatrical pieces, the silences in musical compositions, but also the spaces located in the *interstice*, in the *intermediation* of the full and the empty, the internal and the external, the open and the closed, or the natural and the built.

FIG.1 The latent *interval* in the painting “Pine Trees” (c. 1595), by Tohaku Hasegawa. (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)



This essay focuses, then, on this concept, and on the commonly so-called ‘Japanese gardens’ which, as it’s broadly known, constitute one of Japan’s most exquisite imprints, having caught the attention of the West and numerous Western authors since 19th century, who studied them through many different approaches – culturally, historically and artistically (to name just a few of endless takes).

More importantly, this essay focuses on this subject from the Western’s point of view.

Experiencing that this notion apparently permeates the entire Japanese culture, being a key element in their traditional behaviors, arts, techniques, ethics and aesthetics, always revealing a kind of *emptiness* that is sought and assumed, it would’ve been likely to – or expectable, from our perspective – what appears to be clear echoes between this *interval* and the Japanese gardens design, would’ve been explored throughout time.

However, the truth is that this subliminal Japanese concept seems to have been generally forgotten – or perhaps, (naturally?) overlooked by the Western perspective, possibly due to the fact that it was relatively unknown, or maybe due to its exclusively Japanese existence.

However, no one can affirm, in full certainty, the hypothesis that no Western author seemed to grasp this *interval*. Nevertheless, one can, yes, affirm, by analyzing their published and public writings about the subject, that no Western author explored or theorized about it – with one single exception, which we’ll tackle later on.

We’ll start by focusing on 3 fundamental Western authors: Josiah Conder, Bruno Taut and Gunter Nitschke.

The first 2 authors, Conder and Taut, constituted true cornerstone instigators when it comes to Japanese gardens, not only because they revealed true fascination for them, but mainly because they really studied this matter exhaustively, having been the first Westerns to do it, and to bring this knowledge to the West.

Nitschke, on its side, is a contemporary living author, who somehow followed Conder and Taut’s steps in that same sense.

Starting with Conder – which was the main actor in introducing Western architecture in Japan –, it’s fundamental to note that he built a kind of ‘state-of-the-art’ of the Japanese gardens, as he was afraid that the 19th century modernization of Japan could endanger their original art of gardening.

In his most fundamental works about the subject (Conder, 1886), Conder is the first to make a systematic description of all the types of

gardens, according to the epochs – a really extremely exhaustive study. Indicating, generally, 2 types of gardens – the dry gardens, or flat gardens, and the tea gardens – as the 2 types that are specifically Japanese, Conder goes through their history, its types of rocks and stones, its lanterns, its pagodas, its water basins, its wells, its bridges, its arbours, and its vegetation. And then, throughout, Conder also generally focuses and stresses on the local superstitions and religious principles which influence this gardening design.

In a way, one can say Conder has a kind of an announcing regard – in the sense that, going exhaustively through all the elements of the Japanese gardens, he is kind of announcing what is going to be explored by other authors and architects afterwards. In setting this first landmark, one can say he's announcing a type of landscaping architecture.

FIG.2 One of Conder's plates, from "Landscape Gardening in Japan" (1893). (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)



Continuing towards the example of Bruno Taut – which, as it's commonly known, spent many years in Japan (as Conder also did), in exile from Hitler's Germany –, he developed several written key works on the subject (Taut, 1958).

Regarding the Japanese gardens, although not being as exhaustive as Conder – meaning that he is not going to identify all the different components of the gardens –, Taut eventually comes to explore, in a more generic way, the entire Japanese culture. Speaking about the temple gardens and the house gardens, its architecture, its people and their manners, its religions and its climate, Taut ends up with a special

regard towards the gardens which is, we believe, an innovative regard – as he is the first Western to approach the gardens, listing textually more generic features he found explicit, and which he resumed as a 'refined simplicity'.

Moreover, it's crucial to acknowledge the innovative way in which Taut wrote, speaking about an art of the proportions, a subtle respect for Nature – a *'finesse'* (as Taut puts it), the expression of each element of the gardens, and the fluidity of all the components. Additionally, Taut even claimed that "*Form is Nature*" (Taut, 1958, p. 70) – suggesting, in a way, a kind of indistinguishing between the gardens and architecture, or between Nature and Japanese constructions within it.

Finally, Taut also stressed a lot upon the religious traditions of Japan that impacted these gardens, namely the Buddhist and Taoist influences, but specifically stating the Zen Buddhist particular influence, and the tea ceremony, which, for him, offered the more sober, simple and elegant identity.



FIG.3 Bruno Taut's sketch, with the inscription "Form is Nature" (unknown date). (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)

Lastly, Gunter Nitschke, which, as already stated, is the only living author of these 3. As a German architect, very well-known Professor of Architecture, living currently in Japan, eventually, Nitschke came to specialize in Japanese architecture, and on its gardens specifically.

In Nitschke's case, we can say that his regard is a kind of mixture between Taut and Conder's (Nitschke, 1997). Also going through all the types of gardens, according to the epochs, and through all of their components as well (like Conder does, in a way, but not in such a detailed fashion), instead, what Nitschke undertakes is an analysis of each epoch, but following a more holistic view – in this case, a bit like Taut did.

So, in each epoch, Nitschke is going to relate to the global social norms of each time, its behaviours, its traditions, and, of course, like all the others, he also stresses enormously the Japanese religious trends influence.

Hence, in the end, we can say that Nitschke kind of identifies what is the common motif which, for him, underlies all the Japanese gardens through time – the fact that, in his view, “(...) *the Japanese garden belongs to the realm of architecture*” (Nitschke, 1997, p. 110). This drastic assumption implies one astounding precept – for Nitschke, there’s no separation, no theoretical difference (at least, nomination wise) between Japanese gardens and architecture: they are the same.

FIG.4 A Japanese Kyoto garden, from Nitschke's "Japanese Gardens" (1997). (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)



So, if Conder alluded, in a way, that Japanese garden design was a matter of landscaping architecture; and if Taut, on his side, stated that the Japanese garden greatest feature was the link between ‘Form and Nature’; Nitschke goes even beyond this, strongly affirming: Japanese gardens are architecture.

Seeming to build a continuous growing current, which became

more and more radical throughout time, in the eyes of these 3 authors, this extremely interesting succession of remarks builds its interest in the essential relation between natural and built world.

However, Gunter Nitschke is the exception we were referring to before. In fact, he apparently was the only Western author who – we can say – became aware of the *interval*, in the sense that he was the only one to refer to it in his writings, trying to address the concept in a way which, one can say, he seems to be very intrigued by it (Nitschke, 1993).

Stressing a lot on the similarities between this concept, and the ideas of ‘void’, and ‘emptiness’, surprisingly or not, never Nitschke suggests a connection between the *interval* and the Japanese gardens design philosophy.

So, summing it all up, in very generic terms, what these 3 authors basically stated about Japanese gardening design, were 3 basic vectors:

1. the fact that they really take advantage of their unique landscapes, and foster their praise, not only by adapting to it, but even sometimes trying to imitate those landscapes in smaller or larger settings;
2. the almost obsessive relation with Nature, and how it is always present the need for a fluid integration *between* natural and built components;
3. and the religious and spiritual beliefs – specifically Buddhism and the tea ceremony in particular, which came to influence decisively the Japanese arts in general.

However, what this essay will argue is that the Japanese garden design is not (only) the mere outcome of these points and beliefs, that somehow praised values like simplicity, sobriety, and refinement without extravagances, as these authors stated – but that it is also an aesthetic that results from very distinctive design principles which, we believe, in some ways, and in our hypothesis, try to represent or translate this *interval* concept, that somehow seems to have been left out.

Therefore, moving a bit away from the main referred vectors, this essay’s principle is to somehow build or extract the abstract principles from Japanese garden practices, which we consider that are tremendously linked with this notion of *interval*.

As its widely known, Japanese culture is, imagetically, a very powerful one. Yet, it all lies in suggestion – nothing is obvious, evident, or crystal clear, as in Western culture; it’s exactly the opposite. Japanese culture believes that beauty lies on what’s hidden, or concealed, what’s in the shadow – it’s enough to think of the famous Tanizaki’s work “*In Praise of Shadows*” (Tanizaki, 1933).

FIG.5 One of Kyoto's Katsura Villa's views towards the gardens, from the interior of the Villa. (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)



Likewise, if we take a brief look at one of the Japanese lead aesthetic, cultural and philosophical compendiums, *“The Book of Tea”* (Okakura, 1933), Okakura never really writes directly about the concept – and this is a point which is common in most of the Japanese state of the art –, but he clearly suggests, here and there, its main aspects, and its key importance on the Japanese culture:

“(…) only in vacuum between lays the truly essential”; “(…) the reality of a room is to be found in the vacant space enclosed between the roof and the walls – not in the roof and the walls themselves”; “(…) truth can only be reached by the comprehension of the opposites, and then, by accepting what’s in-between them”; “(…) in leaving something unsaid, unwritten, or unpainted, the beholder is given the chance to complete the idea, (…)

the vacuum between is there, to enter and fill up the full measure of your aesthetic emotion” (Okakura, 1933, p. 33-50); and one last very powerful statement: “(…) vacuum is all potent, because it is all containing – it can be all things.” (Okakura, 1933, p. 53)

Again, the suggestion of all we’ve mentioned before – the acceptance of a state, which is *between*, that can be the 2 opposites at the same time, or be none.

Moving on to trying to abstract the Japanese gardens principles from their practices, what this *interval* seems to inspire – and here, we’ll try to be more Western-like, in the sense that we’ll use more direct and objective terms – is 2 core basic main principles: firstly, the *‘ensemble “natural-built”*, and afterwards, within this *ensemble*, the

interval approach seems to be enhanced by the offering of *vacuums*, or *emptinesses*.

Regarding this first principle, it relates to the fact that the Japanese look for a full, total integration of the 2 antagonistic worlds (the natural, and the built, or the garden, and the building) to a point in which, when one visits these gardens in Japan – whether you speak of the Katsura gardens, the gardens of the Imperial Palace of Kyoto, or the Meiji-Jingu gardens (all from the Edo period), or even the Ryoan-ji gardens (from the Muromachi period) – the *‘ensemble’* is what really stands out.

It is not the gardens, and the palaces, or the gardens, and the shrines. It is the *‘ensemble’*, the inseparability of these 2 realities, that creates one distinct *‘ensemble’* – it is both at the same time: the togetherness of just one space, one complex, which accepts both realities simultaneously (or, if we wish to go even further, that is both realities at the same time).²



FIG.6 A Japanese garden in Nara (from the Edo period). (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)

And where the *interval* comes, in our perspective, is here: in Japanese garden design there seems to be a sense of integration of the space phenomena, which the Western world of categorizations, distinctions and opposites is simply not used to.

And so, the question to pose is just one: how do they get here?

2. Speaking of this aspect, it’s very interesting to remind ourselves of Katsura Villa – Kyoto’s renowned 17th century imperial palace.

If one compares it with, for instance, Versailles Palace, which was being built around the same time in France, the differences are remarkable: while in France there is a firm separation between the palace and the strict, rigid, orthogonal, full domestication of the gardens, in Japan, it’s the total opposite: it is both (palace and gardens) completely integrated in one another.

(One other interesting aspect which we’ll not explore here, would be to compare the huge differences between the 2 palaces themselves: the monumentality of Versailles gold and ornaments, facing Katsura’s striking simplicity, almost being just a modest building of timber, with just some ephemeral paper walls, placed within a garden.)

How do they create this ambiguous cohesion in these complexes?

The answer to this question can be found in its extreme organicity and (apparent) naturality, *between* these 2 sides and realities.

In fact, there are several design strategies that they seem to follow in order to achieve this principle. One of them, we may summarize it as ‘asymmetry’, or ‘the search for irregularity’. In many ways, the Japanese gardens seem not be planned by men – it seems like they were always already there, just like that, for ages, like one organism, as natural as you can get.

And looking closely, there’s a kind of insubordination of all the elements of the garden and buildings to a plan, to axes, or to a pre-established grid – that is to say, there seems to exist an apparent release from certain rules of composition. So, all elements seem to be placed freely – but they aren’t, actually. The way they achieve this is by setting up an irregular layout, which actually is designed according to what seems to be a method of composing certain articulated views *between* the gardens and the buildings – there’s a 2-sidedness, a bilaterality. So, not domesticating nature, but following its laws, they try to arrange all the elements looking natural, or almost random like.

FIG.7 A Japanese garden in Nikko (from the Muromachi period). (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)



One other aspect is the potential of total openness of each space, which creates an ambience of a certain felt ambiguity – and here, we’re speaking about the architectural spaces within the gardens.

The fact that Japanese architecture, with its famous sliding ‘*shoji*’ walls, can transform the interior of the rooms in exterior, or, if we want, can bring the exterior into the interior, ends up creating ambiguous

settings in which, at a certain moment, one doesn’t know already what’s inside and outside – it is both at the same time, or neither of them.

So, it’s an ‘all-containing’ design, where this dilution of limits, and this interpenetration of both realities resumes in a neither interior, nor exterior fashion, but both simultaneously.



FIG.8 The interior-exterior feeling of Japanese natural-built world. (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)

As for the second main core principle – the offering of *vacuums*, or *emptinesses* –, why and how do they manifest this attempt?

By what we summarize as the ‘persuasion of spaces, or moments of *in-betweenness*’.

As we’ve mentioned earlier, suggestion plays a major role in Japanese culture, and that seems to be fostered by the allusions evoked by those spaces of *emptiness*, where the Japanese seem to abstract from reason, to offer a kind of *in-between* spaces of possibility. In fact, the composition of Japanese gardens seems to explicitly solicit this state, by creating vague and inscrutable *empty* atmospheres.

Basically, the underlying fundamental strategy here concerns with the spirit and design of the tea pavilions within the gardens. Although they are designed to specifically respond to the tea ceremonies, in reality, their reason is way bigger. If we analyze them, we see that we are dealing with physical spaces, which are formally defined, and so they constitute habitable spaces, in which one can remain. However – and although they’re purpose is the tea ceremony –, they apparently seem to not be (demandingly) utilitarian.

Why?


Firstly, it’s their spaces’ complete *emptiness* that stands out. And

then, if we analyze them further, we understand that they're really like 'blank spaces' for experimentation – they're *empty* spaces which do not serve only for the tea ceremonies, but actually, often wise, these are spaces to be enjoyed at times by the Japanese families, through the will and sensitivity of each person, who decides how they will fill that *void* at any given time: whether to eat, social meetings, or any other activity whatsoever – or even maybe to simply just be there, and relax.

So, actually, although they do have a reason, they don't really have a specific function. Their uniqueness lies in the fact that they do not need to respond to the demands of everyday life. Thus, this kind of 'non-utilitarian' spaces serve essentially as *in-between* spaces of possibility, which give one the chance to do whatever one likes.

So, eventually, although initially designing a (very) precise function, these constructions do not end up containing a specific utility. They just need to be there, punctuating and organizing the garden – *filling* that space, or that *void*, and accommodating many other *intervals* and possibilities.

FIG.9 A Japanese "chashitsu" (tea room, or tea pavilion). (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)



One other good final example are the dry gardens outside the teahouses – as Ryoanji, for instance. These gardens create true static, almost abstract landscapes, which somehow seem to be suspended in time.

Their simple presence and *emptiness* lead people to true *in-between* moments of suspension, pause, and meditation.



FIG.10 The abstract static and *empty* landscape view from the Ryoanji temple in Kyoto. (retrieved from wikimedia, CC BY-SA 4.0 <<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/4.0/>>, via Wikimedia Commons)

It is clear that some of the mentioned Western authors (and others) have already explored some of the aspects explained throughout this essay.

However, the key fact to be attained is that they never really assessed or considered them through this lens, perception, or theoretical perspective, nor did they organize them through this link with the *interval* (at least, as far as the analysis of their theoretical works is concerned).

Concluding, grasping all these resonances from Japan's historical gardening-practice design and philosophy, this essay aims to argue and bring upon the theoretical resonances and practical exchanges that, we believe, can be found *between* the *interval* and the Japanese garden – reasoning upon the Japanese architectural-landscaping atmospheres that, as Taut suggested, the eyes look for, but (apparently) do not see.

A perception *between* form and emptiness, beyond form and emptiness – and perhaps, even beyond ourselves.

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SOBRE MUNDOS INTERIORES, PAISAGENS, E A NATUREZA DO OLHAR

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INTRODUÇÃO – ARTE E INTENÇÃO

Podemos começar a falar de arte pela afirmação de Gombrich, de que “aquilo a que chamamos Arte não existe. Existem apenas artistas” (2013, p. 21). Artistas e, poderíamos talvez acrescentar, as tantas coisas, objetos, materialidades, relações, sugestões e possibilidades poéticas que esses artistas criam, articulam, procuram – e que críticos como Gombrich, o público, e eventualmente os próprios artistas elaboram conceitualmente, em torno de técnicas, projetos, procedimentos, procuras, questionamentos. Mas, se a arte envolve direcionamentos, vontades, desenvolvimentos, pesquisa, experimentação e descobertas, podendo ser também explorada em termos conceituais, não seria essa arte expressão de intencionalidade?

A simples busca de um efeito, a utilização de uma técnica determinada, o grau e os tipos de controle dentro dessa técnica, a escolha e os modos de utilização de materiais e suportes —bem como a elaboração de conceitos, tão visível na arte do último século, por exemplo, mas que restaria implícita talvez em cada juízo de valor, de qualidade e assim por diante (Isso está bom, veja! Não, não está tão bom...)—, seriam expressões de intencionalidade?

Muito pragmaticamente, a princípio, poderíamos assumir que sim, que a arte envolve uma boa parcela de intencionalidade, ainda que a identificação da origem, dos infinitos caminhos e do alcance dessa intencionalidade possa não ser exatamente uma tarefa simples, ou mesmo passível de ser esgotada.

Como sabemos, a palavra arte, em língua portuguesa, viria do latim *Ars*, vinculada ao sentido do grego τέχνη, *tékhnè*, raiz comum do termo técnica. Apenas nessa breve e primeira aproximação etimológica já é possível colocar uma interessante discussão em torno dos sentidos comumente atribuídos ao termo arte. “Em geral, conjunto de procedimentos que servem para produzir um certo resultado”, diz Lalande, cuidando de bem estabelecer a diferença entre arte e ciência, sendo esta “concebida como puro conhecimento independente das aplicações”, assim como estabelecer a diferença entre arte e natureza, esta “concebida como potência que produz sem reflexão” (1993, p. 89).

Parece configurado, desde já, de forma tão essencial quanto complexa, um certo território da arte, em primeiro lugar, como *procedimento* (vinculado a certo resultado) —o que, vale dizer, aponta mais para o processo que para a obra concluída—, e, na sequência, definida por duas diferenciações, em relação ao *conhecimento puro* (científico) e em relação à *natureza* (potência e produção sem reflexão).

Se quisermos atribuir às palavras uma genealogia semelhante à que podemos observar (por exemplo) na mitologia grega, em que cada entidade carrega um pouco de suas origens, de seus antecessores, a consideração dos sentidos da palavra Arte, então, carregaria essa herança de um fazer intencional, sendo também permeada, qualificada, definida, tanto pelos sentidos de um conhecimento puro como pelos sentidos de *natureza*. Um fazer intencional, portanto, tão vinculado como diferenciado em relação a um conhecimento e a uma natureza.

Mas se a arte não resta identificada completamente a um “conhecimento puro”, científico, é talvez porque guarda em seu território próprio certa possibilidade de conhecimento não científico, não exato, não codificado. E se não resta identificada simplesmente à natureza, é talvez porque a arte implique já alguma elaboração humana, alguma articulação artificial, alguma possibilidade de um fazer pensado, considerado, refletido. Simultaneamente, duas vinculações e duas diferenciações, configurando certa região muito particular do fazer e do imaginar humanos, que poderíamos denominar como um fazer poético.

Um fazer, uma ação que implica a transformação de algo, de uma matéria prima, de uma natureza primeira. Um fazer qualificado, que implica, pois, certo conhecimento de uma técnica, de procedimentos, certo controle de operações visando certos resultados, mas um fazer que não resta identificado nem a essa natureza, nem a essa técnica. Um fazer poético, isto é, um fazer e um criar, um fazer iniciador, inaugurador, e que, assim sendo, elabora uma natureza, diferenciando-se dessa natureza, criando o que antes não havia. Um fazer exploratório, que explora tanto a natureza como o conhecimento, de modo não estanque, não predeterminado, possibilitando o surgimento de novos entrelaçamentos, de novos conhecimentos, e também de novas naturezas.

A técnica, de modo geral, diz novamente Lalande, estaria relacionada a um “conjunto de procedimentos bem definidos e transmissíveis, destinados a produzir certos resultados considerados úteis”, tendo um caráter eminentemente coletivo e progressivo, enquanto que, no território das artes, “cada artista tem os seus procedimentos, os seus segredos”, ainda que possa apoiar-se em uma “tradição do ofício, que é geral e que constitui propriamente a técnica” (1993, p. 1109).

O JARDIM E A PINTURA DE PAISAGEM

Mas se a ideia de arte configura esse fazer complexo, qualificado, intencional e poético, a partir de uma natureza primeira, a discussão em torno de paisagem e arte pode colocar em questão os próprios conceitos de paisagem e de arte, como também o conceito de natureza. Se há intencionalidade no uso de técnicas que visam este e aquele resultado, tal intencionalidade parece relativizada no âmbito da arte, em função de um caráter poético. Já no âmbito da paisagem, na medida em que o termo paisagem não diferencia paisagem natural e paisagem projetada, a intencionalidade pode estar mais ou menos presente. Curiosamente, o que entenderíamos a princípio por natureza, por uma realidade física dada a priori, autônoma, é também tensionada, na medida em que a própria evolução dos modelos artísticos (especialmente no caso do jardim e da pintura de paisagem), entre outros fatores, parece interferir, e mesmo criar, o que entendemos tão simplesmente por natureza.

Se, conforme Panzini, “a arquitetura da paisagem é a arte de intervir com elementos naturais, de remodelar os lugares para torná-los aproveitáveis e esteticamente agradáveis”, o sentido de paisagem rural parece combinar elementos estéticos e de produtividade agrícola. É por essa via que “em sua estrutura ordenada, sobreposta aos lugares selvagens, o campo expressa toda a inteligência do homem para intervir morfológicamente sobre a plataforma geológica: são as maneiras de adaptação ao ambiente que dão forma à beleza da paisagem”. Para o autor, é exatamente a combinação entre as funções agrícola e estética que permitirá o surgimento da forma que hoje entendemos prosaicamente como jardim (2013, p. 14-15).

Da prática agrícola foi-se separando lentamente um espaço de cultura específico, o jardim, superfície cultivada que unia à função produtiva a satisfação intrínseca de viver naquele lugar. Esse processo de especificação foi longo, e, em alguns contextos, o jardim nunca se distinguiu totalmente da gleba em que se produziam frutas e hortaliças. Mas o cordão que unia o trabalho agrícola à criação dos jardins, sendo iguais tanto as técnicas de cultivo quanto as espécies botânicas empregadas, não se rompeu nem mesmo no curso das experiências artísticas mais sofisticadas. (PANZINI, 2013, p. 15)

Para Panzini, a especificidade do jardim estaria em sua “originalidade de constituir uma forma compositiva capaz de assumir e transmitir uma multiplicidade de sugestões e níveis de leitura”. Exatamente por “sua descendência da prática agrícola” e por incorporar, de algum modo, uma metáfora perene da transformação de um mundo agreste

em uma fonte de vida, o jardim passaria a carregar significados simbólicos para muito além de qualquer apreciação estética. Como elemento de articulação entre cultura e natureza, “o jardim narrou mitos, sugeriu alegorias, foi símbolo de capacidade técnica, de riqueza de meios, de posse de lugares” (*idem*, p. 15).

Em torno da relação entre paisagem e arte, no Ocidente, e de um suposto “nascimento da paisagem” a partir da pintura, Alain Roger (2000) elenca obras e pintores em torno do século XV, defendendo um ponto de vista que denomina culturalista, ou seja, um ponto de vista em que (referindo-se a Oscar Wilde) a natureza imitaria a arte. A natureza, então, tão essencialmente e aparentemente natural (isto é, livre de qualquer artifício ou determinação humana), seria ela também, por esse ponto de vista, uma elaboração de nosso olhar, mais que uma realidade em si mesma? Roger fala de paisagens como “aquisições, ou melhor, invenções culturais”, e propõe que “toda nossa experiência, visual ou não, é modelada por modelos artísticos” (2000, p. 33). E é exatamente tomando o processo artístico como mote que o autor vai resgatar o termo *artialização*, atribuído a Michel de Montaigne, para denominar duas vias pelas quais o termo país teria dado origem ao termo paisagem, referindo-se então às artializações operadas *in situ*, diretamente sobre a natureza, no caso do jardim; e às artializações operadas *in visu*, indiretamente, no caso das representações visuais, ou seja, na pintura.

País/Paisagem, essa distinção léxica recente (não anterior ao século 15) se mantém na maior parte das línguas ocidentais: *land-landscape* em inglês, *Land-Landschaft* em alemão, *pais-paisaje* em espanhol, *paese-paesaggio* em italiano, país-paisagem em português. O país, de todo modo, é o grau zero da paisagem, o que precede sua artialização, seja esta direta (*in situ*) ou indireta (*in visu*). É isto que a história nos ensina, mas as nossas paisagens tornaram-se tão familiares, tão “naturais”, que tendemos a tomar a sua beleza como certa; e cabe aos artistas nos lembrar dessa primeira mas esquecida verdade: que um país não é, de início, paisagem, e que, de um a outro, há toda a elaboração da arte. (ROGER, 2000, p.33, tradução nossa)

Anne Cauquelin defende ideia semelhante na medida em que desenvolve o sentido de natureza como função de uma espécie de acúmulo, de longa sedimentação de relatos e de imagens, pinturas. Ao mesmo tempo em que “um lugar é sempre um lugar dito” (2007, p.52), seriam a fabulação e a narrativa o que pode conferir à natureza um sentido de entendimento, de totalidade, de persuasão. É assim que o sentido de paisagem (mesmo que não nominado diretamente) para os gregos antigos, por exemplo, “não se oferece à visão, mas ressoa no ouvido, na luz da inteligência” (*idem*, p. 54).

Por outro lado, a paisagem, ou seja, certa visibilidade da natureza, é em Cauquelin entendida também como resultado de uma construção, como lenta sobreposição de imagens, ainda que suas origens primeiras possam ser ignoradas.

A chamada natureza se compunha diante de nós por uma série de quadros, imagens artificiais, posta diante da confusão das coisas; ela organizava a matéria diversa e cambiante segundo uma lei implícita, e, quando pensávamos nos banhar na verdade do mundo tal qual ele se nos apresentava, não fazíamos nada além de reproduzir esquemas mentais, plenos de uma evidência longínqua, e milhares de projeções anteriores. Essa constante redução aos limites de uma moldura, ali montada por gerações de olhares, pesava sobre nossos pensamentos, por ela impiedosamente orientados. (CAUQUELIN, 2007, p. 25-6)

Mas se Roger (2000, p. 35) vê na pintura flamenca o aparecimento da janela (essa “*veduta* interior ao quadro, mas que o abre para o exterior”) como artifício e “evento decisivo” na invenção da paisagem ocidental, Cauquelin vai destacar a invenção da perspectiva como “o nó da questão”, ainda que lhe pareça impossível apontar um início preciso, um acontecimento inaugural configurador do sentido de paisagem, a não ser de modo arbitrário e provisório.

Em *La perspectiva como forma simbólica*, Erwin Panofsky (2003, p. 14-15) enfatiza a artificialidade da perspectiva assim chamada exata, na medida em que esta não pode corresponder ao nosso olhar binocular, não estático, na medida em que a perspectiva exata não alcançaria uma suposta transposição técnica do olhar humano para um olhar geometrizado, uma transformação de um espaço psicofisiológico em um espaço matemático. Na esteira de Panofsky, Cauquelin (2007, p. 38) reafirma a perspectiva como forma simbólica, não apenas no domínio das artes, mas envolvendo tanto “o conjunto de nossas construções mentais que só conseguiríamos ver através de seu prisma”, como “todas as atividades humanas, a fala, as sensibilidades, os atos”.

Parece bem pouco verossímil que uma simples técnica —é verdade que longamente regulada— possa transformar a visão global que temos das coisas: a visão que mantemos da natureza, a ideia que fazemos das distâncias, das proporções, da simetria. mas é preciso render-nos à evidência: o mundo antes da perspectiva legítima não é o mesmo em que vivemos no Ocidente desde o século XV. (CAUQUELIN, 2007, p. 38)

E é nessa chave expandida que Cauquelin configura um território ambíguo, uma relação complexa entre natureza, paisagem e arte, em que a natureza, ou melhor, suas representações (e reinvenções) verbais e pictóricas, poderiam não apenas dirigir nosso olhar e nossa percepção

da natureza, como também transformar nossas formas de ver, pensar e viver o mundo.

PAISAGEM INTERIOR

Considerado certo imbricamento entre arte, paisagem e natureza até aqui discutido, caberia observar, por outro lado, a questão da imagem no contexto da interioridade humana, da imagem como elemento da consciência, em perspectivas diversas que ampliam e aprofundam os sentidos da realidade (ou meio) na qual o ser humano é sujeito e está sujeito, como agente e objeto dessa realidade, elaborando subjetividades e objetividades, aparentemente sem poder se isentar ou se desvincular de nenhuma de suas faces, de seus desdobramentos. Tais ampliações e aprofundamentos, concernentes ao ser humano no mundo, certamente implicam modos de percepção e elaboração da paisagem, assim como a problematização de suas origens, seus limites, e, conseqüentemente, a discussão sobre sua realidade (existência).

Como ponto de partida, se os modelos artísticos ou imagens da natureza (verbais e visuais) que criamos podem configurar modos de ver e conceber a natureza e a paisagem em um caráter mais amplo, de onde podemos entender que surgiriam tais imagens e modelos? Seria o mundo, antes de qualquer outra coisa, uma imagem mental?

Se nos fosse possível um tal *ponto arquimediano*, fora da terra, um lugar de observação externo à nossa realidade, isento especialmente de qualquer via de imaginação e de representação —seja verbal ou visual, expressa ou pressentida, com maior ou menor grau de consciência—, subsistiria ainda algum sentido de natureza na própria natureza? Como saber? Seria possível, para o ser humano, pensar a natureza a partir de outro ponto de vista que não o de sua condição, de sua natureza humana? Ainda que exposta a um olhar técnico, como o da fotografia ou do computador, por exemplo, a natureza (e a natureza humana) não seria afinal, em última instância, observada e considerada por um olhar humano, por uma natureza humana?

Algumas dessas questões podem soar insólitas, dada a naturalidade com que muitas vezes nos consideramos, humanos, imersos na natureza, profundamente a ela vinculados em todas as eras, e, ao mesmo tempo, seres orgulhosamente distintos e destacados dessa natureza, pela força de uma afirmação, de uma ideia.

Colocadas essas questões, entretanto, outras questões parecem se formar. Em que exatamente consistiria o limite entre o que considera-

mos humano e o que consideramos natural (ou inumano, nos termos de Lyotard)? Qual propriamente a utilidade de distinguir e de separar o humano e a natureza? Seria essa separação apenas uma tentativa de construção de uma autoimagem, uma necessidade de contorno, de identidade? Ou teria uma conotação de autoafirmação, uma necessidade de autoelogio ou de declaração (física e simbólica) de uma suposta superioridade animal?

Gregory Bateson elabora essa relação entre ser humano e natureza, ou, mais propriamente, entre mente e natureza, buscando delimitar, entre os seres vivos, aquilo que os faz semelhantes, interligados. Em suas palavras, Bateson procura o padrão que une, especialmente no tocante a contornos, formas, processos, relações. Para Bateson, a unidade entre mente e natureza era tão certa que ele sugeria buscar nas formas e relações da natureza as respostas para questões relativas ao funcionamento da mente, assim como sugeria procurar nos processos mentais entendimentos aplicáveis a questões da natureza. Bateson tentava relacionar, por exemplo, situações e estratégias de aprendizado, de evolução, compartilhados entre seres humanos, plantas, animais da terra, do mar etc.

Pareceu-me que eu estava assentando ideias muito elementares sobre epistemologia, isto é, sobre como nós podemos conhecer qualquer coisa. No pronome *nós*, incluí, naturalmente, a estrela do mar e as florestas de sequóias, o ovo segmentado e o senado dos Estados Unidos. No “qualquer coisa” que essas criaturas conhecem diferentemente incluí “como evoluir para uma simetria de cinco direções”, “como sobreviver a um incêndio na floresta”, “como crescer e ainda manter a mesma forma”, “como aprender”, “como redigir uma constituição”, “como inventar e dirigir um carro”, “como contar até sete”, e assim por diante. (BATESON, 1986, p. 12)

Por outro lado, Bateson trabalhava com a ideia de que os processos de percepção e de formação de imagens mentais no ser humano era ainda (nos anos 1970) extremamente incompreensível do ponto de vista da ciência. Um aspecto dessa questão está localizado, naturalmente, entre dois gestos aparentemente simples, de olhar e de ver. O primeiro gesto (olhar) poderia ser comparado a uma lanterna ou a uma janela móvel, por exemplo, dirigida para este e aquele ponto, e que encontra objetos a princípio não reconhecidos, cujo reconhecimento poderá se dar desta ou daquela maneira em nossa consciência, normalmente em relação com nossa experiência. Já ter visto tais objetos, já tê-los tocado, conhecer sua textura, sua densidade, seu peso, seus modos de usar, seus significados —tudo isso provavelmente interferirá na leitura visual

que faço da coisa para a qual olho, e essa leitura representaria, de certo modo, o segundo gesto (ver).

A título de exemplo, podemos considerar a utilização da técnica da perspectiva linear ou exata, e o uso de artefatos ópticos auxiliares na pintura de paisagens, a partir do século XV, como dois modos complementares de elaborar a construção de imagens da natureza adaptadas à nossa possibilidade perceptiva, à nossa sensibilidade, à nossa inteligência. Tais artifícios, entretanto, ainda que tenham influenciado decisivamente o sentido de realidade e de natureza por séculos adiante, não podem ser considerados simplesmente como vias de acesso ao real, ao verdadeiro. Dessas perspectivas, dessas pinturas, dessas paisagens, o que vemos? Um conceito de perfeição? Uma realidade conceitual? Um hábito visual?

O olhar, a profundidade do olhar, a inteligência do olhar, evoluem, lentamente, fragmentariamente, e também de formas imprevisíveis. Acaso a pintura de Giotto, de Duccio, de Lorenzetti, como toda a pintura anterior ao século XV, teria parecido menos realista a seus contemporâneos por não seguir moldes dos séculos futuros? Ver não é dado *a priori*, não é uniforme, não é matéria estática ou definida, não está pronto. Ver é entrelaçado aos processos de pensar, de conhecer, de imaginar, e, entre outros fatores, dependerá do ambiente cultural, da abertura e da possibilidade daquele que olha, daquele que, a cada momento, se embrenha e se perde entre os caminhos da consciência, do discernimento, da síntese, da visão.

Algumas décadas depois de Bateson, António Damásio pesquisa uma área próxima da estudada por aquele, e também utiliza alguns termos semelhantes ao primeiro, especialmente quanto aos processos de formação de *padrões* e de *imagens mentais* como resultados e processos advindos de múltiplas entradas perceptivas: visuais, auditivas, olfativas, gustatória, além da entrada somatossensitiva que reúne aspectos como tato, temperatura, dor, aspectos musculares, viscerais, vestibulares (relativos ao equilíbrio), entre outros. Damásio usa o termo *imagens mentais* para denominar processos multissensoriais e dinâmicos de percepção, não apenas visuais, acionados por todos os sentidos, a partir de “processos e entidades de todos os tipos”, concretas e abstratas, propriedades físicas, relações espaço-temporais etc. Em suma,

o processo que chegamos a conhecer como mente quando imagens mentais se tornam nossas, como resultado da consciência, é um fluxo contínuo de imagens, e muitas delas se revelam logicamente inter-relacionadas. O fluxo avança no tempo, rápido ou lento, ordenadamente ou aos trambolhões, e às vezes segue não uma, mas várias sequências. Às

vezes as sequências são concorrentes, outras vezes convergentes e divergentes, ou ainda sobrepostas. Pensamento é uma palavra aceitável para denotar esse fluxo de imagens. (DAMÁSIO, 2015, p. 256)

Esse sentido ampliado de imagem mental, elemento-base de nossa consciência —a que Damásio se refere como “moeda corrente de nossa mente” (*idem, ibidem*)—, estaria intimamente relacionado ao papel das emoções e dos sentimentos na composição de nossa consciência. O autor então estabelece um *continuum* desde “um estado de emoção”, que poderia ser desencadeado inconscientemente, seguido de “um estado de sentimento”, que poderia ser representado de modo inconsciente, até um “estado de sentimento consciente”, reconhecido pelo organismo em que essa emoção e esse sentimento ocorrem. Enquanto a emoção parece “induzida sem que saibamos e se volta para fora”, o sentimento é “essencialmente conhecido e se volta para dentro” (*idem*, p. 40-41). Para o autor, emoções e consciência seriam estratégias biológicas básicas de sobrevivência ao longo da evolução humana, tendo a primeira possivelmente surgido antes da segunda, e estando ambas também vinculadas a um alicerce comum, qual seja, um sentido de representação do corpo.

Mas, se a neurociência tem avançado no esclarecimento do papel das emoções e sentimentos vinculados à base dos processos de consciência, inclusive a ponto de produzir literatura de divulgação científica com relativa visibilidade, seus pontos de apoio são conquistas de um pensamento estritamente racional que investiga o campo de relações entre cérebro e mente, ou entre corpo e mente, para daí construir estudos de referência e padrões de manejo clínico das funções cérebro-mentais ou corpóreo-mentais.

Não sem pontos de contato com estes, mas em chave bastante diversa da de Bateson e Damásio, os caminhos traçados por Carl G. Jung e Gaston Bachelard apontam para um sentido da experiência, do empírico, da descoberta, de uma navegação nas águas do inconsciente e da imagem poética, cuja leitura acontece em um registro não exatamente lógico-científico, nem primordialmente interessado na estruturação de um sistema fixo de interpretação dessas imagens e dessa navegação. Sem trabalharem juntos, mas havendo na obra de Bachelard um diálogo aberto com a obra de Jung, o psicanalista e o filósofo parecem ter delineado, com discernimento e com abertura, procedimentos de investigação de territórios-fonte do imaginário, a partir da psicologia analítica junguiana e da filosofia bachelardiana da imaginação poética, legitimando um campo de saberes atento ao universo de imagens e

sabores do fenômeno humano (psíquico e poético) no mundo, em toda a sua complexidade, potência e mobilidade.

No ensaio “Alma e terra” (JUNG, 2007, p. 33-52), de 1927, em que Jung sugere a imagem da casa como espelho da alma humana —imagem que parece animar ao menos os primeiros capítulos d’*A poética do espaço* de Bachelard, publicado trinta anos mais tarde—, Jung escreve sobre a relação entre alma e terra, sobre vinculações entre povos e suas terras-mães, terras de origem, terras de destino, e especialmente escreve sobre o papel da terra na formação da alma desses povos e da humanidade. Ainda que assinale alguma diferenciação entre os dois conceitos, Jung se refere a *alma*, e mais propriamente a *psique*, como uma espécie de totalidade da interioridade humana, dos processos psíquicos, o que abarcaria consciente e inconsciente, enquanto territórios distintos, porém interligados, permeáveis, de um modo que nunca fica totalmente claro o limite entre eles, ou mesmo se poderiam ter um funcionamento independente. Jung diz:

Pode-se pensar, sentir, lembrar, decidir e agir inconscientemente. Tudo que acontece no consciente também pode —sob certas condições— acontecer inconscientemente. A melhor maneira de explicar esta possibilidade é apresentar as funções e conteúdos psíquicos como uma paisagem noturna sobre a qual incide um jato luminoso de um refletor. O que aparece sob esta luz da percepção é consciente; o que está fora dela, no escuro, é inconsciente, mas nem por isso menos real e atuante. (JUNG, 2007, p. 34)

Usando a metáfora da paisagem noturna para explicar o comércio entre consciente e inconsciente, Jung fala da psique como “campo de fenômenos”, e busca fazer uma “análise profunda da natureza e estrutura do inconsciente” para tratar adequadamente do “condicionamento terrestre da psique”. “Trata-se”, diz Jung, “dos primórdios e fundamentos da psique, portanto de coisas que desde tempos imemoriais estão enterradas na obscuridade, e não simplesmente dos corriqueiros fatos das sensações e da adaptação consciente ao meio ambiente” (*idem, ibidem*).

Como conteúdos móveis e nebulosos da psique, Jung, desenvolve o conceito dos arquétipos, os “fundamentos da psique consciente ocultos na profundidade”, ou ainda, em outra metáfora terrestre, “suas raízes [da psique consciente] afundadas não só na terra, em sentido estrito, mas no mundo em geral” (*idem, p. 35*).

Os arquétipos são sistemas de prontidão que são ao mesmo tempo imagens e emoções. São hereditários como a estrutura do cérebro. Na verdade, são o aspecto psíquico do cérebro. Constituem, por um lado, um preconceito instintivo muito forte e, por outro lado, são os mais

eficientes auxiliares das adaptações instintivas. Propriamente falando, são a parte ctônica da psique —se assim podemos falar— aquela parte através da qual a psique está vinculada à natureza, ou pelo menos em que seus vínculos com a terra e o mundo aparecem claramente. É nestes arquétipos ou imagens primordiais que a influência da terra e de suas leis sobre a psique se manifesta com maior nitidez. (*idem, ibidem*)

Jung constrói uma vinculação entre sentidos de alma e de terra a partir do conceito de arquétipo, que de algum modo concentraria uma memória ancestral, muito poderosa, e impressões de uma psique ainda em formação, tanto no homem primitivo como na infância, em que a imagem da mãe (mais fortemente), do pai, e de elementos e vivências da natureza poderiam restar combinados, atrelados, fundidos.

Recapitulamos, em nossa infância, reminiscências da pré-história da raça e da humanidade em geral. Filogeneticamente, procedemos e evoluímos dos obscuros confins da terra. Por isso os fatores que mais nos afetaram se transformam em arquétipos e são estas imagens primordiais que nos influenciam mais diretamente. (*idem, p. 36*)

Para Jung, “a imagem primitiva mais imediata é a da mãe”, que seria “em todos os sentidos a vivência mais próxima e mais poderosa que atua no período mais impressionável da vida humana” (*idem, p. 38*). Mais tarde, com o desenvolvimento do aspecto consciente, a imagem do pai ganharia importância (de certo modo em oposição à imagem da mãe) como via de acesso ao mundo, à razão, ao espiritual, a um sentido de dinamismo criador.

O chão é solo materno em repouso e capaz de frutificar. O Reno é um pai, como o Nilo, o vento, a tempestade, o raio e o trovão. [...] A mãe que providencia calor, proteção e alimento é também a lareira, a caverna ou cabana protetora e a plantação em volta. A mãe é também a roça fértil e seu filho é o grão divino. [...] A mãe é a vaca leiteira e o rebanho. O pai anda por aí, fala com os outros homens, caça, viaja, faz guerra, espalha seu mau humor qual tempestade e, sem muito refletir, muda a situação toda num piscar de olhos. (*idem, p. 39*)

Ainda mais adiante, com o amadurecimento, a imagem direta dos pais biológicos perderia importância, permanecendo viva, entretanto, em cada indivíduo, na relação com mulheres e homens, nas escolhas, preferências, de modo extremamente sutil. A imagem do pai poderia restar refletida no sentido de sociedade, das leis, do Estado, em um sentido amplo de autoridade, enquanto a da mãe no sentido de família, da terra natal, da Mãe Terra, da Mãe Natureza, da matéria em geral. Daí os sentidos arquetípicos de *anima* e *animus*, configurações de alma com aspectos feminino e masculino, de acolhimento e dinamismo, de ação e

recepção, a que Jung daria um largo desenvolvimento, e que Bachelard espelharia por exemplo nos dois trabalhos lançados em 1948, voltados à imaginação da terra (2016, 1990), senão nas duas vertentes principais de sua obra.

NATUREZA DO OLHAR

O olhar, verbo substantivado, fala mais talvez de um pensamento, de uma interioridade, de um sujeito e sua subjetividade, que de um gesto do aparelho ocular. A terra, os rios e mares, os céus, os animais, e sobretudo o mundo vegetal, denominamos Natureza, substantivo feminino que evoca o nascer, o nascimento, e uma certa qualidade e ambiente de tudo o que (mesmo que aparentemente) nasce e existe de uma certa maneira, em sua natureza. Para aquém dessa natureza, entretanto, podemos localizar uma outra naturalidade, relativa à natureza do olhar, e à natureza do olhar que dirigimos a essa natureza exterior.

Da mãe-terra ao “país pavoroso” (Roger, 2000, p. 37), da mata virgem à natureza selvagem, as ideias de natureza oscilam enquanto qualidades atribuídas a um lugar, em função de um olhar humano, um olhar que parece considerar a possibilidade, remota ou não, sonhada ou concreta, de habitar esse lugar. E o olhar humano, nos ensinam Jung e Bachelard, não é um olhar neutro. É um olhar povoado de sentidos, imagens e profundezas inauditas, uma memória oculta no subsolo de nossa alma, de nossa imaginação, que, no entanto, se move, de forma mais ou menos imprevisível, causando erupções, convidando-nos a uma escuta subterrânea de longo prazo, na tentativa de ler, de acompanhar, de captar os sinais sísmicos desses movimentos.

Nesse porão, que é também fundamento do edifício, fundamento do olhar, imagens de mãe e pai arquetípicos, entrelaçados a vivências igualmente arquetípicas da natureza e do corpo no mundo —prazer e desprazer, proteção e potência, abundância e escassez, vida e morte, guerra e paz, verticalidade e horizontalidade etc.—, imagens que vão reverberar em tantas outras formas femininas e masculinas, positivas e negativas, normalmente em pares de opostos que ganham significados em função da oposição, polaridades que pressupõem objetos e seres em relação, em tensa harmonia, e que aparecem eventualmente nas visões que produzimos do mundo, em ideias de natureza, de paisagem, de jardim.

Simbolicamente, a considerar o modo como temos tratado a natureza nos últimos 100 anos, em prol de uma moderníssima e questio-

nável urbanidade tecnológico-financeira, caberia talvez perguntar qual estágio de evolução psicológica estaria a humanidade atravessando. Se a técnica parece nos dar asas para “reordenar” a terra, reconstruir o corpo, para fugir do medo e da morte, também nos oferece um extenso menu de realidades aparentes, paraísos artificiais, entre telas e espelhos em que narcisicamente, na eletricidade apática da grande cidade, nos perdemos.

Já não há distâncias, dizem. A cidade ocupou todos os espaços. Já não há limites. Não há tempo. O celular é o mesmo, o dinheiro, a indústria, os voos levam sempre a um mesmo aeroporto, a um mesmo hotel, padrão. A mesma comida, o mesmo tom de voz, o mesmo rosto na TV do elevador. O que há de errado? Todas as paisagens foram achatadas, planificadas, viraram imagem —no Google, Pinterest, Instagram. Com o olhar vou a todas elas, qualquer uma delas, apenas não estou lá realmente. Protótipo moderno da ocupação do espaço pelo ser humano, e que poderia por isso ser uma imagem de um lugar habitável, acolhedor, a grande cidade é hoje também um protótipo do Caos. Um caos produzido pelo enxame de ordens e desordens da modernidade. Montanhas de cimento, rios de lixo, mares de plástico.

Ainda assim, nos limites da cidade ou em seus vãos, em bolsões e áreas delimitadas, maiores ou menores, públicas e privadas, em graus variados de intencionalidade, a natureza reaparece, recolhida, permitida, como se fôssemos nós os anfitriões, ou mesmo ignorada. E nesses espaços, paisagens, jardins, interstícios, entre-lugares, articulamos com uma natureza mais ou menos imaginada, mais ou menos planejada, espécies variadas de acordo. Dos Campos Elíseos ao jardim do Éden, do Vale do Nilo ao Central Park, das cenas crepusculares de Claude Lorrain ao jardim planetário de Gilles Clément, a três vasilhas no peitoril, abrimos espaços para pequenos paraísos, espaços sagrados de união entre ser humano e natureza. Nesses espaços, por menores que sejam —e Bachelard também nos mostra que a miniatura pode ser maior que o universo—, parecem ainda conversar a cidade e o campo, o urbano e o selvagem, a arquitetura e o clima, espécies de integração e diálogo possível entre uma forma cultural, construída, e a surpresa de um broto, uma fonte, um caminho, uma promessa de vida e de continuidade.

Domar (mesmo aparentemente) a natureza em um jardim, uma paisagem, é também construir uma imagem de harmonia com o Caos, uma imagem de Cosmos. Do ponto de vista humano, vale a analogia entre os devires da natureza e do inconsciente, com suas relativas autonomias, e, diante de ambos, a vida que tentamos organizar, plane-

jar, colocar nos trilhos. A lida com o inconsciente requer descidas ao subsolo, aprender a enxergar onde há pouca luz, procurar referências e apoios em territórios turvos. Do mesmo modo, o jardineiro precisa cavocar a terra, remanejar emaranhados e raízes antigas, realocar ou contornar as pedras, preparar o solo. A natureza supostamente bruta, a suposta violência das enchentes, as ervas daninhas, de algum modo, estão na terra, tanto quanto estão em nós.

Como no conto de Borges (1974, p. 771), “El tiempo es la sustancia de que estoy hecho. El tiempo es un río que me arrebatá, pero yo soy el río; es un tigre que me destroza, pero yo soy el tigre; es un fuego que me consume, pero yo soy el fuego”, pensamos a natureza que nos sustenta e nos destrói, mas também somos a natureza; a paisagem que nos convida e nos escapa, mas somos a paisagem.

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LANDSCAPE AND PEOPLE: RETHINKING OUR RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE FUTURE

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1. INTRODUCTION

The first thesis I would like to argue in this chapter is that, in addition to its aesthetic meaning, the notion of landscape is endowed with an ethical and political value, capable of shedding light on the socio-economic, political, and cultural dynamics that transform the places where we live. In this sense, landscape turns into an interpretative key capable of fostering critical awareness of the ways of living, as well as guidelines for territorial planning.

Secondly, I would like to highlight why the ethical-political meaning of landscape has a good chance of being fruitful for a rethinking of democratic political practice. A review of the latter in the light of the combination of responsibility and participation offers innovative perspectives and strategies to address the problem of contemporary deterritorialization and achieve a more balanced, sustainable and just development.

These aims will be achieved through a philosophical reflection on individual and collective freedom, and on its active and transformative commitment towards reality. I plan to focus on the two-faced Janus of human freedom, being at the same time oriented to the past and to the future: to the past, to identify the reasons for the current crisis; to the future, to imagine alternative scenarios of territorial development, and design effective, far-sighted interventions that respect the complexity of the dynamics in place.

However, if our future commitment to landscape will be limited to being – as it has predominantly been up to now – mainly a specialist issue that concerns only experts and professionals, I doubt that it will be possible to restore a more meaningful way of creating and transforming landscapes and territories and revive them socially. If – as I propose – landscape is relevant for the vitality of democratic coexistence, our commitment to landscape must become, in a broad sense, a cultural, civic, and political question, that is, it must be rooted in a process that foresees the *participation* of each person and involves individual and collective *responsibility* (Gambino, 2000, p. 125). If it is true that there is no landscape without a project, it is equally true that the task of land-

scape design is not a private affair of architects, landscape experts, and institutional operators. To become effective, this alternative project has to involve experts, citizens, and stakeholders equally (Turri, 1998, p. 186-191; De Rossi *et al.*, 1999, p. 104-105).

It is certainly important to have a good territorial and landscape legislation (Settis, 2010), but this is not enough to assure its enforcement and the efficacy of its results in terms of landscape protection, enhancement, and management (Ministero per i Beni e le Attività Culturali, 2000). What must be done to restore life to those landscapes and societies that have become inhospitable is to contribute to the reconstruction of society, through the combination of “top-down” and “bottom-up” perspectives.

2. EXPERIENCE AS A STIMULUS FOR PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTION

2.1. THE EXPERIENCE OF LANDSCAPE AND CURRENT TRANSFORMATIONS

Instead of focussing on landscape as an epistemic object mainly related to the domain of aesthetics, I choose the different perspective of considering it as a *lived experience*. In this sense, landscape is intrinsically *ambivalent*, because the awareness of landscape’s rich historical texture of signs (natural, human or the result of the interaction between nature and culture), as well as of its admirable dynamics, are closely intertwined with its intrinsic vulnerability, related to the fact that any landscape or territorial intervention has a direct impact on the above-mentioned features and dynamics. The ambivalence is also amplified by the social, political, and cultural trends intertwined with economic development and with the more recent appearance of globalisation. Among the critical aspects related to landscape, we can cite, for example, the standardisation originally affecting border areas between city and countryside, but which now concerns the entire territory, accompanied by concomitant effects like urban sprawl, the deterioration of landscape maintenance, the increase of hydro-geological instability and risks, the inefficiency in the use of natural resources etc. (Tuan, 1974; De Rossi *et al.*, 1999). The repercussion, also in emotional terms, of these tendencies on those who experience the landscape often produces disorientation, discomfort, and disturbance, due to the fact that a common way of understanding and perceiving landscape seems to have disappeared (De Rossi *et al.*, 1999, p. 171; Menatti and Casado, 2016; Menatti, 2017; Menatti *et al.*, 2022).

2.2. PERCEPTION AND FREEDOM

By underlying that landscape is the result of human interaction with nature (i.e. the intersection of nature and culture) and that the meaning and shape given to landscape relies on human freedom (to the extent that the latter measures itself against the world and makes use of the world in order to survive and ensure its home) has a twofold hermeneutical advantage: first, it reaffirms the centrality of human responsibility in both individual and collective terms, no matter how fateful and epochal the macro-challenges related to landscape might appear; second, it is the indispensable premise of an enquiry into the meaning and limits of the human action in the world. Moreover, it is only on such basis as the *effectiveness* of human freedom that the discomfort generated by the above-mentioned present-day “ugly” landscapes can turn into a critical-reflective tool. The “ugliness” of a certain landscape, as well as the related emotional disturbance, seem in fact not only to admit that the portion of territory perceived *could* have been different from how it actually is (for instance, it could have been planned, inhabited or built differently), but somehow also *demand*s that this should be the case. As we will clarify shortly, this does not mean that what *ought to be* can be deduced from a *perceived being*, as if it were already naturally contained or given in the latter. However, my endeavour is also to steer clear of any value-free or value-neutral interpretation of perception, which in the case of the human being expresses a practical and symbolic relationship with reality, a relationship that is enacted within the normative space of freedom (Jonas, 1966, p. 157-182; Turri, 1998, p. 16, 35, 42; Raffestin, 2005). This means that its situated, contextualized, and temporal character turns the perceptual relationship into a complex experience, at the same time theoretical and practical, which unifies the poles of being and becoming, conservation and innovation, identity and otherness, freedom and responsibility. The dynamic, relational, and intersubjective character of this experience is one with the fact that freedom is not enacted in a neutral and uniform *space*, but rather in specific *places* permeated by individual and collective biographies, symbolic meanings and values, differences and propensities (Danowski and Viveiros de Castro, 2016). In a certain way, every individual act of freedom can therefore be interpreted as a response to a *call* coming from a specific context. As will be shown in more detail, this dynamic has to do with the so-called *landscape values*.

2.3. LANDSCAPE AND THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSTITUTION

Let us return to the question concerning the future of local landscapes. This topic expresses a certain hope or desire oriented in an essentially ethical sense: the hope or desire to design and implement courses of action that will reverse the above-mentioned trend towards the impoverishment of landscapes. According to the Italian philosopher Rosario Assunto, at the origin of this loss of landscape value was the turning point of modernity and its refusal of the “idea of infinity” (Assunto, 2005, p. 142). Moreover, modernity promoted a civilization of well-being and *comfort* that has lost any aptitude for the contemplation of landscape (Assunto, 2005, p. 238-239, 360-361; Bodei, 2008). Such a clear-cut judgment on Assunto’s part, while on the one hand is certainly useful to the purpose of historical-critical analysis, on the other sounds like a straw man fallacy: Assunto rejects modernity on the basis of a monolithic, simplified, and distorted perspective, which is incapable of recognising both modernity’s legitimacy and its relevance to understand landscape. Instead of rejecting modernity altogether, I choose the different path of clarifying the question regarding landscape by means of a *critical appraisal* of modernity.

Anyway, Assunto provides also an interesting and innovative reflection on the anthropological centrality of the *aesthetic experience of landscape*, which I endeavour to develop in this paper: the clarification “of the aesthetic experience of landscape as an experience in the fulfilment of which we live in what we enjoy aesthetically [...] also authorizes us to consider the aesthetic relationship that we entertain with nature in the experience of landscape as the fundamental, paradigmatic modality of the man-nature relationship insofar as it is always an aesthetic relationship, and is never a purely aesthetic relationship” (Assunto, 2005, p. 165). Shortly afterwards he reiterates that “any aesthetic relationship we have with nature is never merely aesthetic, but is the aesthetic aspect of a more complex, total relationship” (Assunto, 2005, p. 169). The experience of landscape thus allows us to clarify the unitary dynamic that constitutes the human being as a relational structure with nature and the world. Moreover, the same experience evidences the fundamental critical-reflective and self-reflective character of the human being. Finally, the aesthetic experience of landscape manifests the “implication and solidarity of all the categories of thought, their active participation in the constitution of the aesthetic experience and in its self-mediation, as both a lived and reflective judgment” (Assunto, 2005,

p. 320). As a result, the experience of landscape can be considered a unifying anthropological frame.

Assunto also deduces some corollaries of particular interest to the present discussion. For instance, he affirms that “the aesthetic category, applied to the form of a landscape, expresses, at this point, a moral judgement on the kind of life that men lead in it” (Assunto, 2005, p. 311). Since it evidences the unity of nature and culture, landscape is characterised by an intrinsic *duplicity*, due to the fact that “sometimes the feature of human production is accentuated, while on other occasions what gains importance is the interpenetration of man and his world with nature” (Assunto, 2005, p. 259). Both cases emphasise the central role played in nature by human freedom, as Joachim Ritter had previously theorised (Assunto, 2005, p. 206-266; Ritter 1974). Landscape thus expresses the “form in which we live”, a form that exceeds the limits of mere individuality, is embodied in institutionalised (or collective) structures, and results in a “moral programme” (Assunto, 2005, p. 251). The experience of landscape exceeds the inflexible boundaries of theory in order to become praxis, of mere individuality in order to become a collective or communal effort, of the mere aesthetic domain in order to become an ethical and political issue. Although permeated with the predilection – typical of his times – for the primacy of aesthetics, the following lines in which Assunto proposes a definition of what it means to *contemplate actively* the landscape provide a very innovative perspective:

the specific contemplation of landscape [...] differs from the contemplation of other works of art, posing itself as an activity that intervenes in the very life of the object: a productive activity, in some way, of the object insofar as it is constituted for us as aestheticity; and thus satisfies the need for self-productivity that the present-day crisis of landscape, and the eclipse [...] of nature as an aesthetic object, has unduly displaced in the world of art [...]; and the true open artwork (or rather: *open form*) is nature, insofar as it constitutes itself as an aesthetic object in the landscape (Assunto, 2005, p. 358).

No matter how innovative, these reflections by Assunto need to be critically updated: first, it is necessary to expand the above-mentioned concept of “aesthetic object” by integrating it with other relevant dimensions of human life, like the economic, the social, the political, the ethical, the cultural etc.; second, it is necessary to change attitude towards modernity, no longer opposing it, but trying to *critically appraise* it. It is thanks to this hermeneutical improvement that Assunto’s prophetic intuitions can be employed to clarify the dynamics of contemporary landscapes.

2.4. TOWARDS A NEW LANDSCAPE PARADIGM

An interesting attempt in this sense is represented by the *European Landscape Convention* (Council of Europe, 2000). It was conceived in response to the expectations “of the more than 200.000 local and regional communities that compose the European Continent” that realized the relevance of the landscape issue for their own future, in terms of welfare, identity and development (Priore, 2006, p. 40). The *Convention* provided a “political answer to a social demand corresponding to the most immediate needs of the populations: landscape is in fact considered by them more and more a factor of primary importance for the quality of their daily life” (Priore, 2006, p. 40). The *Convention* has therefore adopted the following definition of landscape, which has the merit of highlighting its relational, as well as its socio-political relevance: “Landscape’ means an area, as perceived by people, whose character is the result of the action and interaction of natural and/or human factors” (Council of Europe, 2000, art. 1; see also the *Convention’s* Preamble). The European local communities demanded that political institutions dealt seriously with the decrease in the quality of local landscapes resulting from globalisation, which also affected negatively the overall *quality of life*.

In this perspective, the question of what is a landscape is therefore intertwined with the following issue: does the territory, in order to be *adequately* planned and managed – i.e. with due *care for* the quality of life of the populations, with democratic respect for the psycho-physical (and economic) health of its inhabitants, and with respect for its complexity –, require landscape regulation? Or, put the other way around: is landscape relevant to the political-managerial level? In this regard, is not the more objective notion of *territory* (in all its declinations: territorial planning, territorial management etc.), being already a geographic-political notion, enough for this purpose? Maybe, after all, it is sufficient to have (good) *territorial* management and planning norms. The abovementioned questions can be summarised in the following: in what sense is the notion of *landscape* broader than *territory* and in what sense is it necessary to tackle the current threats related to globalisation?

In the words of the Italian geographer Eugenio Turri, *landscape* constitutes a second level experience, characterised by a reflective and thus critical and philosophical nature, with respect to the ways in which human beings act individually and collectively in a *territory*: “the land-

scape reflects our deeds, and in the landscape we can find the measure of our living and operating in the *territory* [...]. In this sense, we assign landscape the function of fundamental visual referent for the purposes of territorial construction [...]. The landscape then stands as an interface between doing and seeing what we do, between looking-representing and acting, between acting and looking again” (Turri, 1998, p. 15-16). The role of protagonist gained by the notion of landscape thus corresponds to a profound rethinking of the policies of territorial management, which occurred in the last decades of the twentieth century.

The massive changes in urban and territorial scenarios called into question the effectiveness of the traditional political-territorial paradigm based on the notion of *government* and led to redesigning it in terms of *governance*. Despite the apparent lexical similarity, a deep difference runs between these concepts, as well as between the related political-managerial practices. “The concept of ‘governance’ – states the *White Paper on European Governance* – means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which powers are exercised at European level [or, one might add, generally at the international level; note added], particularly as regards openness, participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence” (Commission of the European Communities, 2001, p. 6; Ciaffi and Mela, 2006, p. 49-50). *Governance* therefore indicates the management of present-day problems based on effectiveness (as opposed to the inefficiency of exclusively “top-down” governmental practices) and carried out according to multi-scalar methods (i.e. with the involvement and participation of the plurality of territorial bodies, from the local to the international), which are respectful of the complexity of the processes and foresee the active participation of citizens. In some respects, the cultural revolution represented by *governance* highlights a paradox: on the one hand, the shift from *government* to *governance* is unavoidable and has been dictated by the complexity of wide-ranging epochal circumstances and the inefficiency of traditional management methods; on the other hand, the effectiveness of the new *governance* practices, as well as the equality of their results in the medium and long term, require the pre-emptive *awareness* and *active engagement* of a plurality of subjects ranging from politicians and stakeholders to ordinary citizens. The fact is that it cannot be taken for granted that this kind of awareness, conviction, and engagement already exists, or that participatory values and practices are *ipso facto* widespread among citizens.

This very cultural change affected also legislation. In the last few

decades, norms concerning territorial and landscape management have been urged to integrate the traditional constraint-based perspective (according to which certain territories and landscapes embody unique, exceptional, and excellent values – in aesthetic, historical, artistic, or cultural terms – which ought to be protected, defended, and preserved) with a perspective of a different kind and more sensitive to social and economic claims. The concept of *governance* has, in fact, made it possible to incorporate, at an institutional level, the unease expressed by local populations about the management of their landscapes (which in many cases are “ordinary”, not “exceptional”, and therefore easily subject to exploitation and degradation, as they are not sufficiently “unique” to fall under the constraints and protection of the law) and the apprehension of local communities for their own well-being, identity, and development. *Governance* thus embodied the attempt to combine aesthetic-artistic-historical-cultural needs with the economic-environmental question, orienting the latter towards innovative and unprecedented forms of “sustainable” and “local” development (Magnaghi, 2000).

As a result, the concept of *governance* provides a tool that can cope with the problematic effects of modernity on local territories and landscapes. The problem with modernity, whose most dazzling embodiment is the contemporary metropolis, is its being ruled mainly “by the laws of economic growth; strongly dissipative and entropic in character; without boundaries or limits to growth; unbalancing and highly hierarchical; homogenizing the territory it occupies; eco-catastrophic; devaluing the individual qualities of places; lacking in aesthetic sensitivity; reductive in the models of living” (Magnaghi, 1989, p. 115; Bevilacqua, 2008). However, the shift towards *governance* is not easy. Nor does it bear fruit in the short term. The model of territorial management established in the West since modernity and culminating with the current metropolisation, is in fact based on cultural premises and “construction rules” that, notwithstanding its highly questionable results, seem still to characterize most of the present-day territorial transformations at the local scale. Magnaghi himself summarizes these rules as follows:

* Liberation of the city from the constraints of place and size. * Predominance of economic functions (production, circulation, reproduction, and consumption) over the organization of space. * Dissolution of public space. * Utilisation of industrial technologies and standardized materials for the construction of cities and territories. * The territory of metropolitan growth is perceived as a commodity (Magnaghi, 2000, p. 20-25; Turri, 1998, p. 70 ff., 101-102, 108 ff.).

In this contribution particular attention will be paid to the dissolution of public space and the connected erosion of shared landscape values – values which are the result of an uninterrupted historical process – no matter if implicit and unconscious – of civic negotiation and public dialogue (Settis, 2010). In this regard, the following reflection by Eugenio Turri is of particular interest:

In our rural societies, as in primitive societies, which religiously feel the weight of natural constraints, the action of transforming nature, that is, the theatrical *acting*, is always rather exiguous, controlled and careful to respect the natural environment, also in order to take the greatest advantage of its exploitation; correspondingly, therefore, the “reflective” moment is reduced, the part of spectator assumed by the individual in the social context. In other words, if it is true that these societies act for the gods and the natural forces that are believed to be involved in the landscape, they do not come to take pleasure in their action, they do not come to feel the landscape as a spectacle (Turri, 1998, p. 56).

To what extent does this picture change after the advent of modernity and the transition to late modernity? In the light of these reflections by Turri, we can say that the current scenario evidences a deep difference from the previous era: the human, theatrical *acting* has embraced the reasons of functionalism and got rid of the natural and social conditioning altogether; on the other hand, however, the “reflective” and “self-reflective” moment does not seem to have increased. Or rather, the latter has been separated from production and restricted to the private dimension of escapism or the search for individual comfort and consolation. As pointed out by Hans Jonas, this is a typically modern dynamic, related to modernity’s “excess of power to ‘do’ and thus an excess of offers for doing” not counterbalanced by an adequate reflection on the *consequences* of action (Jonas, 1974, p. 181; Jonas, 1984). How to cope with this problem, then? By rejecting modernity altogether, as proposed by Assunto? It is likely that this dismissal ends up in a dead end. A more feasible and promising way is to consider modernity legitimate and the modern spirit as one of the possibilities related to the peculiar *ambivalence* of human freedom. In this sense, the critical analysis of modernity presented in the previous pages cannot be separated from the constructive effort to identify and develop its unexpressed “reflective” potential. To some extent, this is the duty still to be carried out: starting from the challenges, the cognitive possibilities, and the emancipatory character of modernity we must endeavour to clarify the meaning of the human being in light of the new image of his/her individual and collective action in the world. In this sense, Turri warns


that “there is no power and there is no culture until man does not place himself as a spectator of himself and of his action, which is a necessary condition for the control of the world and therefore of his own social reproduction” (Turri, 1998, p. 95). Questioning landscape turns thus out to be a culturally, anthropologically, and ethically oriented effort.

2.5. THE ETHICAL AND ANTHROPOLOGICAL RELEVANCE OF LANDSCAPE

In my attempt to focus on the ethical relevance of landscape, I claim that it must be characterized in a public ethical sense. The ethics of landscape is not a question of mere individual ethics. On the contrary, it deals with current challenges regarding the quality and dignity of *collective* life (Council of Europe, 2000, Preamble). Before dealing with the issue of landscape, it is important to clarify the meaning of the expression “public ethics”. In its most common sense, public ethics avoids dealing with controversial issues concerning values, opting instead for a study of the legal norms that regulate public life. Some scholars have warned of the possible shortcomings of such a public ethics paradigm (Da Re, 2001, p. 43). I share these concerns, especially if we are interested in finding an effective ethical-public paradigm for landscape management. In this sense, a “public ethics for landscape” cannot limit itself to providing an abstract, individual or deontological model, but must aim to address openly questions of *meaning* and *value*, bearing in mind that these are endowed with public and not just private or individual relevance. Second, it must endeavour to address the complex issues related to landscape management and recover the social and dialogical construction of meaning related to the diachronic aspect of social life. Third, it must engage in the recovery of the social and dialogical meaning of dwelling. It must – at least this is the thesis I will try to argue – aim at the theoretical and practical recovery of the *forms of rationality* and *participatory relationality* that are inscribed in what we are going to define as the *polarized and relational area of responsibility*.

I endeavour to clarify these expressions thanks to the following graph, which summarises the previous reflections regarding landscape. In Graph 1 the dynamic of construction, change, management, protection, and valorisation of landscapes is enacted and represented dialectically. The basic idea is that any change, modification, or intervention on landscape expresses a variety of possibilities, ranging from the extreme where the natural objective world prevails (left side of the graph), to the

opposite where the subject succeeds in dominating the natural object (right side of the graph). In the middle, there is the so-called *area of responsible landscape action*. The graph implicitly refers to the definition of landscape proposed by the *European Landscape Convention* (Council of Europe, 2000, art. 1/a).



GRAPH.1

The qualifying aspects of landscape interventions inspired by the objectivist tendency are the following: a) primacy of the object (nature etc.); b) objective landscape values; c) determinism. Whereas the qualifying aspects of the opposite subjectivist tendency are: a) primacy of the subject; b) landscape values as subjective constructs; c) conventionalism. Moreover, the realisation of territorial and landscape modifications inspired by both extremes evidences certain threats, which can be detailed as follows. On the side of objectivism: a) integralism (also in the environmental sense); b) inability or refusal to act; c) a spirit of preservation enforced by legal constraints; d) community-based organicism; e) the focus on exclusive identity. On the side of subjectivism: a) enhancement of technical interventions that are indifferent to the specificity of the place; b) unlimited faith in technology and technological solutions; c) creation of historical and cultural fractures and interruptions; d) conflict and antagonism as a means of social and cultural development, as well as an end in itself; e) unrestricted individualism (Pulcini, 2013, p. 19-80).

Instead, the intermediary position of *responsible landscape action* means that it consists of neither the exercise of unrestrained subjective freedom, nor the mortification of freedom through a totally heteronomous and objective claim. At the same time, the characterization of landscape action as *responsible* does not mean restraining it to the sole preventive analysis of its possible consequences on an individual or collective level. On the contrary, by building on the thinking of Hans Jonas (1984), Bernard Waldenfels (2004; 2007), Seyla Benhabib (1992) and Joan Tronto (2013) among others, and intersecting it with specific claims coming from the interdisciplinary area of landscape studies, it is

possible to reframe the concept of responsibility in the following terms: in addition to paying attention to the consequences of action, being responsible for the landscape also means attentiveness to the meaning of human agency as situated in a specific historical-cultural and existential-relational context permeated by traditions and values; this kind of responsibility entails also feeling committed to intergenerational dialogue about the value of those values (Turri, 1998, p. 157; Cosgrove, 1984).

After this first description of the so-called *area of responsible landscape action*, let us now try to take a closer look in order to understand its internal dynamics. The dichotomic scheme used in Graph 1 proves once again its hermeneutic effectiveness, since also internally the area of landscape responsible action evidences a dynamism of forces structured around opposing poles. This is true in two respects: first, landscape responsibility entails exercising the plexus of freedom and responsibility, pluralism and inclusion, as well as governance and re-territorialisation¹; second, landscape responsibility is a polarised area characterised by an incessant dynamic of opposing forces, tending towards either *ontological* (i.e. objectivist) or *constructivist* (i.e. subjectivist) claims². Ontological claims suggest the morphological primacy of specific places, the centrality of certain historical values etc., whereas the constructivist emphasises the social importance of ways of living and building, including the tendency towards social emancipation.

In fact, this scheme can be generalized beyond landscape action alone, since human agency *tout court* can be interpreted in the light of the same incessant dynamic and as a productive synthesis between mutually divergent tendencies. The “constructivist” tendency embodies the desire for action and relation, the fulfilment of freedom, the concrete and symbolic modification of the world through projects. On the contrary, the “ontological” tendency expresses an original and, so to speak, mostly receptive relationship with a context or an otherness that in some way calls upon individual *responsibility*, thus shaping it. It is a claim expressing sensitivity to the context, as well as to its stimuli and pressures. It is because of this original sensitivity that human beings can consequently interpret their own context of life as a set of features that demand a preliminary recognition on their part. The response to such demands entails the activation of the “constructivist” tendency, the effectiveness of which relies on its preliminarily and essential relationship with the “ontological” tendency³.

Specific landscape actions might provisionally enact one pole

1. “Territorialisation” can be defined as follows: “the co-evolutionary relationship between human society and natural environment (i.e. the way through which develops the relationship between human dwelling and nature)” (Magnaghi, 2005, p. 312).

2. Philosophical, epistemological, and psychological constructivism is the tendency to put ontological features into brackets in favor of epistemology and in order to carry out a reflection on the internal experience of the subject and its autonomy. See scholars like E. von Glasersfeld, H. von Foerster, L. Vygotskij, J. Bruner, U. Bronfenbrenner, and E. Morin among others.

or the opposite, but over a long historical-cultural period, when the stratification of actions takes place, it is possible to perceive the coexistence of both tendencies. That the opposing claims are not, however, naturally and spontaneously in harmony, since they can also arise independently of each other (sometimes even one *against* the other), is shown by the previously cited examples of present-day landscapes, which seem to have lost their identity and specificity and in which the harmony between the opposing components of landscape has disappeared. While both tendencies contribute to the construction of landscapes, they also behave as rival forces capable of inspiring landscape actions in two opposing directions. In the light of these reflections, the question – endowed with ethical relevance – concerning the *value* and *future destiny* of landscapes achieves the following intermediate result: the capability to build “good” landscapes entails becoming a *responsible interlocutor*, which means assuming the burden of “transcending all aestheticism, but also avoiding any kind of subjective psychologism; landscape ought not to be interpreted from the subjective perspective of an imaginary imposition – in both solipsistic and ‘cultural’ terms – of expectations and schemes, but from the different perspective of symbolic impersonality that allows to recognize the specific physiognomy of landscape, and thus develop the understanding of its various meanings” (Bonesio, 1997, p. 33). *Symbolism* – states Luisa Bonesio – is thus a human specificity conveying a certain connection with a *place* and its *spiritual characterisation*. This proves that nature is far from being reducible to its quantifiable objective aspect, because nature is endowed with deeper *ontological* meanings (Bonesio, 1997, p. 78-79, 102, 118-120).

However, in the light of the abovementioned polar scheme, a clarification has to be added: strictly speaking, the symbolic value expressing the physiognomy of a landscape is not a pure natural construct, but is already the result of a human act, which has established a previous relationship with nature and which, in *dialogue* with it, has co-constructed symbolic meanings and *values*. The “symbolic impersonality” allowing anyone to recognize landscape’s physiognomy or its specific *genius loci* (Norberg-Schulz, 1979) ought not to be understood as a *totally heteronomous* construct with respect to human freedom. That feature, however, can certainly serve as a useful critical and methodological indication in order to adequately grasp the otherness of landscape and the fact that, to some extent, it can claim to be respected as an objective *value*: in order to contemplate (in the active and pas-

3. The intermediate area where these two tendencies are dynamically at play and in equilibrium as the opposition of autonomy and belonging (or heteronomy) is the ambivalent and dialectic space of the “social being” (Pulcini, 2013, p. 210, 80).

sive sense, indicated by Assunto and Turri) landscape adequately, it is necessary to take one step backward with respect to both oneself and to landscape. Take a step back from *oneself*, since the recognition of the otherness of landscape demands that the subject is put into brackets (together with its own actions), and this is also in order to assess the real effect of his/her actions. The otherness of landscape means that, far from having created it, humans shaped landscape out of a pre-existing “material” (namely nature) with the help of their peers; it is also worth noting that this material was nothing inert and indifferent, but already characterised by “natural” forms and signs traced on it by past humanity. At the same time, it is also necessary to take a step back from *landscape* and regard it *as if* it was completely autonomous from human action, in order to be able to perceive more clearly its identity and the call for responsible re-appropriation. This happens (and must happen) with each generation: the meanings and symbols inscribed in reality by the previous generation are passed on to the next, which has to enquire into the meaning of this heritage, as well as into its characteristics, in order to sort out the possibilities to rewrite or overwrite these symbols and values. However problematic, the excesses produced by modernity testify and confirm, albeit in a paradoxical way, the open and ambivalent character of human freedom: in both its individual and collective expressions, the latter can in fact choose to disregard entirely pre-existing landscape values and carry out actions whose effects are patently homologating or decontextualized (Bonesio, 1997, p. 60-63; Turri, 2004, p. 212 ff., 232 ff.; Bonomi and Abruzzese, 2004). This is certainly possible, albeit one could doubt the *legitimacy* of this choice. Anyway, those who do not intend to accept the devastations of modernity will always have the possibility to dedicate themselves to a different cause, namely denounce the contemporary lack of human responsibility and fight for *good re-territorialising practices*, capable of inspiring *good governance policies* and fostering the “transition from participation to self-government” (Magnaghi, 2000, p. 96).

3. LANDSCAPE AS AN INDIVIDUAL AND SOCIAL PRACTICE OF RESPONSIBILITY

We have thus come to the central question: what strategies should be adopted to restore the dialogue between human beings and nature on which depends landscape? What design methods can re-establish the relationship between actors-spectators and “landscape as the reference

of their own identity” (Turri, 1998, p. 127)? A promising working hypothesis in this regard is the *participatory* interpretation of landscape responsibility.

The basic idea is to restore our being individually and collectively protagonists and builders of our *local* landscapes (where – states Turri – “one perceives the sense of being in the world, of being part of a society and of a human community”), without relinquishing our being at the same time actors in the “world theatre”: “Man must learn to cultivate both of these souls [...]. Indeed, he cannot live without the local, but at the same time he cannot exclude himself from the global. And if it is true that, as an actor on the world stage, he does not have many ways of making himself heard [...], he can certainly have a leading part on the local stage” (Turri, 1998, p. 136; Bonesio, 2007). Between the local and the global countless forms of collaboration take place. The global network offers local cultures a greater chance of visibility and even an opportunity for renewed vitality. Besides, the technological digitalisation of information allows the connection of distant or heterogeneous experiences and cultures. Finally, the sharing of information is often the first step towards the construction of networks and virtual communities of mutual help and exchange of best practices. The possibilities offered by globalisation must, however, be developed consciously, so that they can be translated into responsible practices and effective *governance*. These projects ought no longer to disregard – as usually happened in the past and as too often still happens today – the *effective participation* of local populations, on pain of the substantial ineffectiveness of such projects. If the management of landscape transformations will succeed in reactivating, through participation, the “common sense of landscape” (De Rossi *et al.*, 1999, p. 35-37) and the empowerment of those present-day *communities* existing mostly at an informal level which take care of their local landscape (Bonesio, 2007), then we will have beneficially taken advantage of the opportunities offered by the present time.

As regards *responsible participation*, Turri underlines two faces, the first *active* and the second *reflective* (or related to the spectator), which have already been mentioned. The geographer, however, is also aware of a risk: in the future “the role of the individual as an actor in the landscape is bound to become increasingly reduced”, compared to the fact that it seems instead “destined to grow functionally the new role of spectator who observes through the devices that put him in communication with the ecumenical space” (Turri, 1998, p. 137). It is there-

fore necessary to preserve the individual and the community's "acting role in the landscape" that – according to the *European Landscape Convention* – is considered essential for the vitality of cultures. Turri also states that the adjective "reflective" is not only endowed with a perceptive-dramaturgical relevance (one perceives a landscape representation as a spectator), but also possesses a more specifically cognitive and ethical one ("One looks at the landscape [...] to obtain useful knowledge that is necessary to guide action" [Turri, 1998, p. 28; Turri, 2004, p. 85]). In this sense, the term "reflective" expresses a specifically *philosophical* potential: the perception of landscape turns into an opportunity to reflect on landscape and question oneself (self-reflection), in both *critical* and *self-critical* terms (Lipman, 2003; Bleazby *et al.*, 2022). The need to reactivate, through political participation, this philosophical reflection in a way capable of fostering the appreciation of landscape arises also from a further issue, namely the need to tackle biased or short-sighted interests, which give rise to one-sided and irresponsible judgements as regards territorial and landscape management. Indeed, partisan interests "obnubilate every ability to look and appreciate, and in fact in a society like ours where only few individuals deal concretely with the landscape, the majority of citizens [...], are insensitive, indifferent to everything that happens around them, even if what is at stake is the landscape that is the setting for their daily life" (Turri, 1998, p. 46).

This is why the following question is so urgent: how can the sensitivity towards landscape be reactivated (Council of Europe, 2000, art. 6)? How can we ensure that the citizens re-appropriate landscape from an ethical-political point of view and perceive it as a value and a good that is both "their own" and "common"? How is it possible to mediate between the knowledge of experts and the one disseminated at a deeper cultural level (Ciaffi and Mela, 2006, p. 127-128, 150)? How can individual and collective interests be critically analysed, transparently discussed, and effectively combined? Much research shows that the answer to these questions relies on the reactivation of a regenerative place-based dynamic based on sociality, empowerment, and community care (Sclavi and Susskind, 2011; Tronto, 2013; Bleazby *et al.*, 2022). However, in order to steer clear of the threats of communitarian crystallization and integralism, such process must be supported by the critical awareness of the complexity of the variables at play. In this regard, the specific contribution of philosophy to the question of landscape consists in the ability to ensure not only that participation takes

place, but that a reflective, self-reflective, and hospitable environment is ensured among its participants. To participate in the landscape not only means – as Turri puts it – to act or act differently, but to become actors-spectators who are *aware* of their own deeds, of their consequences, and of the landscape values that appeal to human action. In a word, to become *responsible* actor-spectators.

Philosophy makes thus a *reflective* contribution to the consolidation of the codified types of action composing the participatory processes (communication, animation, consultation, and empowerment) (Sclavi, 2003; Ciaffi and Mela, 2006; Bobbio, 2007; Sclavi and Susskind, 2011). A further step can be envisioned. According to Magnaghi, the abovementioned actions of "re-territorialisation" cannot be separated from a broader cultural change regarding the "model of land use" (Magnaghi, 2000, p. 122). This means posing once again the question of the *place* and of its *identity*, whose claims should be collected in documents called "statutes of places". Like a "planning tool for local development", the statute is "a step further as regards the description of the identity of the place", since it "defines the structural elements, the modalities of treatment of territorial values (as potential resources), the rules of transformation and their effects on ordinary planning" (Magnaghi, 2000, p. 124). These statutes – underlines Magnaghi – rely on the fact that territorial values, history, norms, and rules are and must be the result of *negotiation*, *participation*, and *mutual recognition* at an individual and social level.

This takes us back to the issues of participation and of the specific role played by philosophical reflection: the reactivation of the *relationality* and *participatory rationality* at the core of landscape relies on the enhancement of *reflective participation* and *community responsibility* through the practice of philosophy. Both tasks can be achieved effectively, through communal activities focussed on the *reading and reflection on the landscape*. The source of inspiration for this proposal is once again the thinking of Turri, who understands the "reading of the landscape as an expression of the way in which human action fits into nature, as an appreciation of the qualities of this action [...], as a reading of a human event, as an interpretation of a narrated or represented story" (Turri, 1998, p. 165). In this sense, science and "expert" knowledge are of fundamental importance to reading the complexity of landscape effectively. Provided, however, that they dialogue with the non-expert knowledge disseminated at a deeper cultural and historical level.

In Turri's opinion, *reading the landscape* is an intrinsically complex action that requires specific educational measures. This complexity relies not only on the natural and cultural stratification of what we perceive (or on which we are going to intervene on the basis of specific projects of transformation of the world), but also on the fact that our perception of landscape is a highly selective process characterised by various stages. Thus, reading the landscape means learning to interpret it as a sign that has been diachronically imprinted on nature by the human community, and to consider it "as the result of a communicative relationship between man and the natural environment" and a set of "specific responses that man gives to the particular environment in which he operates" (Turri, 1998, p. 163). Reading the landscape is therefore composed of two steps: *identifying* its landmarks, components, and structural elements (in a word, its *values*), and *appreciating* the quality of the latter and their being open to the future (Turri, 1998, p. 164; Lynch, 1960). These two operations combined explain how through the perception of what landscape *is*, we understand its value or, in other words, *why and how it ought to be*.

The method used to carry out these "reading" tasks is not indifferent to the result. It should aim as much as possible to encourage the *active and reflective participation* of local stakeholders and citizens, whose role can be neither passive nor, strictly speaking, merely active, but indeed *reflective*. Through the mobilisation of personal interest, landscape self-education, and the exchange of experiences, the aim is that participants become aware of the fact that they are co-protagonists and co-constructors of the landscape in which they live, as well as of the fact that the landscape is directly connected to the quality of their life. In this regard, landscape functions as a synthetic notion, capable of expressing – from both an individual and collective point of view – the connection of identity, quality of life, economic and human development, and so on (Bonesio, 1997, p. 116-117, 121; Bonesio, 2007, p. 189-222). This takes us back to *responsibility*, an ethical value capable of inspiring the active engagement and conscious cooperative practice of landscape communities. The community practice of landscape responsibility means reflecting critically on the meaning and limits of human freedom and recognizing – to say it with Jonas – a certain pre-eminence of responsibility over planning (Jonas 1984, p. 122). Moreover, it also means enacting the connection between individual and communal responsibility. Both as an individual and as a community, citizens are responsible not only for their actions and the related consequences,

but also *before* the other, in the sense that future courses of action are assured. Being a responsible agent thus means caring for the other. Moreover, each person is responsible for the research enquiry of the community (epistemic responsibility), whose historical sedimentation is expressed through the so-called "landscape values". Finally, each one is responsible for the quality of the results of this communal ethical enquiry and for the practical effects of the decisions taken at community level. As one can imagine, these tasks involve fostering individual responsibility and, at the same time, require the assumption of responsibility at a communal or public level.

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ROSARIO ASSUNTO, THE PHILOSOPHER OF THE GARDEN

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AN AESTHETIC REALITY

For almost half a century, Rosario Assunto took in hand the task of thinking about beauty and the centrality of aesthetics, not only for philosophy but for human life in all its amplitude. His thought, often in confrontation with the dominant positions, has covered various themes and periods, always with the aim of understanding the multiple ways in which man's relationship with himself and the world occurs – hence his sharp criticism of certain features of modernity, in clear rupture with the primacy of beauty, like the urge to favour productivity or the “total urbanization” of cities and even the countryside. In fact, for Assunto, agriculture should always be developed alongside the rhythms of nature, what we now call traditional or low-impact agriculture, otherwise it is industry, pure utilitarianism.

Assunto's philosophy of the garden is both the apex of this “battle of ideas” and the work that earned him the greatest recognition, rescuing him from his isolation and, ultimately, attesting to his actuality. In his reflection, the garden is taken as the scales of the relationship between man and his natural base, opening the door to seeing the garden as a testing ground for the recovery of a man-nature relationship governed by wisdom and harmony. Such a harmonious relationship can only be recovered in a place where man perceives himself as part of Nature, a peer of other living creatures. By saying “recovered” it is immediately clear that it is assumed that there was once such a connection that was broken and that no longer exists (but that can, nonetheless, be restored). The garden is this place also because it is the “aesthetic epiphany” of the earth as a nurturing mother, the earth as mother, and nature as a totality to which man belongs because he is a living being.

So what “thing” is the garden?, questions Assunto – the garden taken in its essence, not in its particularity. What is at stake is not finding the definition or best description of this or that garden, but understanding what is common to *all*, what makes *any* garden a garden.

Aware of the impossibility to summarize in a few pages a whole body of work, I will merely point out some of the fundamental aspects of Assunto's considerations. First, the garden is an aesthetic reality – a

reality that we experience through a sensible observation that is also evaluative. Secondly, the garden is, if you will, a point of encounter and conversion of opposites (natural/built; idea/reality; feeling/reason; subject/object; life/death; light/shadow, etc.). In the garden these opposites come to complement each other, overcoming duality and opposition. And thirdly, in the garden, finitude and infinity are intertwined. The garden is an open finitude or *finitezza aperta*, a condition it shares with the landscape, not only because it is open to the sky above and it is not without limits – after all, having or not a fence around it, all gardens are delimited or enclosed spaces –, but because it opens up to the infinite, surpassing our finite existence. It is important to clarify, up front, that although the garden is space, it is not merely space. Indeed, it is an image of time. I will return to this point.

Another of the distinguishing features of Assunto's thought lies in taking the garden as the result of an action aimed at contemplation. The garden is not a representation but a reality. Although it may be said that all gardens recreate an image of nature (as we will see in greater detail), this re-creation is not an illustration, it is a world in itself. Also, by contemplation, it is not meant that it is a bi-dimensional image to be looked at. Even in the cases when gardens include areas with productive purposes (a vegetable plot or bed with aromatics), a garden is a place created for contemplation, meaning that it is a place where the beauty of nature is central to the aesthetic experience. Moreover, in this peculiar place, the contemplation of life and life contemplative come together, the subject of contemplation becoming the object of self-contemplation. Because the garden is made of life, it is the place where contemplation is lived, contemplating life itself at that very moment in which it is lived. In fact, not only is the garden made of life, but it is also a place for our life because we experience the garden living in it (the expression *living the garden* refers to a contemplation that takes time, that makes use of our whole body, it is not something we pass by and give a look to). Therefore, alongside the contemplation of the beauty of nature and of the human work, there is a parallel contemplation, as it were, that of our own life, which contemplates itself as contemplation of life: In the aesthetic delight, life itself is both object and subject of contemplation.

Here it becomes clear that it is out of the question to think of the garden as something inert or made entirely of "artificial" objects. Contrary to those for whom we can speak of gardens devoid of a single plant, Assunto, although conjecturing the aesthetic experience of such a

place, refuses to consider it as a garden, as for him they are something else entirely. In the garden, life itself rejoices in aesthetic delight. By stating that the garden is a place of life Assunto already points to an ontology:

"in making a garden, caring for a garden, governing a garden, it is an interpretation of nature that is sought and exposed: an interpretation of nature as the ontological horizon of the life of each man and of the history of men." (Assunto, 1991, p. 10.)

That is, the garden is taken as a place of Being. A place of being that is always inseparable from the idea of nature. What underlies all gardens and unifies them is the attempt to recover an image of what nature would be like "in the beginning", in a foundational moment:

"This is the ideal to which the need to make art in nature, of nature, with nature (this is what we say when we talk about gardening) aspires; the recovery, through our work, of an image of nature as intact but at the same time stripped of all savagery, domestic but not artificialized: the ideal, say, of a nature that is at the same time as we imagine it to have been at the beginning, before a history that can be interpreted as a growing estrangement from nature [...] and at the same time that which we hope to restore at the end of a history whose process has been converted from estrangement from nature and progressive detachment from nature (as is, in fact, celebrated by some and for the same reasons deprecated by some others, the utilitarian-technological epoch currently experienced by all humanity) into the restoration and reconquest of a nature for us and with us and in us reconciled in itself and for itself." (Assunto, 1981, p. 3)

The aesthetic contemplation of nature as garden transcends the eye and the intellect. It takes place, at first, in and through the physical presence of the body in the garden, because it is through the bodily senses that we experience the materiality of the objective elements of nature. The subjectivity that results from this is then integrated into thought. This does not mean that the reflective plane occupies a subordinate place, but rather that it incorporates sensitivity. In Assunto, contemplation is inseparable from being in, from the experience that takes place in presence, and which becomes part of the reflection itself.

The aesthetic experience of the garden is not, therefore, only a visual perception of images that we observe from the outside, but a sensory-driven and complex contemplation that places us inside the garden. And because the garden's aim is to be contemplated, it is a work of art (an object whose finality lies in itself and in its contemplation). Thus, the garden is a work of art in which nature is not a theme

about which the artist conceives their work (or for which they makes use of the pictorial representation of elements of nature to convey a certain impression), but is itself the matter, subject, object, purpose, and expression of itself. It is a reality that can only be contemplated in experience.

The garden is real (living) nature, which has, in itself, not only its end but also its own generation and growth. Again, it is not a representation of something but a reality. This implies that its “matter” is not a passive element that simply allows itself to be fixed in a certain form, but rather a constitutive element that becomes, to some extent, itself an agent. It is *real* nature that gives form to an *idea*. Assunto, when he considers the garden a work of art, takes it as a work where not only nature is itself creative, but gardening as an art that configures the garden having as its model precisely the original force of the world.

TIME

We’ve briefly mentioned time. The garden cannot be thought of without engaging a proper reflection on time and the nature of our experience of it. Assunto’s thought proves enlightening also in this regard.

Heirs of the industrial city, our life is battled in the meaninglessness of time as consumption – or as Assunto calls it, “*temporaneità*” (temporariness): where time is experienced as a continuous annihilation of the present in face of the future, a permanent interruption of the flow of time. It is a forgotten, rectilinear time, without memory and without expectation. We only become aware of other forms of time, or that time is not just this fleeting moment that we can never fully embrace, when we look beyond the human world of our everyday life and see the life that lives outside. Here, along the ancient city, which is an image of time as history (with past, present, and future intertwined and bridging one another), the garden proves to be particularly fruitful. The imbrication of space and time – or the garden as *meta spatiality* – is of extraordinary importance, if we are not to be held hostage to the temporariness of the short term. But if it is true that we can observe the cyclical rhythm of nature in the interstices of concrete (as when, for example, we are dazzled by a dandelion that has blossomed in a crack in the tarmac), it is in the garden that we can best admire it in the city. Contemplative immersion in the garden allows us to experience qualitative temporality, in a rhythm that is indifferent to ours, but which vivifies us (that is also why the garden is the bridge between city and

landscape: a bridge between two orders of time).

In this regard, Rosario Assunto is acute: the time of the garden is an absolutely different time (reminding us that Plato, in the *Timaeus*, defined time as “the moving image of eternity”). The garden, he adds, is a place that excludes destructive time (that is, time of pure decay). Precariousness and ephemerality are external to it. Nevertheless, the garden *is* time, it is a particular relationship between a space with certain characteristics and a corresponding characteristic time: a circular time. The circularity of the seasons that we witness in the garden reveals a time that is not mere caducity, but renewal and infinity. A time that renews itself and lasts. That is why there is no destructive time, the ephemerality of plants is a passage to a new beginning, more life. Thus, it is not death but renewal, and continuity.

The circular temporality of vegetation is the easiest to contemplate in the garden. It is the negation of irreversibility, the guarantee of the future, and a glimpse of the infinite (which we perceive, above all, when the garden combines various species of deciduous plants, with periods of distinct flowering, and perennials, whose constancy resists permanent renewal).

Then there is the animal, bringing us face to face with the image of life and presence that only animals can offer us. In the contemplation of the animal, the finite in us contemplates its infinite foundation and rejoices. The animals that are most visible (and audible) in the garden (and outside the garden, becoming a bridge between two realms), are birds. They are the ones who, in the city, best give us a sense of temporality as an absolute movement. Assunto elects the animal as the image of pure movement, for they are never long still and we can never anticipate what they will do next, we can study animals, but their movements always illude and surprise us.

As for the mineral kingdom, the garden is inseparable from water. Ponds, fountains, or small water elements have always been present in them. Water contributes to the understanding that although the space of the garden is finite, its time is not. In its flow and in its stillness, water makes the space of the garden overflow and multiply itself. When not in motion, but still, it becomes a mirror, reflecting the garden, creating both depth and a link to the sky. In their turn, rocks (whether naturally present in the garden or sculpted, or even used in structures) are the image of the perennial absolute, the long, geological time that was before and will remain after our time. Time, finally, as absolute presence (*presenza assoluta*), contrasts the absolute impermanence of the temporal city.

SPACE

In the garden the space is singular. All gardens are limited space, scale is of utmost importance: intuitively, beyond a certain dimension we either call it “park”, or use the plural, “gardens”. Perhaps due to its conciseness, the care given to detail, but surely in great measure due to the intertwining of the three images of time described above, the garden makes time spatial (it is, in Assunto’s words, a “spatialization” of time).

If the garden is a peculiar experience of time – a spatial image of time –, it is not only time that helps to shape space, but the space also makes room for time. Space and time come together both in idea and in presence. Time is present in the garden. A presence that is only perceivable through space, through its spatial concreteness created by volumes, shapes, and colours, but not only. In fact, light and shadow – in their juxtaposition, alternation, combination, or, simply put, in their interplay – are paramount in the creation of space. Because the garden is a real place and not a representation of space, it is in its materiality that we experience it (and in it, time). The way how trees are aligned along a wall or planted to create a patch; how they are surrounded or alternated by bushes and flowerbeds of specific density and colours, how stones are placed, and the space that is given to water (and the space that water helps to create), in short: the way how the garden is implanted, made real, the gardening choices, all contributes to making time spatial and thus to our experience of both time and space.

Conversely, the endless expansion of the conurbation engulfs space, so to speak, spreading or covering all in its way in a manner that annihilates time, but that also annihilates space itself (because, in this process, it erases differences of any kind), the conurbation or the megalopolis is space without time.

CONTEMPLATION

And that is why the garden is such a prominent place for contemplation.

In fact, Assunto’s philosophy of the garden constitutes an antidote to alienation both by temporariness (or the time of the megalopolis and the *homo Faber*) and by the standardization or uniformity of space. His reflection on the ways of experiencing the garden shows us that it is in contemplation that we can find a way of situating ourselves in the world, that the anguish of our own finitude is appeased before the

infinite of nature. Contemplation reveals itself to be the way of not succumbing before the massification of accidental temporality, opening the door to seeing oneself as part of the not-only-human world.

When we contemplate the garden, it requests our full attention in the “here” (in *this* place and in *this* moment), we are immersed in its spatial-temporal dimension. But the spatial experience of the garden goes beyond its limits. In fact, the experience of the garden proves important for our experience of the city and even further, to our experience of the landscape. Because the garden is this unique articulation of space and time, when we contemplate the garden, we are imbued with a heightened awareness of the place where we are, which endures after we leave the garden. We then perceive more acutely the hardness of the pavement, for instance, or the distress provoked by billboards, maintenance, or technical devices placed with no regard for pedestrians let alone for beauty, we notice more rapidly and are offended by the trash left behind on benches, bus stops, sidewalks, which is swept by the wind to the nearest tree or bush.

So, the contemplation of the garden makes us more aware of the garden itself and also of the city. It also makes us more aware of what we dislike or would like to improve in the city – though we should perhaps speak here not of the city but of the urban realm, because more and more cities are cities-no-more, stretched beyond the idea of the city into an amalgam of an undefined mesh of dense urban types. The way our body moves about in the garden, on the mountain, or on the high street and crowded areas differs immensely. The density of the urban mesh, with its skyscrapers and narrow streets, can be felt as overwhelming and aesthetically numbing, or, as Arnold Berleant puts it, “oppressive” and “sensory overloading” (Berleant, 1986).

Although the garden has a place both in the countryside and in the city, its role and our experience differ greatly when in an urban or rural setting. The examination of such differences in detail is beyond the scope of this essay. At this point, it will suffice to stress that the rural garden is a place of *condensed beauty*, collecting in its interior all the beauties of the landscape around it and maintaining a direct dialogue with it. Whereas in the city garden, because it contains elements similar to those of the landscape (say, vegetation of the same species), it connects the city with its outer (or distant) surroundings, creating a dialogue. This dialogue is coated with an extra layer of urgency, so to say, because the landscape is further away than in the rural garden, between the two are vast built areas constructed according to the abovementioned different order of things (temporariness).

CONCLUSION

The specificity and richness of the garden is the reason why Assunto battled against the *green space*, as not all spaces with turf or trees, or even flowers, are gardens. Lawns with or without flowers, “green” roundabouts, traffic separation meadows, and sidewalks with trees or bushes are all improvements to cities of concrete and asphalt only. However, they are something else. Heirs of a “hygienic” need to provide better air and reduce the negative effects of the industrial city on health, or, more recently, to provide space for physical exercise to city dwellers, these places are not built for contemplation, their *end* is not the contemplation of beauty (and of oneself). Certainly, the experience of walking on a sidewalk with trees is a pleasant one and more pleasant than on bare concrete pavements, and the opportunity to sit in the sun on a terrace in a city meadow offers a break to the busy urban mindset and can, possibly, even be a moment of bliss. Several landscaping interventions in cities improve our daily lives and can, perhaps, be seen as allies of gardens, but they cannot substitute them. For one must be able to contemplate life, temporality, and a glimpse of infinity. That is only possible in the garden.

And that is why, for Assunto, Gardens are to be cherished, defended whenever at risk, and new ones created. In experiencing them we can, indeed, recover a more harmonious relationship with the world and ourselves.

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HORTUS CONCLUSUS: FROM EDEN TO METAPOLIS

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FIG.1 *The Garden of Eden*, Thomas Cole, 1928.¹

1. https://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Thomas_Cole_The_Garden_of_Eden_detail_Amon_Carter_Museum.jpg

GENESIS

«In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth.» (Genesis, 2007, p.7)

The first of the five biblical books begin with this pragmatic verse. It expresses the first day of the world creation. The beginning was governed by the essential opposition between heaven and earth, but as the days go by, the story became more complex, establishing the Paradise scenario.

On the seventh day, the creation work was finished: between heaven and earth there was light, water, vegetation, animals and Adam and Eve. God has created a perfect place for creatures to inhabit the world: the Garden of Eden. Later, We already know what happened!

NO EDEN, GARDEN INVENTED

Some mortal remains, and other signs of human presence persist from the ancestral past in some territories, which were inhabited accord-

ing to the hunter-gather activity of small family groups. Human life on earth was errant and the need to ensure survival probably forced a behaviour very similar to other animals: finding or building a shelter. A space that could, above all, guarantee protection against the adversities of the surrounding territory and the attack of predators. The world was full of dangers and adversities, and it was far from that idyllic place described in the *Book of Genesis*, where food was at arm's length and shelter was the place itself, Eden.² In memory of this place we invented the garden.³

HORTUS CONCLUSUS

These two Latin words mean literally enclosed garden. It is a term that doubles up the original meaning because the etymology of the word 'garden' already has this notion of enclosure.⁴ Although seeming a paradox, in architecture the garden is closely related to the surrounding landscape, because it is, *the most condensed unit in which the historical, functional and spacial complexities of the landscape are made manifest.* (Steenbergen in Aben, de Wit, 2001, p.10).

In this context the *hortus conclusus* is a garden that *gathers* the landscape around it, but also, encloses its spaciality from the same landscape, although they are under the same sky. We could say that what is *gathered* is the nature – or the representation of a natural space⁵ – which is contained in a human space – or a *place* where man expresses his artificiality in the world through architecture. In this way, the enclosed garden can be the expression of our profound desire to return to Paradise. Knowing that we will never find the Garden of Eden, we humbly continue our journey, still linked to our ancestral cradle (nature) and to our hut (artificiality), because we cannot be human considering only one of the two parts.⁶

Rob Aben and Saskia de Wit identified the origin of the *hortus conclusus* in Medieval Europe, naming it as “sanctuary in an inhospitable world”, in a context dominated by the chaos of the barbarian invasions and where the monasteries represented the Mankind refuge.⁷

Generally, some of the essential elements of these enclosed gardens were:

- Open-air garden with plants, birds, with the sound of gushing water and the flowers and the fruits scent;
- Enclosed by walls, to separate the garden from other spaces of the surrounding architectural structure.

2. «Eden /'i:dn/ n (also the garden of Eden) (*Bible*) beautiful garden where Adam and Eve lived in great happiness before they disobeyed God: (*fig*) *Life is no garden of Eden* (ie is unpleasant) at the moment.» (Cowie, 1992, p.384)

3. «Our perception of any particular garden is filtered through our cultural memories and our personal experience of gardens. The cultural memory of garden visitors in the Abrahamic tradition goes back as far the Garden of Eden, which has been endlessly recreated in painting and in gardens.» (Campbell, 2019, p.4)

4. «The Old-English 'geard' means (woven) fence and thus enclosed space. The garden shows the landscape its containing walls, and in the garden the natural horizon is shut out and replaced by an internal horizon: the upper edge of its surround. Inside it, a *paradise* is depicted.» (Aben, de Wit, 2001, p.10)

5. This space can be vegetal or geological: «In the West, for example, gardens are usually centered on horticulture, whereas in the East, gardens are often centred on stones.» (Campbell, 2019, p.1)

6. «Like a suspension in time, the protected space of a garden allows our inner world and the outer world to coexist free from the pressure of everyday life. Gardens in this sense, offer us an *in-between* space which can be a meeting place between our innermost, dream-in-fused selves and the real physical world.» (Stuart-Smith, 2020, p.16)

7. «A whole range of gardens evolved there [in the monasteries]: orchards, cemeteries, herb gardens, flower gardens, vegetable gardens and the cloister garth. These gardens, set within the introverted ensemble, represented the landscape.» (Aben, de Wit, 2001, pp.22-23)

The architectural form is, therefore, decisive for the various aspects of space orientation, namely: cosmic, temporal and territorial.⁸

The authors of *The Enclosed Garden* propose three types of *hortus conclusus* in the Middle Ages:

- *Hortus ludi* (the garden of courtly life);
- *Hortus catalogic* (garden with various species contained in a orthogonal grid, in order to classify the plants);
- *Hortus contemplationis* (regular plan shape, with a center point and axial cross surrounded by a gallery).

«Together they give an overview of the sheer range of the *hortus conclusus*, but at the same time they lay the foundations for those components that would join forces in landscape-architectural designs from the Renaissance onwards, the three layers that determine the form of the garden: spatial form, plan configuration and appearance.» (Aben, de Wit, 2001, p.58)

THE SEED

Focusing on the *hortus conclusus* as a prototype, Aben and de Wit studied how this space, based on its essential elements (spatial form, plan configuration and appearance), evolved into European gardens until the 20th century. For this critical interpretation they observed: *The question is what happens to the introverted garden when it engages with the world outside, the landscape. What happens when the central point and the horizon meet?* (Aben, de Wit, 2001, p.62).

From the 16th century onwards, the immense natural and 'empty' territory would become the scene for the next stage of human development: the Modern Age.⁹ The structural forms built within the walls during the medieval centuries could now have new practical and theoretical developments. The territory was waiting for the seeds.

THE DNA IN THE SEED

With the Modern Age, the essential elements of the enclosed garden were able to evolve into new type-morphologies¹⁰ of gardens, guaranteeing, despite everything, some conceptual invariability, namely:

- Spacial form → (or symbology): the garden as place 'connected' with the idyllic Eden, in art and architecture is distinct and separate from real nature;
- Plan configuration → (or structure): the garden as a *place* where geometry organizes topologically different zones/spaces within a terri-

8. «*Cosmic orientation*, the primitive experience of being on this earth, is provided by the opposition between earth and heaven, high and low, vertical and horizontal, light and dark. The sun's path and that of the stars aid orientation and give a sense of direction. *Temporal orientation* is gained from the rhythm of the seasons, of day and night with their utterly different effect on our experience of space, and from the tangible presence of the past. *Territorial orientation* proceeds from the visible topography, the simultaneous presence from close to and far off, the references to the far distance from out of the enclosed space, and the dualities of center and periphery and inside and outside.» (Aben, de Wit, 2001, p.35)

9. «Modernization is a process that emerged well before the period we classify as modern. It results from the interaction of three socio-anthropological dynamics whose marks we find in different societies, but which, as they emerge in Europe during the Middle Ages, gave rise to modern societies: individualization, rationalization and social differentiation.» (Ascher, 2010, p.24) Translated from the Portuguese edition by the author. «A modernização é um processo que emergiu bastante antes do período que classificamos de moderno. Ele resulta da interação de três dinâmicas socioantropológicas cujas marcas encontramos em diversas sociedades, mas que, ao entrarem em ressonância na Europa no decurso da Idade Média deram origem às sociedades modernas: a individualização, a racionalização e a diferenciação social.»

10. Using the term "type-morphology" has the intention to stress the important structural interrelation between the concept of type and the form identity. See *Un enunciado lógico sobre la forma* in Arís, Carlos Martí, *Las variaciones de la identidad*, Fundación Arquia, 2014, pp. 23-27.

tory, to organize different places connected by significant paths;

• Appearance → (or function): the *hortus ludi*, the *hortus catalogic* and the *hortus contemplationis*, as functional themes for garden conception: recreational, practical, or aesthetic/contemplative purposes.

HORTUS CONCLUSUS: ABOUT EXISTENCE, SPACE AND ARCHITECTURE

Christian Norberg-Schulz recognized that man's interest in space has existential roots, unconditionally in the concrete space (*Raum*).¹¹

His perspective is based on Heidegger's philosophy, but also on the thoughts of Merleau-Ponty, Bachelard and Otto Bollnow. An important aspect for Norberg-Schulz is the space structure proposed by Bollnow through the "hodological space"¹², especially in the physical and topological conditions of the concrete space experienced from one point to another, and in clear opposition to the abstract space represented in maps or in plans. Under this concept Norberg-Schulz proposed the following existential space elements/identities:

- Center and place: "center of the world", "places of action", "place is a 'round' space";
- Direction and path: "vertical and horizontal meaning", "the path as a tool for experience", "orientation and structuring the world";
- Area and domain: "territory divided in areas by paths", "cardinal points axis as territory dividers";
- Elementary interaction: "topological relation", "geometry *versus* topology", "representation of the direction", "system of paths", "coherent action-pattern", "textural domain", "bifurcations or crossroads as centres and places".

In the *hortus conclusus* variations we can identify all these elements, especially the "centre and place" identities, for the spatial enclosure and to establish a strong relation between the garden and the zenith (or infinity), between the vertical and horizontal axis. The hodological space is also present through paths that structure "areas and domains" which have recreational, practical, or aesthetic/contemplative purposes, enhancing some levels of "elementary interaction". Space is functionally explored considering its symbolic representation as much as possible and, therefore, leads us to a kind of introspection under our existential condition.

11. «In a late essay «Art and Space," Heidegger in more detail discusses the twofold nature of spaciality. First he points out that the German word *Raum*, (space) originates from *räumen*, that is, the "freeing of places for human dwelling." "The place opens a domain, in gathering things which here belong together." "We must learn to understand that the things themselves are the places and that they do not simply belong to the place." Second the places are embodied by means of sculptural forms. These embodiments are the characters which constitute the place.» (Norberg-Schulz in Nesbitt, 1996, p.435) «The concrete space of the developed human being is to be taken seriously in the entire fullness of the significances experienced by him, for the singularity of its qualities, structures and orderings it is the form of expression, test and realization of the subject living in it, experiencing it and reacting to it.» (Dürckheim in Bollnow, 2011, p.21)

12. «Coming from the Greek word *hodos*, a path, it denotes the space opened up by paths, [...] the path opens up space, and the distances to be covered on these paths. [...] This hodological space is from the start contrasted with abstract mathematical space. In mathematical space the distance between two points is determined only by their respective coordinates; it is thus an objective quantity, independent of the structure of the space lying between them. Hodological space on the other hand means the change that in concretely lived and experience space is added to what we had already designated the accessibility of the respective spatial destinations.» (Bollnow, 2011, p.185)

ABOUT MODERN AGE AND THE [ENCLOSED] GARDEN SPACE

With the end of the Middle Ages the beginning of Modern Times is recognized. What François Ascher called the first phase of modernization led to [...] *the transformation of thought and the place of religion in society, the politics emancipation and the nation-state birth, the science development, the mercantilism progressive expansion, and after the industrial capitalism*.¹³ (Ascher, 2010, p.25)

This context necessarily had consequences to the space transformation, as it passed from the medieval Aristotelian finite element concept¹⁴ to acquiring the renaissance *Spatium* infinite potentiality, especially using linear or point-projection perspective in the architectural design process.

The perspective allows the observer to stand out in space: in a vertical position, because it is on a horizontal plane and can look in any direction around it, up to the horizon line.¹⁵ Infinity was transferred from the idyllic vertical axis to the earthly horizontal plane. This transition places Man at the action centre, establishing the human inventiveness within the context of universality.¹⁶

François Ascher, in his "urbanism new principles", divides the Modern Times into three periods, attributing to each a concept that characterizes the urban territory at different ages of expansion, till the present:

- "Alveolar": urban form developed between the end of the Middle Ages until the beginning of the First Industrial Revolution. The natural space near the cities was progressively transformed into human space, like city expansions (creating zones for recreational, economic and military activities, beyond agriculture areas);
- "Areolar": urban form developed between the First and Third Industrial Revolutions. The natural space no longer dominated the surround city territory, due to the significant increase in population and the communication routes also increased and diversified (as the railroad);
- "Reticular": urban form developed from the Third Industrial Revolution. In this case, the natural space is generally fragmented, integrated into the metropolitan system, although it is still possible to identify significant areas, but progressively smaller and in continuous transformation due to various pressures from the diffuse urban system.

The gardens also followed the human expansion into the immense territory that surrounded the medieval urban "enclaves". The enclosed garden evolution to other type-morphologies is characterized by au-

13. Translated from the Portuguese edition by the author. «(...) à transformação do pensamento e do lugar da religião na sociedade, à emancipação da política e ao nascimento do Estado-nação, ao desenvolvimento das ciências e à expansão progressiva do capitalismo mercantil e depois do industrial.»


14. «Space is not a system of relationships between things, but the boundary, completed from outside, of the volume taken up by a thing. Space is the hollow space bounded by a surrounding cover, and therefore it is necessarily exactly as large as the thing that takes it up. As a hollow space of this kind, space is necessary finite.» (Bollnow, 2011, pp. 30-31)

15. «In 1435, or thereabouts, Alberti advertised the perspective method described in his book *On Painting* as an easy, practical method. It was so, and proved immensely influential. A line, called "the prince of rays," commands everything in its path. It travels from the observer's eye, parallel to the ground. On it is hung the picture plane which it penetrates, perpendicular and in the middle. Alberti's method gives a perspective of a squared pavement behind the picture plane. The tiles are aligned with the picture plane and aligned, therefore, with the prince of rays. The point of its penetration is the point of convergence of the foreshortened images of the pavement lines coursing toward the horizon.» (Evans, 2000, pp.110-111)

16. «In its attitude toward art the Renaissance thus differed fundamentally from Middle Ages in that it removed the object from inner world of the artist's imagination and placed it firmly in the "outer world". This was accomplished by laying a distance between "subject" and "object" much as in artistic practice perspective placed a distance between the eye and the world of things – a distance which at the same time objectifies the "object" and personalizes the "subject".» (Panofsky, 2000, pp.50-51)

thors in significant documents: *The Enclosed Garden* (1999) and *Architecture and Landscape* (2001).

FIG.2 (left) *The Enclosed Garden* book cover.
FIG.3 (right) *Architecture and Landscape* book cover.



In the first one, by Rob Aben and Saskia de Wit, they try to demonstrate, through a method developed by Clemens Steenbergen, how the enclosed garden original model was transformed under three themes:

- “Landscape transformations” (as an autonomous type-element);
- “Urban transformations” (as a complementary element in the architectural/urban type-forms morphologies);
- “Current transformations” (as an experimental type-element in the urban fragmented landscape context). These current experiences can get from the past many formal and symbolic references.

The themes and its contents can be synthesized in a table:

TABLE1. Rob Aben and Saskia de Wit conceptual structure about how the enclosed garden original model was transformed into variants under three themes.

	“Landscape transformations”	“Urban transformations”	“Current transformations”
Model	as an autonomous type-element	as a complementary element in the architectural/urban type-forms morphologies	as an experimental type-element in the fragmented urban landscape context
Variants	<p>OPENING</p> <p>Gothic garden French castle garden Early Renaissance garden</p>	<p>IMPLANTATION</p> <p>Medieval town</p>	<p>Historical REF.</p> <p>→</p> <p>The condensed emptiness</p> <p>The captured landscape</p> <p>Artificial nature</p> <p>Hidden city</p> <p>...</p>
	<p>INTEGRATION</p> <p>Renaissance garden Baroque Garden Landscape Garden</p>	<p>EVOLUTION</p> <p>Renaissance town Neo-classical city Industrial city</p>	
	<p>DISSOLUTION</p> <p>Modern Movement garden</p>	<p>DISASSEMBLY</p> <p>Garden city Modernist city</p>	

Articulating François Ascher’s “socio-territorial morphologies” with these different themes of analysis from Aben and de Wit, the following summary table is constituted:

		HORTUS CONCLUSUS TRANSFORMATIONS		
		LANDSCAPE TRANSFORMATIONS	URBAN TRANSFORMATIONS	CURRENT TRANSFORMATIONS
SOCIO-TERRITORIAL MORPHOLOGIES	PRÉ-ALVEOLAR	<p>OPENING_Gothic garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Romanesque garden of the Santes Creus monastery *Garden of the Cathedral of Santa Eulalia <p>OPENING_French castle garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Château Amboise *Château de Bury <p>OPENING_Early Renaissance garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Villa Medici 	<p>IMPLANTATION_Medieval town:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *The centre of Leiden *The centre of Oxford 	
	ALVEOLAR	<p>INTEGRATION_Renaissance garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Villa Capponi *Villa Lante *Villa Giulia *Villa Pisani <p>INTEGRATION_Baroque garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Versailles <p>INTEGRATION_Landscape Garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Rousham House *Hawkstone Park 	<p>EVOLUTION_Renaissance town:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Cortile del Belvedere *Clusiustuin *Prinsenhof <p>EVOLUTION_Neo-classical city:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Hôtel de Saint-Agnan *Palais Royal *Place des Vosges *Place de la Concorde 	
	AREOLAR	<p>DISSOLUTION_Modern Movement garden:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Villa Savoye *Villa Noailles 	<p>EVOLUTION_Industrial city:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Birkenhed Park *Central Park <p>DISASSEMBLY_Garden city:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Hampstead Garden Suburb <p>DISASSEMBLY_Modernist city:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Viktoria-Luise-Platz *Amsterdam Bos 	
	RETICULAR			<p>The condensed emptiness:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Mariavall convent garden *Wilmkebreek Polder <p>The captured landscape:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *The garden of Säynätsalo Town Hall *Entreprenørskolen <p>Artificial nature:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Park André-Citroen *Square des Bouleaux *Garden of the Jewish Museum *Brion cemetery *Jardin des Bambous <p>Hidden city:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> *Foundation Louis-Jeantet garden *Freshwater pavilion *Espace Piranézien

NATURE: FOREVER OUR ANCESTRAL CRADLE

The enclosed garden DNA ensured a common identity in most of the cases presented here. The perpetuation of some principles from the iconic medieval garden, like symbolic, structural and functional aspects, allowed the creation of other type-morphologies of enclosed gardens while the territory was transformed, especially under the phenomenon of natural space urbanization. From those principles, it is important to highlight the introduction of some compositional elements that enhance the existential space constitution, especially from:

- Spaces with clear physical edges to create special “places of action”, to define “centers and places”;
- Paths (hodological space) between the “places of action”, structuring the garden’s territory;
- Definition of hierarchy between “places of action”, preserving what is essential for existential space: a topology.¹⁷

TABLE2. Articulation between the Ascher’s “socio-territorial morphologies” and the hortus conclusus transformation themes from Aben and de Wit, with the respective cases analysed by these authors in their book *The Enclosed Garden*.

17. «Topology does not deal with permanent distances, angles and areas, but is based upon relations such as proximity, separation, succession, closure (inside-outside) and continuity. The topological schemata are in the beginning tied to the things themselves. The most elementary order obtained is based on the proximity relation, but the ‘collection’ thus established, soon develops into more structured wholes, characterized by continuity and enclosure.» (Norberg-Schulz, 1971, p.18)

18. The mechanized transports, symbol of the modern age, allowed the human body to be not limited to some physical and biological restrictions, making possible to anyone to be in several places almost at the same time. This seems to be innocuous, but perhaps it led us to disregard the existential space. More recently, with the *cognitive revolution*, announced by Yuval Noah Harari, the effect of the space acceleration became more complex because it integrates the effect that André Barata calls “disconnection of the world”: «Perhaps the final stage of our disconnection lies in our dematerialization. Or in the migration of human life to virtual places and to the places of denial on Earth that science fiction is prodigal to imagine.» Translated from the Portuguese edition by the author. «Talvez a etapa derradeira do nosso desligamento esteja na nossa desmaterialização. Ou na migração da vida da humanidade para lugares virtuais e para os lugares de negação da Terra que a ficção científica é pródiga a imaginar.» (Barata, 2020, p.13)

19. «Architecture is essentially an art form of reconciliation and mediation, and in addition to settling us in space and place, landscapes and buildings articulate our experiences of duration and time between the polarities of past and future. In fact, along with the entire corpus of literature and the arts, landscapes and buildings constitute the most important externalization of human memory.» (Pallasmaa in Andersen, 2008, p.189)

20. See Pallasmaa, Juhani, *An Architecture of the Seven Senses* in AA.VV., *Questions of Perception: Phenomenology of Architecture*, Architecture and Urbanism, Special Issue, July 1994, pp.27-37.

21. In order to illustrate the second example, see location of nature parks in Europe © Association of German Nature Parks e. V. (using geodata from the European countries included in the project), https://www.naturparke.at/fileadmin/user_upload/

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The *hortus conclusus*, despite its medieval origin, is an example of Man’s ability to artifice. The cultural paradigm that this garden represents has endured in time and space, mainly because it is based on relations of proximity which introduce complexity and symbolic identity through continuity and closure.

Currently, the enclosed garden seminal identity continues to make sense in a territory that is now increasingly dominated by human presence. Perhaps the danger that once was in the nature obscurity, today has been transferred to the density of artificiality itself, or the space artificiality produced by industrial/hypertext societies, and materialized through the metapolitan system.

Today it is very easy and quick to cover thousands of kilometres in a single day. During the 20th century, especially with the use of mechanized transport, the advanced societies initiated and accelerated the “disconnection of the world”¹⁸.

The matter acceleration in space is a *sine qua non* condition for detaching the body from space, and, simultaneously, it distances us from what Juhanni Pallasmaa calls “temporal dimension of existential space”¹⁹.

When we disconnect the body from space, we distance ourselves from concrete space, creating generic abstractions about the world, because there are no “embodied experiences”²⁰. From this “disconnected body” perspective, we easily construct fictional narratives with superficial meanings, leading to radical positions in our relationship with the world. The “detachment from the world” allows the concept of “enclosed garden” to be as banally idealized on the microscale as on the macroscale. The first as a *terrarium*, the second as a natural park that we identify in any aerial view, or we envision it as a simple green spot defined by a green colour on a map.²¹

Now, that we already reached the zenith, with the vision from the top, perhaps we can better understand some of the harmful effects of our urban expansions over the natural territory. Expansions that do little to humanize the space, as they trace a generic territory under a *Spatium* matrix. In this context, the emerging relevance of the enclosed garden is understood, as it is one of the artificial components that enhances the definition of “levels of existential space”²² from the concrete space, or *Raum*.

Perhaps today the *hortus conclusus* allows us – more than ever – to ‘touch’ Paradise or, in a less idyllic view, it just sends us back to our ancestral cradle: the nature. Something that connects us with our oldest ancestors:

«Most of us fall asleep under the sky or under a tree or in its branches. We use animal skins for clothing: to keep us warm, to cover our nakedness and sometimes as a hammock. When we wear the animal skins we feel the animal’s power. We leap with the gazelle. We hunt with the bear. There is a bond between us and the animals. We hunt and eat the animals. They hunt and eat us. We are part of one another.» (Sagan, 1980, p.180)

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Naturparke/Bilder-PDFs-Naturparke-Oesterreich/1-VNOE/Internationale-Aktivitaeten/1.4.2%20Europes%20Nature-Regional-Landscape%20Parks/Karte-der-europaeischen-Naturparke-_c_VDN.jpg **22.** Norberg-Schulz, about the “levels of existential space”, referees that the lowest level of existential space is “the thing” and the highest level is “geography”. «The system of levels, the different schemata developed on each level, and the interaction of levels constitute the structure of existential space.» (Norberg-Schulz, 1971, p.27)

GARDEN, WALKS, AND PHILOSOPHICAL SCHOOL¹

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INTRODUCTION

The garden is what emerges between nature and the city. Nature is not controlled by a human, the city, on the contrary, is a living environment created by humans. If nature appears as a chaotic disorder or the order of God's creation incomprehensible to us, the city is a man-made environment for comfortable coexistence with others. True, there has never been a uniform approach to developing the city. We have the medieval old town with its winding streets, the rectangular classicist street network, the modernist functional grouping of districts, and the postmodern city of syncretic planning. The view of what is comfortable and convenient for a citizen changed along with the changing political, social, and aesthetic attitudes.

However, there is one element of the city that seems to be completely inconvenient and not handy for a citizen, because it takes away the spaces of the city by increasing the distance from one part of it to another and taking away precious time. No city can be imagined without this element. It is a garden that somehow contributes to the quality of the city by making it attractive to city residents and visitors. A city garden is a special place, which is often created by a landscape architect, the material of which is not bricks or concrete, but plants, i.e. the elements of nature, which somehow turn into the culture here. It is true, especially on the outskirts of the city, there can be a completely natural forest, which has a greater value the less it is "organized" by man.

The garden is an urban reservation in the city, the place where the citizen comes to take a breath, to separate and withdraw from his affairs imposed by the metropolis with its economic obligations. The garden, with its ecological aspects, challenges the economic approach. At the same time, it is an expansion of the narrow concept of *oikos*, home: the city, like our home, is not only intended to ensure the chain of consumption. A garden, designed or natural, seems to contradict the idea of the city. It encourages walking slowly instead of driving fast, chatting freely instead of discussing necessary matters, exercising "emptily" instead of performing limited operations, and even laziness instead of

1. The chapter is prepared according to presentation in the conference "FilArch symposium", 22–24 June, Budapest, Hungary.

hard work. Finally, it is a place to think, and not to solve everyday tasks that have arisen.

This chapter is about the connection between the garden and philosophy, which first arose in the ancient Greek world. As I walk in retrospect, I first discuss the Epicurean Gardens and the Stoa of Zeno. Later I examine Aristotelian Lyceum and the Peripatetics who walked along it, then the Platonic Academy and the idea of a university. Finally, I briefly discuss Umberto Eco's walks in the wood of fiction. As the topic obligates, I use the method of walking through the gardens of philosophy and history.

THE EPICUREAN GARDENS AND THE STOA OF ZENO

The Epicurean Gardens have an ambiguous name. One, this is a garden that used to be in the suburbs of Athens. Another, it is associated with one of the four main philosophical schools of antiquity alongside Plato's Academy, Zeno's Stoa, and Aristotle's Lyceum. Here I will discuss all of them as they relate to the garden and walks.

The Epicurean school is often associated with the ideas of hedonism in the exaltation of pleasure. This motif is inseparable from the garden, a semi-private place outside the city, where one can afford not only to free himself from social constraints but also to philosophize freely in search of general things for coexistence. It is noteworthy that the gardens were located near the Eridanus River. On the one hand, it watered the trees and other plants in the gardens, making this environment lush and herewith – shady, so pleasant for walks during discussions. On the other hand, the river is associated with constant change (remember Heraclitus), which corresponds to the chaotic nature and makes us question the universality of common philosophical principles.

However, when talking about pleasures, Epicurus did not pay attention to satisfying the needs of the body (the nature in us), even if this is a necessary condition for happiness. He was primarily concerned with the mental activity that is nurtured among friends. These share the discoveries of their wisdom while enjoying what they have under the shade of the plane trees while they live. After all, there is no death as long as we enjoy life while the river flows, and when death comes, we will be gone. So it's pointless to fear death, isn't it, my friend? A garden is an environment that maintains a delicate balance between short-term pleasures and long-term wisdom.

Stoa is also a common name. The Greek word "stoa" comes from

the Indo-European proto-language root “sta-”, related to the Lithuanian word “stovėti” (to stand). It meant “to stand, do or be firm” (Online Etymology Dictionary 2001–2022). Stoa is a portico, a porch, or more precisely, an antechamber, a covered colonnade in front of the entrance to the temple. It stood in every Greek city with temples in it. It is both an open and protected space. It is open by inviting passers-by to walk by discussing when philosophizing is heard on the street. It is protected from both natural (rain) and human (other-minded) attacks, as it offers the protection of the school (in this case, the stoa). In addition, as an antechamber, it appeals to the protection of the gods, although it is a school of philosophy, not religion. The stoas, of which there were four or five in Athens, served as public art galleries with mostly religious paintings or sculptures. So it was a public art space in the city. As such it was festive, but intended for any passers-by who wanted to stop by after leaving their daily business. It was no coincidence that the upcoming festivals were announced from this place.

When Zeno, the founder of the stoa school, arrived in Athens, Poecile Stoa was both a festive art gallery and a space filled with various people from the street. The Roman traveler and writer Pausanias describes the scenes painted here: Theseus fighting the Amazons, the Greeks fighting in Troy, the Athenians defeating the Spartans at Argo, and the victorious Battle of Marathon, in which a much larger Persian army was defeated. In addition to Theseus and Hercules, the goddess Athena was also depicted here. Not to mention, Spartan shields taken in a battle were exhibited here. In other words, it was a testimony to the glorious history of Athens under the patronage of its goddess, or a space of civic education where the heroic moments of the past of the most important Greek polis were stopped.

This space, rich in historical and mythological narratives, was crowded with beggars, sellers of fish and other goods, stunt performers, and just passers-by hiding from the heat of the day (Camp, 2001, 68-69). Hence, daily life also boiled here. Thus, the stoa was a space for both festive narrations and everyday meetings.

Zeno, himself a newcomer, chose this festively daily space for meetings with his debaters, thus giving its name to a new school of philosophy that was destined to become dominant in the Roman Empire. Zeno’s meeting with philosophy is noteworthy after this merchant from Cyprus arrived in Athens. When driven by curiosity, he stopped by a bookstore, he began to voraciously read *Memorabilia* of Socrates by Xenophon (2012). Looking up, he asked the salesman where to find

people like Socrates. The seller looked around and pointed his finger at Crates of Thebes, a student of Diogenes of Sinope, who was passing by. Zeno followed Crates, whose ideas he later developed in the stoic school he created. Presumably, Zeno chose Poecile Stoa for his teaching and discussion because of the possibility to meet both virtue and truth while walking with his students. Thus, the stoa was a safe and open place for all passers-by to develop their virtues. Later, the expanding school attracted a wide range of passers-by, from slaves (Epictetus) to emperors (Marcus Aurelius).

The mobility of Zeno and his school is illustrated by the fact that the Stoics, unlike Platonic Academicians, Aristotelian Peripatetics, or even Epicurus’s “guardians”, never had a fixed location for their school (Wycherley, 1978, 231–233). Stoics, taking an example from Zeno, taught here and there, for example, in Platonic Academy and Aristotelian Lyceum (Diogenes Laertius, 2021, 7.1.11), in gymnasiums (also for sports) or other spaces (also for music). Epictetus traveled to and from Rome to learn and find a place to teach, Seneca migrated from the public political space to the private, and Marcus Aurelius wrote to himself and others in tents defending the boundaries (limes) of the empire against barbarian attacks. Despite this mobility, Stoa became a solid foundation of moral (self)education, on which the palace of Christianity was built.

WALKS OF THE PERIPATETICS

Aristotle founded his school in Athens since the space between the walls of Plato’s Academy was too narrow for him. According to him, “Plato is a friend, but an even greater friend is truth.” This expression describes the relationship between the teacher and a student, while the latter is moving away from the former towards independent thinking. At the same time, this testifies to the different forms of truth, based on different assumptions. However, Aristotle rather circled Plato’s theory of ideas (remember his secondary substance or common notion, without which a separate individual cannot be understood) than away from his teacher. As for Aristotle’s lyceum, the walk has another – more obvious – meaning, when one was learning by walking after the teacher in the covered galleries (stoas?). Finally, the walk can be called an interdisciplinary study, which was corresponded to the multifunctional environment of the lyceum.

In addition to philosophical activities, military exercises, meetings

of the Athenian legislators, religious ceremonies and sports training took place in the Lyceum. This abundance of functions and the environment of the area determined each other. From ancient times it was a large open space with groves; it was bordered by the Ilissos and Eridanus rivers and Lykabettos hill. The Lyceum was connected to Athens by more than one road and detour. In addition, the area was carved by canals, which ensured the lushness of this Athenian suburban garden, as well as the shade necessary for fruitful philosophical discussions. The garden's name Lykeios, meaning wolfish, is a reference to the god Apollo, whose temple was nearby. Apollo was the god of sunlight, music, poetry, and health, spreading light to the earth and dispelling disease, predators, and humans (Greek colonists with their culture). Even before Aristotle, established his school here in 335 BC, the place was favored by various famous people, including the philosopher Socrates, the sophist Protagoras and the rhetorician Isocrates. In the dialogue *Lysis, or friendship*, Plato describes Socrates' walk from one Athenian garden (the Academy) to another (the Lyceum). On the way, he meets two friends with whom he discusses friendship (Plato, 2019, 203a–204a). Did academics and peripatetics walk the path of friendship toward truth? Before their campaigns, the Athenians deployed their army in this garden and trained both mind and body while learning. Wolf-ness here means several things. First, the garden is beyond the jurisdiction of the city, that is, with its freedom and autonomy, which later became a prerequisite for the creation of universities. Second, the Lyceum Garden is a marked area for mind and body training, an important ancient school, widely known for many centuries despite political upheavals. Finally, it represents a more sensitive seeing and hearing, which are further developed here in shaping the young people's worldview.

Aristotle rented several buildings in the garden and established his school, which became a place not only for sharing knowledge but also for collecting books and creating the works of the teacher with his assistants. After Aristotle's death (322 BC), his student Theophrastus, who took over the leadership of the school, corrected this mistake of "temporary" walking in the garden by buying the buildings, thus ensuring the continuation of the school, which was being revived over and over, for centuries until 529, when Emperor Justinian closed all philosophical schools in Athens, including the Lyceum. Some historians consider this date (and not 476, when the Western Roman Empire collapsed) to be the end of antiquity. The common name of the Peripatetic

school derives either from the Greek word *peripatos*, meaning a detour in the garden, or from Aristotle's habit of teaching while walking. One complements the other, and a philosophical thought is best walked out of the head and returned to it matured in discussions while walking. It is likely that Aristotle left Platonic Academy, not only because he was not offered to take over the leadership of the school, but also because he would have more space in a garden out of the city like the Lyceum. His striving to collect all kinds of knowledge and books is another aspect of his "walk" through the gardens of knowledge.

Theophrastus, who sought to systematize and consolidate Aristotle's heritage, embodies a paradox. On the one hand, the introduction of authority provides direction for academic movement, which is characterized by the method used in the school. On the other, any canons introduced in a school (scholasticism) limit the "walks" of its students in the academic garden. A similar contradiction arises later when skeptics become dominant in the school. On the one hand, skeptics need authority, such as Aristotle who criticizes Plato. On the other, skepticism threatens to sweep away any authority, including the founder of the school. By the way, on this wave of skepticism, the heliocentric system of the peripatetic Aristarchus of Samos arose, which refuted Aristotelian geocentrism.

ACADEMY GROVE

The Academy Grove is perhaps the most famous garden of all time, made famous by Plato's academy founded here. It is often considered the first university in the world. Plato founded this sedentary educational institution, which existed for several hundred years, after his travels to Italy, Cyrene, and Egypt. All voyages were full of various dangers posed by pirates, the stormy Mediterranean Sea, and the unpredictable rulers of distant lands. In the Greek colony of Syracuse, encouraged by his friend Dion, brother-in-law of the ruler, he intended to implement his idea of an ideal state. However, the path to this was the proper figure of the ruler-philosopher. However, the ruler of Syracuse, Dionysius I, who could not resist feasts and orgies, was not like a philosophizing ruler, although he had certain sophistic inclinations. This is evidenced by an episode crucial for the Academy. Plato taught the ruler not to be a slave of his pleasures and, on the contrary, to be content with his virtues, which free one even after becoming a slave. If we test this idea by selling Plato into slavery, Dionysius I reasoned, he would remain free and thus lose nothing. Fortunately, Plato was recognized

and bought from slavery by the representative of the Cyrene school, Anniceris, who paid twenty minae. The paradox is that the Cyrene school, whose origins go back to Socrates, is focused on pleasure while avoiding pain. Even so, Anniceris does not spare the large sum of money, twenty minae, that might have been spent on pleasures, to save Plato from being sent into slavery by another pleasure-seeker, Dionysius I. Yet the school of Cyrene, as the gardens of Epicurus later, emphasized that wisdom, virtue, and friendship provide the greatest pleasure, not feasting, orgy, or even avoiding pain at all costs. If it were, death would be the greatest pleasure. By the way, for Plato, a feast is a gathering (symposium) of friends sharing ideas (Plato, 2008).

After returning to Athens, Plato collects twenty minae from his wealthy family to repay the debt to Anniceris. After the latter refuses money in the name of friendship, Plato buys the Academus grove, a garden outside the city walls, with that money and establishes an academy here. It was also originally a place for informal gatherings of friends where philosophical ideas were developed. Only later did it become a place of attraction for young people seeking science, including Aristotle. Academus grove was so named because of the legendary hero of the Trojan War, Academus, who was allegedly buried there. By the way, there were graves with tombstones on both sides of the road from Athens to this country garden. There are several points to emphasize here. First, in choosing an academic path, we seek to be heroes of wisdom and virtue. Second, the academic environment (the garden outside the city) represents liberation from what is irrelevant and what is not true. Thirdly, the dead on both sides of our path toward the garden of the academy are full-fledged interlocutors when we communicate with Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle.

DISCUSSION: UMBERTO ECO'S WALKS

Now let us leave the ancient gardens and take a walk with Umberto Eco, who shares the experiences of his six walks in the woods of fiction. In *Six walks in the fictional woods*, Eco (1998) shows his as a passionate reader, experiences by reading different “pulp” including comic books, Agatha Christie’s detective novels, Agent 007 stories, etc. As he walks, Eco looks around in wonder, asking why we love fiction so much. First, he points out that a literary work with a fable provides the appearance of order to our chaotic life, which we seek to create as a meaningful story. Besides, fictional worlds allow us to bracket reality with

all the things we do not like about it. The plunge into fiction is an act of freedom, unfettered by any laws of reality as we overcome our limits. Moreover, when we read, we find ourselves in a world of indisputable truth, even though we know that the artistic text only pretends to tell the truth. Does Eco walk along the woods of imagination and fiction emerge as an alternative to philosophy, which also requires “exit” and “bypass”?

CONCLUSIONS

The article, which covers philosophical, communicative, and educational issues, examines four schools of ancient philosophy concerning the garden environment and walks in it. On the one hand, the garden indicates an exit both from the urban environment and from everyday activities and instrumental thinking. On the other, such a daily practice as a walk is associated with “bypassing”, i.e. metaphysical thinking. For example, when talking about pleasures, Epicurus paid attention not to the satisfaction of bodily needs, but to mental activities that are nurtured among friends. Stoa was a space for both festive stories and everyday meetings. Zeno chose Poecile Stoa for his teaching and discussions for the possibility of meeting both virtue and truth while walking with students. Thus, the stoa was a safe and open place for all passers-by to develop their virtues. As for Aristotle’s Lyceum, the walk has several layers. Here one learned by walking after the teacher in the covered galleries. In addition, the walk can be called an interdisciplinary study, which corresponded to the multifunctional environment of the lyceum. Finally, the walk is related to Aristotelian first substance and the scientific approach “from beneath”. Later, it evolved into empirical and field research. Plato’s garden outside the city – the academy – also indicates several things. First, in choosing an academic path, we seek to be heroes of wisdom and virtue. Second, the academic environment represents liberation by breaking away from what is irrelevant and untrue. Third, the dead on both sides of our path to the garden of the academy are full-fledged interlocutors in our communication with ancient philosophers.

Examining the gardens of Epicurus, Zeno’s Stoa, Aristotle’s Lyceum, and Plato’s Academy, we saw that the garden is inseparable from philosophy, from thinking, and sharing ideas with the spacious environment. Eco’s metaphor of walk includes both a wandering into a “not serious pulp” and a raise to the meta-text, i.e. talking about the text

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with its fictional elements while considering the relationship between fiction and reality. Ultimately, walks in search of truth require a garden space where discovery is inseparable from fiction.

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